Decoding the Pashtuns in the Afghanistan–Pakistan Region

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Riya Sinha interviews Tilak Devasher, Member, National Security Advisory Board of India, and Consultant, Vivekananda International Foundation, on his fourth book, The Pashtuns: A Contested History, published by HarperCollins in 2022.

The Pashtuns are an ethnic group in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, spanning the Hindu Kush in the west to the Indus River in the east. Sometimes known as Pakhtuns, Pathans, or Afghans, the community has been in the news for decades. In the 1980s, the United States (US) and Saudi Arabia backed Pakistan’s support to the mujahideen to launch strikes against the Soviets in Afghanistan and in the Pashtun-dominated Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Two decades later, the same location was among the critical areas in the US “War on Terror”. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and the return of the Taliban, the Pashtun debate has intensified, especially with respect to the contested Pakistan–Afghanistan border — namely, the Durand Line.

In his book, Devasher brings the focus back to the Pashtuns, the people at the centre of these political developments. He highlights the fact that the community is strategically important for India, Pakistan, the region, and the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is important to “understand the key trends among the Pashtuns and their history” because a “superficial understanding and prescription has had and continues to have devastating consequences for the region” (p. xv). He highlights five attributes of the Pashtuns: first, their ability to show unity only when threatened by foreigners; second, the colonial depiction of their proclivity for conflict and warfare; third, the issue of Pashtunistan, or a state for the Pashtuns; fourth, their tribal identities vis-à-vis their Islamic identity; and finally, their dependence on foreign sources for revenue. Devasher argues that by understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Pashtuns, the international community can play a greater role to bring development and peace to this ethnic group.

Based on an analysis of the historical and contemporary literature on the Pashtuns, his decades of experience working for the Government of India, and his specialisation as a veteran analyst on Pakistan, the book amalgamates historiography with current developments. It delves into the lives of Pashtuns and their relations with neighbouring countries and external powers over the past two centuries. Devasher concludes by proposing a road ahead, focusing primarily on strengthening the tribal decision-making structures (such as the loya jirgas), socio-economic development and building ownership among Pashtuns of all shades.

Riya Sinha: In the book, you emphasise that an understanding of two important forces, “Pashtun nationalism and Pashtun extremism,” and their potential combination is critical for peace and security in the region (p. xv). In addition to this, there is also an element of Islamic conservatism. How have these contradictions affected the region?

Tilak Devasher: The common thread linking Pashtun nationalism, extremism, and conservatism on both sides of the Durand Line is Pakistan and its insecurity. An Islamic identity was the catalyst for Pakistan’s creation. Thus, recognising any other identity such as Pashtun nationalism was, and continues to be seen, as an existential threat to its existence.

To weaken Pashtun nationalism, Pakistan exploited Islam and later pan-Islamism, since the late 1970s, by leveraging the conservatism of the deeply religious Pashtuns for use as cannon fodder to further its own security and foreign policy goals. For example, it supported only Islamist parties among the mujahideen. Such a policy required the subversion of the tribal structure, a process that began in the early 1970s and gathered momentum after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the process, Pashtun tribalism and conservatism that had provided stability was rent asunder and was replaced by an extremist structure that has bred terrorism and violence.

Pakistan’s support first to the mujahideen and then to the Taliban in Afghanistan largely solved the problem of Pashtun sub-nationalism within Pakistan. However, what Pakistan did not factor in was that while the nationalist threat diminished, the birth and growing strength of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) became a serious problem. Pashtun Islamism, especially after the rise of the Taliban, has become a formidable force and has the potential to lead to a major blowback in Pakistan. The real danger to Pakistan, of course, would be if the TTP were to take on the nationalist mantle. Early signs of this are now visible in their statements.

As a result, the region has been deeply affected because extremism has been strengthened, which has become a threat not only to Pashtun society but to Pakistan itself and the region. Insecurity and instability at this crossroads would radiate insecurity in the whole region, lead to a surge of refugees, an increase in drug trafficking, and provide space for global terrorists to incubate in ungoverned spaces.

