The Kashmir Back Channel 2004 – 2007: Prospects for India-Pakistan Negotiations

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Riya Sinha interviews Dr. Happymon Jacob on his new paper, The Kashmir Back Channel: India-Pakistan Negotiations on Kashmir from 2004 to 2007, published by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (2021), Georgetown University.

In February 2021, India and Pakistan announced a ceasefire along the Line-of-control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. It was speculated that back-channel diplomacy led to the ceasefire talks between the military commanders of both countries. High-level political meetings, especially between conflicting states, do not simply occur in the spur of the moment. They are preceded by a series of back-channel talks or diplomatic discussions to probe interest and set out an agenda.

In the last seven decades, India and Pakistan have made several attempts to settle the Kashmir dispute and improve bilateral relations, albeit with little success. In this recent paper, Jacob focuses on the India-Pakistan back-channel negotiations that took place between 2004 and 2007. These talks represented a breakthrough after a volatile period of relations between both countries. Shortly before, India and Pakistan had fought the Kargil War in 1999 and, in 2001, Pakistani terrorists attacked the Indian parliament.

Jacob makes a case that the negotiations conducted during these three-and-a-half years should be seen “as a new approach for conflict resolution between the two rivals” (p. 3). He provides insights on the factors that influence back-channel negotiations, including personalities (leadership, interlocutors, and negotiators), internal political developments, and external pressures (in this case, the United States’ intervention in Afghanistan). While the consensus eventually collapsed, Jacob maintains that the 2004-2007 back-channel diplomacy was a “unique experiment”, where the negotiators dealt with some of the most sensitive issues, including on Kashmir, in creative ways (p.23).

The paper is an important contribution to the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. By breaking down the nuances of back-channel diplomacy, it creates a template for future talks, not just between India and Pakistan, but also to address other “historically rooted conflicts in South Asia” (p.23). This is important for both practitioners engaged in such talks, as well as scholars seeking to better understand them.

Riya Sinha: You mention in the paper that “backchannel diplomacy derives its legitimacy from unambiguous political will” (p. 10). However, you also note that “secrecy” is essential for such talks (p. 11). Can backchannel talks be isolated from political optics, especially in the case of India and Pakistan, where there is a tendency for governments to gain credibility at the cost of one another?

Happymon Jacob: By political will, I mean here the political sanction of the leadership (Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan) for backchannel negotiations. Backchannel diplomacy is undertaken when normal diplomatic processes are unable to deliver on a major bilateral issue such as finding a resolution to a protracted and politically sensitive conflict. So, the essential purpose of the backchannel dialogue is to take the process out of the routine channels and attempt to resolve it using a more personalised and discreet channel, often directly reporting to the leaders of the respective governments.

There are several reasons why secrecy is essential in backchannel negotiations. Today, no serious negotiation on a major conflict can be conducted purely on the merit of the facts keeping the political and media pressures away, except perhaps in backchannel negotiations. Therefore, given that backchannel talks are typically held outside the normal diplomatic channels, secrecy helps in ensuring that ‘spoilers’ (I use this word with a strictly technical intent) such as opposition parties, adverse media commentary etc. do not actively subvert the talks while they are still on. Finally, secrecy also helps in ensuring that the talks do not become a victim to the inter-departmental rivalry within the government.

What is striking about the 2004-2007 backchannel was that while there was a great deal of media speculation about the existence of the backchannel itself, details of which were not known to the outside world.

So, unless they are reasonably isolated from political optics and media attention, backchannel talks are unlikely to survive and succeed. What is striking about the 2004-2007 backchannel was that while there was a great deal of media speculation about the existence of the backchannel itself, details of which were not known to the outside world. Ideally, therefore, backchannel talks should become public knowledge only when they succeed (or fail, for that matter) and when the time comes to rally the larger public around a potential agreement (if the talks were about arriving at a certain agreement on a conflict).

So, to answer your question, backchannel talks can and should be isolated from political optics if their intended objectives are to be achieved.

RS: The Karachi Agreement of 1949, signed under the office of the United Nations (UN), created the India-Pakistan boundary in Kashmir called the ‘Ceasefire Line’ (CFL). However, the Suchetgarh Agreement of 1972 delineated the ‘Line of Control’ (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), effectively renaming the CFL as LoC and making the presence of the UN in Kashmir irrelevant. Do you think that removing the agency of the UN from the Kashmir dispute resulted in any improvements in the conflict?

HJ: To the extent that the United Nationals Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was not involved in the post war negotiations in 1972 and the territorial status quo ante bellum was not reinstated in J&K after the 1971 war (unlike after the 1965 war), the UNMOGIP, at least from the Indian point of view, became irrelevant in J&K since 1972. However, UNMOGIP continues to be present in J&K and Pakistan continues to report violations of the ceasefire to the UN body which the UNMOGIP sends to its headquarters in New York even though those reports are never published. Put differently, UNMOGIP has de jure authority in J&K, not de facto.

