Latin America: A New Geography for India’s Emerging Critical Minerals Partnerships

New Delhi has simultaneously been hedging its bets via bilateral agreements and at multilateral forums in its engagement approach to the Latin American countries (LACs), particularly around critical minerals. China controls 70% of global rare earth refining and has weaponised that leverage. India’s answer has been to build a constellation of mineral partnerships that ensure climate ambition doesn’t remain hostage to Beijing’s export controls. In January 2025, India announced its investment of approximately $2 billion in Argentina, signalling that lithium and cobalt from the region could power its clean energy ambitions. This isn’t about a single investment or negotiation. India has also advanced simultaneous trade agreement talks with Peru and Chile, with an explicit focus on minerals. Parallel to this, in October 2025, the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) nations reached a consensus to deepen their preferential trade agreement (PTA) with New Delhi.

As India accelerates its clean energy transition and seeks to position itself as a major global manufacturing hub for green technologies, access to diverse and secure supplies of critical materials has become indispensable. Lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements form the backbone of these emerging industries, and India’s ability to ensure their long-term availability will shape the trajectory of its energy security and industrial competitiveness. Latin America is home to the world’s largest concentrations of lithium, significant copper deposits, and a wide array of other strategic minerals. It has therefore emerged as one of India’s most essential partners in building resilient supply chains.

India’s relations with the region have deepened steadily over the past two decades, evolving from traditional commodity flows and hydrocarbon ties to a more strategic alignment, centred on clean energy, sustainability, and technology-driven economic cooperation. With growing recognition in both New Delhi and Latin America of the need to diversify away from China-centric mineral supply chains, the time is now to build long-term, institutionally anchored partnerships.

India’s relations with the region have deepened steadily over the past two decades, evolving from traditional commodity flows and hydrocarbon ties to a more strategic alignment, centred on clean energy, sustainability, and technology-driven economic cooperation.

India’s engagement with Argentina in this sector signifies the shift from policy to practice. This is exemplified by Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL)’s operational flagship: the signing of a landmark Exploration and Development Agreement in January 2024. Under this agreement, KABIL aims to explore five lithium brine blocks in Catamarca Province, marking its first overseas mining asset acquisition, backed by a ₹200 crore (approx. $2 billion) investment and the establishment of a branch office on the ground. Table 1 gives an overview of the common critical minerals identified by India and Latin American countries for their green growth ambitions. It should be noted that not all LAC partners have published similar official lists.

This blog begins with an overview of why Latin America has become increasingly relevant to India’s critical minerals strategy, before briefly tracing the evolution of India’s political and economic engagement with the region. It then examines the domestic policy architectures governing critical minerals across key Latin American countries, highlighting how these frameworks shape resource development and external partnerships. The analysis subsequently turns to India’s existing and emerging engagements with these countries and concludes by outlining policy options for strengthening India–Latin America cooperation going forward.

Table 1: Common Minerals Between India and LACs Mentioned in National Documents

Note: This is a matrix-style table using only Latin American countries with identifiable, government-published critical/strategic mineral lists (Brazil, Columbia, Peru) or catalogues that explicitly enumerate minerals (Argentina and Chile).

Source: Author’s compilation based on Government of India, Ministry of Mines, List of Critical Minerals (2023); Government of Brazil (MME/CTAPME), Strategic Minerals List; Government of Argentina, Secretaría de Minería, Metales y Minerales Críticos para la Transición Energética; Government of Chile, Ministry of Mining, Draft National Critical Minerals Strategy (public consultation materials); Government of Colombia, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Strategic Minerals (Resolution 180102 and related technical documents); Government of Peru, INGEMMET, Catálogo de Minerales Críticos y Estratégicos.

Strategic Convergences Between India and the LACs

India’s early links with the region date to the 1960s, including Nehru’s 1961 visit to Mexico and Indira Gandhi’s 1968 tour of eight countries, which largely expressed non-aligned solidarity but generated limited trade or institutional follow-through. By 1992, India–LAC trade still remained under $500 million, reflecting distance, other foreign policy priorities, and the region’s focus on the United States (US) and European markets.

