



# Letting the Elephant Dance: Unlocking India's US\$500 Billion Export Opportunity

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# Contextual Understanding

- World trade is fragmenting under geopolitical conflict and tariff uncertainty.
- India has moved toward neo-mercantilism through higher tariffs, broader import protection, and QCO proliferation.
- At the same time, services exports and remittances have strengthened the rupee in real terms.
- The paper asks whether India is leaving a very large merchandise export opportunity unrealised.

# The Argument in Numbers

**US \$516B**

Estimated Missing Merchandise Exports in 2022

**24 Million**

Formal Jobs Linked to the Missing Export Gap

**Almost 50%**

of the missing merchandise export gap is attributable to India's near neighbourhood

**1 in 3**

of India's top exports are losing share in growing global markets

# Explaining the Stalled Growth in Goods Exports

## Process

A product-partner  
PPML gravity model

Corridor-level  
decomposition of  
underperformance

Sectoral mapping of  
where India is gaining  
and losing

## Diagnosis

Rising protection and  
QCO frictions

An appreciated real  
exchange rate

Leading to weak GVC  
integration, in turn  
hurting scale and  
diversification

## Policy Options

Tariff rationalisation and  
disciplined standards

Deeper FTAs and  
cheaper input access

An East Asia plus  
neighbourhood pivot

An export-enabling  
macro stance

# India's Export Story

Before 1991

## Closed economy

Import substitution, inward-looking, highly protected, weakly integrated

After 1991

## Opened up

Liberalisation, devaluation, lower barriers, and renewed global integration

2001-2012

## Export boom

Trade deepens, exports surge, and growth accelerates

2013 Onwards


## Momentum Softens

Stagnation sets in, protection rises, goods trade plateaus, and merchandise export gaps widen

Year	Exports(in billions) (Goods and Services)	Global share
1980	\$11.4	0.50%
2001	\$61.0	0.79%
2024	\$827.4	2.56%

Source: World Bank

# Exports were central to India's high-growth phase



Source: World Bank

# The Mandeng Framework: Where India Gains and Struggles

## Rising stars

India gains share where world demand is also rising

## Missed opportunities

World demand rises, but India loses share.

## Falling stars

India gains share, but global demand is weakening

## Retreats

India loses share in slow-growing segments

# The Product Story

## Rising stars

- HS 27: Mineral fuels and oils
- HS 30: Pharmaceuticals
- HS 39: Plastics and plastic articles
- HS 76: Aluminium and aluminium products
- HS 73: Articles of iron or steel
- HS 85: Electrical machinery and equipment

## Falling stars

- HS 84: Machinery and mechanical appliances
- HS 87: Vehicles and auto parts
- HS 29: Organic chemicals
- HS 72: Iron and steel
- HS 10: Cereals

## Missed opportunities opportunities


- HS 63: Other made-up textile articles
- HS 61: Knitted apparel and accessories
- HS 26: Ores, slag, and ash
- HS 42: Leather articles and travel goods
- HS 08: Edible fruit and nuts
- HS 71: Precious stones, metals, and jewellery
- HS 23: Food industry residues and animal feed

## Retreats

- HS 62: Non-knitted apparel and accessories
- HS 64: Footwear and related parts
- HS 41: Raw hides, skins, and leather
- HS 52: Cotton
- HS 03: Fish and aquatic invertebrates
- HS 09: Coffee, tea, maté, and spices
- HS 57: Carpets and textile floor coverings


Source: UNCTAD, Authors' calculations

# The Region Story



Source: UNCTAD, Authors' calculations

# India in Comparative Perspective



Source: World Bank

- Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia have leveraged the external sector far more effectively.
- China dispelled the myth that large economies cannot achieve trade-led growth.
- India's trade-to-GDP ratio remains relatively low
- Widening deficits often provoke alarm about freer trade, even though imports are vital to export competitiveness.

# India and China: A Comparison

	Export Value (current US\$)	Exports (% of GDP)
India	773 billion (2023)	21.4
China	773 billion (2005)	33.4

	GDP (current US\$)	Exports (% of GDP)
India	3.64 Trillion (2023)	21.4
China	3.60 Trillion (2007)	34.9

Source: World Bank

# Problem 1: Protection Undercuts Export Competitiveness

- Lerner's theorem suggests that import tariffs can act like export taxes by raising input costs and diverting resources into less efficient production.
- Imports are not just substitutes for domestic output. They provide inputs, capital goods, technology, and variety, making them central to export competitiveness.
- Easier access to imported inputs helps firms lower costs, upgrade quality, expand product range, and export more.
- The paper also notes a broad expansion of QCOs, reaching about 765 by 2024 and covering roughly 6% of HS-6 tariff lines adding another layer of trade friction
- This is a core point of the paper: policies meant to protect domestic production can also weaken exporting sectors.


MFN tariff rates, simple average (%)

Country	2002	2009	2018	2024
India	29.01%	14.03%	17.14%	16.19%
China	12.37%	9.86%	9.74%	7.50%
Vietnam	16.05%	10.39%	9.51%	9.49%

Source: WTO

# Problem 2: A Persistently Appreciated Real Exchange Rate

- India's REER has tended to appreciate over time, creating a persistent hurdle for merchandise exports.
- A stronger REER makes Indian goods costlier abroad and compresses margins, especially in thin-margin sectors.
- The effect is large: a 10% real depreciation is associated with about a 6% rise in real exports.
- But India cannot simply follow the East Asian playbook of maintaining a deliberately competitive exchange rate.
- Price stability, financial stability, and the structure of India's external account limit how far exchange-rate policy can carry the export strategy.



