India-Africa Forum Summits (IAFS): Revisiting the Past to Reinforce Partnerships

Nearly a decade has passed since the last India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) was held in 2015. Since then, India’s relations with African countries have grown steadily across multiple dimensions. Yet, the absence of this high-level convening has left the partnership without a central diplomatic anchor.

India and African countries, as a result of overlapping histories of injustice and colonialism, face similar developmental challenges. India’s economic and trade partnerships within Africa are historic, with steadily growing engagements in recent decades. Now, amid larger geopolitical events, including the US-led trade war have heightened economic uncertainties, presenting new and complex challenges for all developing economies.

Given these shared histories and new vulnerabilities, African countries and India can address these developmental issues collaboratively. However, many of the existing partnerships remain bilateral and fragmented. This shortfall makes it imperative for India to consolidate its engagement with Africa through the IAFS, fostering interdependent and resilient partnerships.

Up till now, the IAFS has served as a nominal mechanism between India and its African partners, but it has potential for strengthening economic cooperation. This blog offers a survey of the past three India-Africa Forum Summits while contextualising them within the broader scope of India-Africa relations discourse.

By analysing primary state documents and secondary literature, it maps engagement, outputs, and challenges encountered concerning the summits. Lastly, it lays out considerations for the fourth India-Africa Forum Summit, discussing its potential in going beyond optics and symbolic gestures.

Introduction

In the early 2000s, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was replaced by the African Union (AU). This central body envisioned diversifying external partnerships with emerging economies, primarily away from unequal relations with former Western colonies. Among others, India, Japan, and South Korea were strategic choices due to their distinct developmental trajectories.

To implement this vision effectively, in 2006, the AU Assembly adopted the ‘Banjul Formula.’ It implied participation of a select few African member countries on a rotational basis in a ‘continent-to-country’ convening format, that had already been occurring. For instance, the Japan-led Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) took effect in 1993 with representation from four African countries. The role of these select members was to collectively represent African priorities for development, regional integration and strengthening South-South partnerships.

Aligned with the AU on the foundations of South-South solidarity, India established the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) toward formalising relations, beyond traditional bilateral partnerships.

Since its inception in 2008, the India-Africa Forum Summit has complemented India’s bilateral sector specific engagement, and regional business conclaves, with a focus on broader development cooperation.

Since its inception in 2008, the India-Africa Forum Summit has complemented India’s bilateral sector specific engagement, and regional business conclaves, with a focus on broader development cooperation. Recently this year, for example, the Confederation of Indian Industry’s (CII) held its 20th India-Africa Business Conclave.

Despite achieving significant milestones, however, the convening has faced several operational challenges. Thus, evaluating the first three summits presents an opportunity to draw lessons in the lead-up to the much-anticipated IAFS-IV.

Multi-Layered Engagement; Cooperation and Enhanced Cooperation

The first India-Africa Forum Summit was held in April 2008, with representation from 14 select African countries. The summit was established during India’s post-liberalisation, which saw increased attention and convenings of Africa with global powers such as China, Japan, and the European Union. India’s then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh emphasised that by jointly representing over 2 billion people, the collaboration between India and African countries set an example of fruitful South-South cooperation.

The 2008 summit produced two diplomatic outputs: (i) Delhi Declaration, and (ii)the Framework for India–Africa cooperation. The joint declaration was a political statement to strengthen cooperation with the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). With this declaration, New Delhi emphasised mutual respect, marking renewed partnerships with African countries, and highlighting priority areas to address the multitude of shared developmental challenges.

These areas of cooperation can be categorised in three broad areas: (i) Sovereignty and Pan-Africanism: Regional integration, democratisation, South-South Cooperation, and improving processes and representation at the UN and other Bretton Woods institutions, (ii) Development Through Enhanced Trade and Climate Action: Increasing trade and development support to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), while recognising climate change as a global challenge under the aegis of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and that “development is the best form of adaptation,” (iii) Strengthened Global Security Landscape: Inclusion of Africa in the UN Security Council, aligning with the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus. In addition, both sides committed to the timely elimination of nuclear weapons and condemnation of all forms of terrorism.

In tandem with the declaration, the Framework for India-Africa cooperation was adopted as an implementational blueprint. It reflected the several contexts and areas of potential partnerships with African nations. The following were the seven broad areas covered: (i) Economic Cooperation; (ii) Political Cooperation; (iii) Science, Technology, Research and Development; (iv) Cooperation in Social Development and Capacity Building; (v) Tourism; (vi) Infrastructure; Energy and Environment; and (vii) Media and Communication. These areas reflected the plurality of opportunities between African countries and India, but the implementation pathways to achieve set goals was unclear.

The coordination gap, combined with potential opportunities, led India to hold its first-ever meeting with officials from RECs in New Delhi, with the aim to operationalise the adopted framework. In addition to the IAFS, this approach was a testament to India’s multi-layered partnerships with Africa: Regional, Bilateral, and Continental. The meeting hosted eight AU-recognised RECs, many of which had existing MoUs on trade and development partnerships with India. The convening provided a platform to build new partnerships between the RECs, enabling them to interact with several ministries and private sector actors.