RS: The status of women in Afghanistan, particularly their right to education, has been a contentious issue under the Taliban. You highlight the fact that Pashtun customs and cultural norms play a key role in the status of women and that “no political party or movement has raised the issue of cruel treatment of women in the Pashtun society” (p. 46). Do you think this is likely to change with the rising pressure from states and human rights groups as they link the much-needed aid to the upliftment of women?

TD: Most Pashtun women have remained suppressed by and bound to traditional practices in the name of either Islam or cultural norms, or both. According to journalist and author Geoffrey Moorhouse, no women in the world could be more jealously possessed by their menfolk than the Pashtun women. This is exemplified by the Pashtun proverb that there are only two places for a woman: the core and the gore, Pashto for the house and the graveyard, respectively.

Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgars (Pashtun non-violent resistance movement against the British in colonial India) did raise the issue of the cruel treatment of women in Pashtun society, and Ghaffar Khan did try to implement changes by setting a personal example and working for the empowerment of women. His movement did not succeed, primarily because neither the British nor the Pakistani state supported it. On the contrary, they opposed it. The present Pashtun society lacks an indigenous social reform movement that could take off from where the Khudai Khidmatgars left it.

Under Taliban 2.0, draconian restrictions on the freedom and movement of women have been reintroduced that are reminiscent of their 1990s rule.

Under Taliban 1.0 (1996–2001), the condition of women had severely deteriorated because of misogyny and violence. Under Taliban 2.0, draconian restrictions on the freedom and movement of women have been reintroduced that are reminiscent of their 1990s rule. They have used a disingenuous argument to justify stopping women’s education—the lack of funds. However, the international community is not buying this. It remains to be seen how long the Taliban can resist international pressure because this is one of the main demands for their international recognition and for sustained funding.

RS: No government in Afghanistan has accepted the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 demarcating the border between the then British India and Afghanistan. While Pakistan insists that the Durand Line is the de facto border, the Taliban regime has refused to accept this. Could you delve more into the legal and controversial issues behind the Durand Line? Do you think this matter has the potential to lead to a breakdown of relations between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially as the latter is focused on fortifying the line to prevent migration?

TD: There are several controversial issues about the 1893 Durand Line Agreement signed between the Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman (Amir 1880–1901) and the British Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand.

First, it is indeed a mystery why the Amir signed the English version of the agreement, though he did not know that language. It remains unknown why the Persian version was not used even though Durand knew Persian and had agreed, in deference to the Amir’s desire, that the Persian text would be binding. The line itself was drawn on a small map that the Amir did not sign.

Second, the British themselves regarded the agreement as fixing only the limit of their respective spheres of influence rather than being a demarcation of sovereignty. Several British letters, communications, and statements testified to this. It was only around the Partition, in order to strengthen Pakistan’s borders, that this sphere of influence was converted into an international border.

Third, was the Durand Line signed in perpetuity? If it were to be valid in perpetuity, such a clause would have been mentioned in the agreement. That this was not done was quite possibly because the agreement only earmarked spheres of influence.

Fourth, the Anglo–Afghan treaty of 1921 that is used to validate the Durand Agreement gave both states the right to repudiate it within three years after a one-year notice. So how could a treaty that had a termination period validate the alleged permanence of the Durand Line Agreement?

After the formation of Pakistan in 1947, there was no formal agreement or ratification of the agreement or treaties pertaining to the Durand Line between Islamabad and Kabul.

Afghanistan, in fact, repudiated the various treaties signed with the British in a loya jirga held in July 1949. These included the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak, the Durand Line Agreement of 1893, the Anglo–Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919, and the Anglo–Afghan Treaty of 1921.

No Afghan government since 1949 has abandoned this standpoint. Even the Taliban, who were very close allies of Pakistan, did not recognise the Line—neither in the 1996–2001 period, nor since August 2021, till the time of the interview. On the contrary, the Taliban have called the issue unresolved and at places have even stopped Pakistan from constructing the fence.

This issue does have the potential for creating tensions between the Islamic Emirate and Pakistan, especially if the Taliban continue to disrupt the construction of the remaining portion of the fence.

RS: The presence of Al-Qaeda (AQ), Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan poses a difficult challenge not just for the US in the region but has significant security implications for India. In your assessment, what steps should India take to not only subvert this threat, but also maintain a working (if not diplomatic) relationship with the Taliban while bypassing Pakistan?