Source: FRED, Authors Calculations

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
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# The Rupee Relief Is Real, but Not Enough

- The recent fall in the REER is welcome, even if much of the media coverage has treated it negatively.
- But the correction does not erase the wider problem: India's recent REER remains above the level seen during the 2000s export boom.
- Exporters therefore still face a real-exchange-rate hurdle, even after the latest depreciation.
- That hurdle is reinforced by two structural headwinds: strong ICT services receipts and large, steady remittance inflows.
- Since India cannot rely on devaluation alone, goods exporters need competitiveness gains from deeper reforms.

India's REER Is Still More Appreciated Than in the Export Boom Years



# Problem 3 : GVC Integration as a Policy Outcome & Feedback Loop

- GVC integration is policy-shaped: input access, trade costs, standards, logistics, and FTAs determine whether firms enter production networks.
- Once inside, GVCs create a feedback loop through scale, technology diffusion, productivity, and diversification.
- India's backward GVC participation peaked around 2012, then fell to about 17% by 2020, well below Vietnam and Thailand.
- East Asia used export-oriented policy to embed firms in component trade; India did not do this deeply enough.
- The result is weaker scale-dependent manufacturing and less dynamic goods exports.

**25%**


India's foreign value-added share in gross exports at its peak in 2012

**17%**

India's backward GVC participation by 2020

# Most Exposed Sectors: Market Share Losses and Jobs

- Low-complexity goods lost market share.
- Apparel, footwear, leather, carpets, and jewellery cluster in the low-complexity, low-share zone.
- These are labour-intensive sectors where overvaluation and costly inputs bite hardest.
- More complex sectors perform better, but not enough to solve India's jobs problem.
- The lost jobs story is embedded in the lost export basket.



# The Model

- The paper uses pooled cross-section time-series HS-level trade data for 1995 to 2022, covering about 424,000 observations.
- The gravity model is estimated in the PPML form, which allows exports with zero values to be retained in the analysis.
- Data are drawn from the World Bank, UNCTAD, and the CEPII gravity database.
- Bilateral goods exports are estimated using GDP, distance, population, shared language, contiguity, colonial ties, tariffs, exchange-rate terms, and crisis controls.

$$\text{Exp}_{ijt} = \exp \{ \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log(\text{GDP}_{it}) + \beta_2 \log(\text{GDP}_{jt}) + \beta_3 \log(\text{Dist}_{ijt})$$

$$+ \beta_4 \log(\text{PopMag}_{ijt}) + \beta_5 \log(1 + \text{Tariff}_{ijt}) + \beta_6 \log(\text{Curr}_{ijt})$$

$$+ \beta_7 \text{comcol}_{ij} + \beta_8 \text{comlang\_off}_{ij} + \beta_9 \text{contig}_{ij} + \beta_{10} \text{CrisisDummy}_t + u_{ij,t} \} + e_{ij,t}$$

# The Findings

- The model then compares India's actual exports in 2022 with the level predicted by its fundamentals.
- This yields an estimated shortfall of about US\$516 billion in merchandise exports.
- The paper is not claiming India can add US\$516 billion overnight. It is arguing that the current policy mix is keeping goods exports far below what India's fundamentals would predict.
- **India has still not reached that level of export intensity, even by 2025**

**Actual Goods Exports**

**US \$437bn**

**Missing Exports**

**US \$516bn**

**Missing Imports**

**US \$301bn**


# The Corridors of Missed Opportunity

Worst Performing Corridors: Missing Exports, USD billion




# Not All Gloom: Corridors Outperforming the Baseline

Best Performing Corridors: Exports Above Predicted Level, USD billion



# India's Export Gap Is Also a Massive Jobs Loss

- In the 1999 to 2012 export boom, real exports grew **12.8%** a year while export-linked employment grew **4.1%** a year.
- That implies an export-employment elasticity of about **0.32**, closely in line with World Bank evidence of around 0.3.
- Using this elasticity, the paper estimates that closing the US\$516 billion export gap could support roughly **24 million jobs**.
- The missing exports are equivalent to about **68% of 2020** export-related employment.
- The export shortfall is concentrated in labour-intensive, thin-margin activities where stronger export performance would translate most directly into higher-wage, formal, export-linked jobs.



## The Policy Sequence is Pragmatic, Coherent and Actionable

1

### **Rationalise tariffs and discipline standards**

Publish a trade-policy white paper, rationalise tariffs, reduce tariff dispersion, and tie QCOs tightly to transparent safety and quality objectives rather than disguised protection.

2

### **Sign deeper market-access agreements**

Use FTAs, and potentially mega-regionals such as RCEP or CPTPP, to lock in openness, support standards recognition, anchor investment, and deepen GVC participation.

3

### **Build a more export-enabling macro environment**

Avoid entrenched REER overvaluation, reduce trade costs, and ensure predictable, duty-free access to imported inputs, especially for MSMEs in low-margin sectors

4

### **Execute a neighbourhood and East Asia pivot**

Normalise and deepen corridors with China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, while using the Netherlands and the UAE as hub platforms to extend market reach.

**The paper's policy stance is not anti-services. It is about complementarity: preserve the gains from services while restoring the competitiveness of goods. On that basis, India could more than double its goods exports.**

*"The elephant is ready to dance, but only if India lets it."*

**Thank You**