This began to change with India’s post‑1991 liberalisation and the launch of the “Focus LAC” policy in 1997, which explicitly treated Latin America as a diversification partner rather than a diplomatic afterthought. The real inflection came with the 2003 Framework Agreement and 2005 PTA with MERCOSUR, followed by a similar framework and PTA with Chile. Between 2004 and 2014, India–LAC trade grew at an average annual rate of about 30%, driven largely by Indian imports of crude oil and commodities and exports of pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and manufactured goods. By 2022–23, bilateral trade had reached roughly $50 billion, a hundredfold increase over the early 1990s baseline, even as the relationship remained concentrated in hydrocarbons and a narrow set of sectors.

Over the last decade, however, structural global shifts have pushed both regions toward a more strategic alignment. Prime Minister Modi’s 2014 BRICS visit to Brazil, the first state visit in 57 years, signalled a shift toward treating Latin America as a serious partner in shaping a multipolar order and diversifying economic and technological linkages. Since then, India has expanded the MERCOSUR PTA, intensified outreach to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and positioned itself as an alternative economic partner in the region. Latin American states increasingly seek diversified economic partners as a hedge against geopolitical uncertainty, sanctions volatility, and overdependence on China or the US. India, in turn, views the region as essential to diversifying its mineral imports and supporting its clean energy ambitions.

Simultaneously, Latin America’s own renewable energy transitions, exemplified by Chile, Brazil and Argentina’s push for decarbonisation, have created scope for cooperation with India in areas such as solar energy, green hydrogen, battery technology, and sustainable mining practices.

The evolving geopolitical and economic context, alongside growing Chinese engagement in the region, has reshaped India’s ties with Latin America. These ties have evolved from transactional to strategic, positioning India’s expanding presence as the outcome of long-term alignment of complementary strengths rather than extractive opportunism.

Domestic Policy Developments Across Key Latin American Countries

Latin America is home to some of the world’s most significant reserves of critical minerals, and governments across the region are actively refining domestic policies to harness these resources. Table 3 (see Annex) outlines key mining and investment frameworks adopted by major Latin American countries, illustrating how different countries seek to balance resource control, foreign investment, and value creation.

Argentina

Argentina integrates critical minerals into its federal–provincial mining framework rather than a standalone “critical minerals” law. The Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI) offers large mining projects 30-year fiscal stability, tax/customs incentives, foreign exchange access, and international arbitration. This makes Argentina one of Latin America’s most investor-friendly environments. As part of the Lithium Triangle, Argentina’s current strategy welcomes foreign ownership (unlike Bolivia and Chile), while provincial governments manage environmental and water-related concerns. Argentina has pursued international cooperation agreements with partners such as the US, the European Union (EU), the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and others. This openness, combined with India’s KABIL–CAMYEN lithium deal, positions Argentina as India’s most accessible LAC partner.

Bolivia

Bolivia has some of the world’s largest lithium reserves, which remain largely untapped due to nationalist policies requiring state control of all extraction. Recent reforms have cautiously allowed foreign partners, but only under strict technology transfer and local processing mandates aimed at ensuring value addition. Political instability and technical challenges (such as high magnesium content in the minerals) have slowed progress despite various high investment contracts with China and Russia. For India, Bolivia offers significant long-term potential but requires patient diplomacy and alignment with Bolivia’s industrialisation goals.

Brazil

Brazil stands out as one of the most diversified and investment-friendly mineral economies in the region. Its substantial deposits of niobium, copper, rare earth elements, manganese, and graphite are integrated into a broader industrial strategy that links mining to renewable energy, aerospace, digital technologies, and green industrialisation. The 2025 National Mining Policy Council coordinates sustainable extraction, environmental, social and governance (ESG) compliance, and geological mapping. Unlike countries with resource-nationalist policies, Brazil welcomes long-term offtake deals and technology partnerships in battery recycling and low-emission mining. As India’s largest LAC trade partner ($43 billion annually), Brazil offers both immediate supply security and strategic diversification.