TD: This issue needs to be viewed in a larger perspective. India has had civilisational links with the Pashtuns going back to the Mahabharata and the Mauryas as well as the Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms in what is now Afghanistan.

In more recent times, India has provided Afghanistan with assistance of more than three billion US dollars for various people-friendly projects. There was much appreciation of Indian efforts across the board in Afghanistan. India would like to retain such goodwill at the level of the people of Afghanistan.

Whereas the presence of the AQ, AQIS, and ISKP in Afghanistan has significant security implications for India, it is fairly well known that Pakistan has relocated terrorists of India-focused groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to ungoverned spaces, especially in eastern Afghanistan. The recent letter that Pakistan wrote to the Afghan authorities about the presence of Masood Azhar in Afghanistan bears testimony to this.

The Taliban, too, realise that India is the only country in the neighbourhood that could provide them humanitarian support, as long as India’s security interests are taken care of.

Given the stronghold of terrorists in Afghanistan, many of whom are Pakistan sponsored, India has to adopt requisite strategies. Apart from beefing up our own security grid, a direct working relationship with the Taliban could assist in meeting our security requirements. The Taliban, too, realise that India is the only country in the neighbourhood that could provide them humanitarian support, as long as India’s security interests are taken care of.

Hence, mutual interests could develop and that would lead to a direct working engagement without recognition of the Taliban regime.

RS: In the book, you mention that Pashtunistan has had one fundamental weakness— “lack of internal resources to pay for governance and defence” (p. xxviii). This has resulted in dependence on foreign sources of revenue and aid and, thereby, interference in domestic affairs. As the Taliban look for ways to unfreeze their assets in the US and scramble for funds, do you think their dependence on Pakistan will continue to increase? What role can India play?

Throughout history, Afghanistan has suffered from an inability to generate internal sources of revenue.

TD: Throughout history, Afghanistan has suffered from an inability to generate internal sources of revenue. Thus, Ahmad Shah Durrani raided India in the 18^th century; 19^th-century rulers got substantial subsidies and weapons from the British in exchange, of course, for territory and sovereignty; and the Musahiban in the 20^th century leveraged the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US to modernise Afghanistan’s military and develop its economy. The Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) depended almost entirely on resources from the Soviet Union; the Taliban 1.0 looked to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; the governments of presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani were equally dependent on the US and other Western countries. Taliban 2.0 are now looking to unfreeze Afghan assets in the US. The downside of such an economic model has been the erosion of domestic legitimacy on the one hand and giving regional powers the opportunity to interfere for the sake of their interests, on the other.

Pakistan is not in a position to do the heavy lifting that is required to stave off a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. The Taliban knows this, and hence it is unlikely that their dependence on Pakistan would increase. In fact, the Taliban would be looking for other benefactors, especially India.

In reality, trade with its neighbours has been one of Afghanistan’s main economic activities. However, Pakistan has been blocking Indo–Afghan trade despite professing faith in geo-economics and connectivity. It allowed the transit of 50,000 tonnes of wheat donated by India to Afghanistan for humanitarian assistance with some amount of difficulty. It would be necessary for countries invested in the region to prevail on Pakistan to permit direct Indo–Afghan trade. This would reduce the likelihood of cross-border implications of a growing humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.

About the author:

Tilak Devasher is the author of four widely acclaimed books on Pakistan: Pakistan: Courting the Abyss (December 2016); Pakistan: At the Helm (July 2018); Pakistan: The Balochistan Conundrum (July 2019); and now, The Pashtuns: A Contested History (September 2022).

He retired as Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, in October 2014. He is currently a member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and a consultant with the Vivekananda International Foundation. During his professional career, Mr Devasher served in Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, and abroad. He specialised in security issues, especially pertaining to India’s neighbourhood. Post-retirement, he has continued to take a keen interest in such issues, with a special focus on Pakistan. Mr Devasher has taken to writing after superannuation. Apart from his books, he has written articles for a host of newspapers, magazines, and think tank journals. He is a regular contributor to the Indian Express and Tribune and contributes occasionally to India Today. He also appears frequently on TV talk shows.