Subsequently, in 2011, Addis Ababa hosted the second instalment of the IAFS with representation from 15 African countries and 9 heads of state. With the aim of furthering partnerships, India announced strengthened financial support for Africa’s development goals by providing Lines of Credit (LOC) of USD 5 billion over three years. The second summit led to the adoption of (i) the Addis Ababa Declaration and (ii) the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation through the Joint Action Plan as a supplement to the 2008 Framework. Similar to the Delhi Declaration, the Addis Ababa Declaration was a joint political statement.

The 2011 declaration expanded on the previous one; (i) identified and renewed shared interests in the trade, security, and development landscape, such as the UN Millennium Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), (ii) recognised outcomes of IAFS-I, including the 2009-established Pan-African e-Network Project (PAENP). Through this program, and by setting up a fibre-optic network, India promoted Africa’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) goals. The Joint Action Plan was further adopted to strengthen the multilayered approach by identifying areas of enhanced cooperation with several sectoral initiatives.

With the first and second instalments of the summit, India’s interest in partnerships with African countries gained momentum and reflected a collaborative approach with some notable outputs. However, it can be inferred that the broad areas of cooperation identified in IAFS-I and IAFS-II may have been insufficient as a roadmap in themselves due to reasons including: lack of clarity in institutional operationality, relevance to national plans, and lack of measurable outcomes.

The two convenings reflected ambition, but with fewer outputs. It was evident that a much more tactical engagement was required to ensure that IAFS leads to tangible outcomes, without which India’s relations with Africa could lose steam.

Further, New Delhi recognised that following the Banjul formula was insufficient for successful and long-standing engagement with African states. While had India followed this approach, other convenings such as TICAD and China-led Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) had not adopted the same, inviting several African representatives.

Three primary concerns with the Banjul approach may have stood out for India to identify as insufficient for building a long-standing relationship with Africa – (i) limited and non-inclusive participation of African leadership, (ii) practical inefficiency emerging due to the rotational participation, and (iii) poor optics reflecting a lack of support for the Pan-African agenda.

Strategic Cooperation, but Recurring Challenges

The third IAFS, held in 2015, introduced several changes, with New Delhi further dissolving the Banjul formula, and sending invitations to all 54 African member states of the AU (now 55), 41 of whom were present for the summit. The large representation symbolised India’s growing presence on the continent as well as its ambitions for a renewed diplomatic strategy with African states. The strengthened relations are reflected in bilateral investments and trade to some extent, which grew from USD  5.3 billion in 2001 to surpass the targets of USD 90 billion by in FY 2021-22.

IAFS-III also established a theme for the first time – ‘Partners in Progress: Towards a Dynamic and Transformative Development Agenda,’ solidifying India’s political will to shape the collaborative and mutually respectful partnerships with Africa. This theme yet again indicated India’s aspiration to position itself with Africa as a non-exploitative, equitable partner to support Africa’s priorities.

Outputs of IAFS-III also narrowed down the areas of cooperation, reflected in the (i) Delhi Declaration-2015, and (ii) the India-Africa Cooperation for Strategic Cooperation. The 2015 Delhi Declaration reinforced prior commitments, aligning with reformed and new global visions; African Union Agenda 2063 and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

While the scope of the Delhi Declaration expanded, the Strategic Cooperation Framework narrowed to focus areas for general cooperation. These were aimed at addressing challenges faced by the continent that were perceived as more urgent and unmet needs: (i) Economic (including Education and Skill Development), (ii) Trade and Industry, (iii) Renewable Energy, (iv) Health, (v) Peace and Security, and (vi) Regional (Integration and Cooperation).

Acknowledging the pivotal role of the private sector and regional integration goals of Africa, the third IAFS also recognised the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) to encourage Indian businesses to engage with 26 African countries belonging to three Regional Economic Communities (RECs): The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

The economic partnerships, however, were evolving independent of the IAFS. This trend is exemplified through the Strategic Cooperation document, which outlines potential initiatives, but provides less clarity on achieved outcomes. Further, the coordination with the RECs encountered challenges, due to institutional inconsistencies on both sides. Studies by prominent Indian scholars speak to India’s domestic and structural inefficiencies that render achievements unsuccessful, particularly attributed to bureaucratic challenges and capacity deficits the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Concurrently, African states and the AU face similar challenges in operationalising set goals across regions.

This glaring mismatch between political objectives and economic outputs is evident in the lack of fulfilment of fiscal commitments made during the IAFS.

This glaring mismatch between political objectives and economic outputs is evident in the lack of fulfilment of fiscal commitments made during the IAFS. For example, the many announcements to extend LOCs to Africa for strengthening cooperation and supporting Africa’s developmental agenda have not been entirely materialised; the disbursal rate from India’s side has been as low as 40% (2015-2020).