Chile

Chile remains one of the world’s most important suppliers of copper and lithium, backed by a highly developed and transparent mining regulatory system. Its National Lithium Strategy seeks to maintain strong state involvement while still promoting partnerships with international actors and firms, creating a hybrid governance model that balances public ownership with private-sector expertise and investment. Chile places strong emphasis on sustainability, indigenous rights, and community participation. As the country expands its renewable energy ambitions and seeks partners for value-chain upgrading, India finds fertile ground for long-term cooperation that includes both mineral acquisition and bilateral clean energy collaboration, which the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiations would bolster.

Peru

Peru’s mineral economy is deeply export-oriented and centred on copper, making it an indispensable partner for India’s electronics, electric vehicle (EV), and renewable energy sectors. While Peru periodically experiences political shifts and community-led protests that affect the mining sector, its broader regulatory environment remains pro-investment, competitive, and open to international capital. The country’s strong focus on community engagement and conflict mitigation has become central to its mining governance. India’s ongoing Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with Peru could play a pivotal role in institutionalising supply chains for copper and other essential minerals, while also creating opportunities for Indian firms to participate across Peru’s value chain.

Venezuela

Venezuela, historically vital to India’s energy security through its crude oil exports, now seeks to diversify its mineral sector as part of broader economic restructuring. Political instability, sanctions, and institutional constraints have limited the scale of critical mineral development, yet the government has highlighted ambitions to expand exploration of coltan, nickel, and rare earths. India retains longstanding goodwill in Venezuela, and although operating conditions remain challenging, the potential for future cooperation in emerging mineral sectors exists if political conditions stabilise. Venezuela’s historical energy ties with India create a foundation that could eventually support broader mineral engagement.

India–LAC Cooperation on Critical Minerals

India’s engagement with Latin America on critical minerals has expanded significantly in recent years, driven by the realisation that the region offers both resource diversity and political compatibility. Diplomatic outreach has intensified through KABIL, which has taken the lead in negotiating mining partnerships, particularly in Argentina, alongside exploratory engagement in Chile and Brazil. Government-to-government dialogues have become more frequent, focusing on long-term contracts, joint exploration, and acquisition of mining blocks. A key priority for India is securing stable supplies of lithium and copper minerals central to its EV and renewable manufacturing ecosystem.

The mapping in Table 1 shows that India and its Latin American partners share priorities across several key transition and industrial minerals, creating scope for complementary and non-competitive supply chains. Yet, the overlap remains partial. While Latin America can help meet some of India’s critical mineral needs (particularly for batteries and bulk industrial inputs), India’s requirements for high-technology, semiconductor, and speciality minerals remain largely outside the scope of current Latin American critical mineral frameworks. This underscores the need for a diversified partnership strategy.

Diplomatic outreach has intensified through KABIL, which has taken the lead in negotiating mining partnerships, particularly in Argentina, alongside exploratory engagement in Chile and Brazil.

Argentina and Chile have emerged as pivotal lithium partners, while Peru and Chile hold strong potential for copper offtake agreements. India’s trade agreements have also become facilitators of mineral access. The ongoing FTA negotiations with Peru and the expansion of the PTA with Chile are structured to support mineral flows and reduce tariff or procedural barriers, strengthening India’s position in regional supply chains. Table 2 showcases India’s engagements with the LACs in the minerals and mining sector, highlighting the increase as countries try to diversify and secure their supply chains.

Table 2: India’s Cooperation with Latin America on Critical Minerals

Source: Authors’ compilation based on various sources.

Technological and sustainability cooperation is another emerging area. India and Latin America share common goals in areas such as green hydrogen, sustainable mining, battery recycling, and renewable integration. Chile and Brazil, in particular, are exploring partnerships that emphasise technology exchange rather than purely raw mineral exports, aligning with India’s interest in integrating its technological capabilities into the partnership. The Indian private sector, especially companies involved in EVs, steel, and battery manufacturing, is increasingly exploring stakes in mining projects, long-term contracts, and value-chain integration across the region.

Future Pathways for Collaboration

India and Latin America are well positioned to develop a deliberate policy architecture for long-term, resilient cooperation in critical minerals. With KABIL’s foothold in Argentina established and FTAs with Chile and Peru advancing, India must now institutionalise this nascent partnership through forums, joint ventures, and midstream cooperation. The following five recommendations draw on proven models from India’s global engagements while addressing Latin America’s unique policy landscape, thereby transforming complementary endowments into resilient supply chains for India’s clean energy future.

1. Expand KABIL’s Regional Footprint: KABIL’s 2023 Argentina lithium joint venture (valued at $24 million and covering 5 blocks in Catamarca) should be scaled to include participation in Chile’s lithium salt flat tenders and Brazil’s rare earth deposits. Argentina’s provincial equity model seems to be providing results and with the National Critical Minerals Misson’s (NCMM) ₹16,300 crore budget, it can be replicated across a few priority countries in the region.
2. Co-Develop Midstream Processing: LAC partners can cooperate with India on processing and refining minerals, similar to the partnership on refining that India has through Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IREL) with Japan’s Toyotsu Rare Earth Pvt Ltd. India’s ₹15 billion battery recycling scheme announced in 2025 under the NCMM also supports this. Joint refining can focus on Argentina’s Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) pilots and Brazil’s Serra Verde REE plant. India’s NavPrakriti facility (Eastern India’s first Li-ion recycling plant, with 1,000 tpa capacity) demonstrates commercial hydrometallurgical processing capacity that LAC partners currently lack, creating mutual value in technology transfer.​
3. Accelerate Bilateral FTAs with Minerals Chapters: India should finalise Chile CEPA (3rd round in 2025, with a target of early 2026) and the Peru FTA (9th round completed, with resumption scheduled for January 2026) with dedicated critical minerals chapters. The EU–Chile 2024 interim trade agreement’s raw materials provisions could serve as a potential model. India’s MERCOSUR PTA expansion shows the potential benefits of such an expansion.
4. Bilateral Geological Mapping Exchange: India could consider working with LAC partners to undertake geological mapping MoUs like India’s experience with the Geoscience Australia This could focus on Argentina’s lithium reserves and Brazil’s REE deposits. Geological Survey of India’s ongoing mapping exercise in Zambia proves operational readiness, enabling reciprocal data sharing for NCMM targets while reducing China supply risks.
5. Coordinate Global Minerals Governance: India’s 2025 BRICS presidency offers an opportunity to coordinate Global South approaches to critical minerals governance. Drawing selectively on existing frameworks developed in minilateral groupings, such as energy transition discussions under the G20, supply-chain traceability initiatives within the Quad, and resilience principles under the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). India could work with BRICS partners, particularly Brazil and Argentina, to develop common positions.

With KABIL’s foothold in Argentina established and FTAs with Chile and Peru advancing, India must now institutionalise this nascent partnership through forums, joint ventures, and midstream cooperation.

India–Latin America cooperation on critical minerals institutionalises longstanding diplomatic ties into resilient supply-chain architectures. KABIL’s foothold in Argentina and advancing FTAs with Chile and Peru strengthen access to diversified lithium, copper, and rare earth elements essential for India’s NCMM and 2030 clean-energy targets. By establishing South–South partnerships beyond traditional resource diplomacy, India is pioneering a new frontier in energy security governance by operationalising mutual economic priorities alongside ESG-aligned sustainable development.

Annex

Table 3: Timeline of Key Latin American Policies and Initiatives on Critical Minerals (2021–Present)

Source: Authors’ compilation based on various sources.