To address this issue, the 2015 declaration and framework agreed upon setting up a monitoring agency. This third-party entity was conceptualised to oversee and ensure the success of commitments and cooperation, yet it is unclear why this agenda item has not come to fruition. While India aligns with Africa strategically and politically, this consistent shortfall weakens trade relations and mutual trust.

Reinforcing Partnerships Through IAFS

With India’s active push to position itself as a leading voice in the Global South, its relations with Africa have gained greater significance for South-South cooperation, toward multipolar realities.

In 2018, India’s Union Cabinet approved the opening of 18 new diplomatic missions in Africa with the primary purpose of fulfilling commitments made during IAFS. These newly established embassies feed into India’s multi-faceted engagement approach in Africa. In the last few years, India has been steadily deepening its bilateral engagements by adopting several MoUs with key African partners such as Tanzania, Ghana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

Further, in 2022, India welcomed all 55 African countries as a permanent member in the G20 during New Delhi’s presidency. Subsequently, in 2024-25, Egypt and Ethiopia became full members of BRICS, expanding the forum, while Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda joined as partners.

Despite deepened ties, IAFS-IV has not yet materialised yet, suggesting it might not be as important for India’s engagements with Africa. The IAFS postponement suggests a clear lack of political will from either one or both parties.

Unprecedented global situations may have contributed to this delay. For example, the IAFS-III, supposed to be held in 2014, was postponed due to the Ebola outbreak in Africa. Similarly, the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent economic shocks may have delayed IAFS-IV.  However, similar convenings led by other prominent global players with Africa have not paused. Japan, for example, recently hosted its 9^th TICAD event. Similarly, the last FOCAC was held in 2024.

The reduced importance of the conference may stem from relatively more political outcomes than economic achievements, that are often achieved in other frameworks such as the emerging CII Bank Conclave on India-Africa Project Partnerships. This delay also begs the question for India, whether it is diluting its multi-layered engagement approach with Africa, focusing more on bilateral initiatives.

This delay also begs the question for India, whether it is diluting its multi-layered engagement approach with Africa, focusing more on bilateral initiatives.

It is important to note, however, that on a programmatic level, the praise of such convenings has been juxtaposed with recurrent  backlash from the community. Several experts reject the ‘Africa-Plus-One’ or ‘Country-to-Continent’ approach to these convenings. They suggest that by gathering African heads of state with only one country—such as Russia, India, or China—the partner country symbolically reduces the power held by each African country. While the IAFS cannot address this issue directly, it must uphold the sovereignty and agency of its African partners by providing equitable spaces for dialogue and coordination, while deepening bilateral engagements.

Nonetheless, IAFS has the potential to become a key summitry mechanism to enhance India’s economic engagements with African countries, but it must go beyond dialogue and symbolism, towards actionable outcomes. For this purpose, India can consider co-developing targeted, long-term and sustainable interventions. The following are the underlying considerations for India to redefine and re-strategise goals in the lead up to the next IAFS.

• Co-Develop a Roadmap: India and the African Union can redefine a sectoral roadmap that establishes short-term and long-term goals, operationalising timely investments. On the basis of the set areas of strategic cooperation (IAFS-III), the roadmap can be developed with more granularity, aligning with African continental agendas and 2018 Kampala Principles but also national plans and priorities. In this way, India can assess its financial capacity and allocate adequate resources.
• Reconfigure Operations: Operational challenges may lie on both sides, impeding development outputs, but timely dialogue is key for sustained partnerships amid volatile geopolitics. Additionally, while the AU spearheads in establishing its continental free trade agreement (AfCFTA), India can develop improved channels to support operational capacities of RECs, supporting regional integration goals and ensuring smooth and efficient delivery of partnerships and projects.
• Measure Outcomes: To ensure that development financing and projects are up to date with the required quality, a third-party monitoring mechanism (also proposed in IAFS-III) could be established. This institutional solution to track partnerships could bring in necessary accountability mechanisms while bridging the gap between proposed and delivered projects.

The aforementioned measures are some initial steps that could ensure that the India-Africa Forum Summit produces long-term and tangible outcomes to enhance engagement with Africa. However, implementing such measures would require greater institutional and structural capacity, political will, and coordination from both sides. Establishing enhanced Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues that enable knowledge sharing on policy pathways to sustainable development would be integral to long-lasting partnerships.

It is imperative that India and African countries not only prioritise timely dialogue through IAFS but also collaborate to deliver concrete economic outcomes.

It is imperative that India and African countries not only prioritise timely dialogue through IAFS but also collaborate to deliver concrete economic outcomes. In this way, India can ensure that IAFS achieves its potential, becoming a key driver of mutual growth, toward enhanced South-South cooperation and multipolar realities.

Annex:

Table 1: India-Africa Forum Summits: Agenda and Outputs