The Indian side considers the Simla Agreement, which made the UNMOGIP’s role in Kashmir irrelevant, a major diplomatic victory over Pakistan. Although it indeed was a diplomatic victory for India, doing so has not improved the situation on the ground in Kashmir. Prior to 1972, local territorial disputes between India and Pakistan were settled by the UNMOGIP. Today such disputes lead to firing and loss of lives. The pre-1972 presence of the UN group on the CFL had also functioned as a deterrent against ceasefire violations. In that sense, the presence of UNMOGIP and the resultant peace on the CFL was most conducive for the local population that live close to the line on either side of J&K. Given the absence of any such deterrence today, Ceasefire Violations (CFVs) have caused untold damage to the civilian population on either side. There was terrorist infiltration from Pakistan into the Indian side of Kashmir in those decades, but I wonder if the UNMOGIP could check such infiltration if it were to be actively present on the LoC today.  In the end, however, I think the presence of the UNMOGIP in J&K today is a redundant exercise.

RS: You mention, rather positively, that the US War on Terror in Afghanistan enabled Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf to make a “virtue out of necessity” and pursue talks with India (p.9). However, in a recent book, Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark argue that Pakistan only needed the ceasefire to keep its pact with the US and never intended to settle for a peace deal that was favourable to Delhi. What is your take on this?

HJ: President Parvez Musharraf’s offer of talks with India on Kashmir, assurance that the Pakistani soil wouldn’t be used for terrorism against India and the bold statement that it is time to think beyond the UN resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, may have been, at least initially, a result of indirect American pressure on Pakistan in the wake of the US’ war on terror. I do not know if the argument made by Levy and Scott-Clark is a statement of fact or an opinion. But even if their argument is right that it was a tactical ploy by Pakistan to buy time, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Kashmir backchannel assumed a life of its own. There is little evidence to show the contrary. As a matter of fact, over the years, the Pakistani side became more serious about the Kashmir deal than the Indian side. For Musharraf, it was also a legacy issue – he wanted to go down in history as someone who resolved the Kashmir issue rather than as a military dictator.

RS: Earlier this year, we heard the news that the announcement of a ceasefire by Indian and Pakistani military chiefs was preceded by secret talks brokered by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). What are your thoughts about the role of third countries, whether US, UK, China or any other, in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute?

HJ: With regard to the role played by external powers during the 2004-2007 backchannel negotiations, there is some evidence to show that the US and UK were keen on a deal between India and Pakistan on Kashmir and encouraged the two sides to stay the course on the negotiations. As for China, I have not seen evidence to suggest that it had a role to play.

But in general, I am deeply sceptical about the role of third countries in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Both the US and UK appear to favour a peaceful resolution of conflicts between India and Pakistan; US due to its strategic interests in the region, and UK since it views itself as having a historical responsibility to help build peace in the subcontinent. However, any active intervention or advocacy by even well-meaning countries such as these might prove to be detrimental to the cause of conflict resolution as India is opposed to any such intervention.

Chinese neutrality on the Kashmir question appears to have undergone a major change in the recent years especially after New Delhi’s decision to reorganise J&K in August 2019.

As for China, Beijing has for a long time adopted a neutral stance on the dispute stating that it is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan. Chinese neutrality on the Kashmir question appears to have undergone a major change in the recent years especially after New Delhi’s decision to reorganise J&K in August 2019. Since then, China’s stance on Kashmir has been anything but neutral, and its statements since 2019 indicate that it views itself as a party in the territorial conflict over the erstwhile princely state of J&K. In any case, China has been in possession of territory that formerly belonged to the princely state and as a result, it has been a party to the larger territorial conflict, a reality that has become sharper now.

In the recent past, especially last year, the Gulf states also played a role in facilitating conflict resolution between the two sides. The UAE has admitted to have played a key role in facilitating, and not mediating, a ceasefire between India and Pakistan earlier this year. UAE’s ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al Otaiba, claimed that his country had facilitated the discreet meetings between Indian and Pakistani intelligence chiefs. India, under the Modi government, has grown close to the UAE over the years. UAE’s facilitating role in this context needs to be read along with its warming of relations with Israel, another close friend of India in the region. UAE and Bahrain had signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 thereby normalising the diplomatic relations with Israel. Given the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan, many of these states in West Asia are also keen that South Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular do not witness more turmoil and extremism which perhaps explains their interest.

The increasing role of the regional actors in defusing the Indo-Pak conflicts or facilitating peace between them is a new phenomenon outcomes of which are still not fully understood. Previously, the mediatory role was played mainly by the USA or even Russia. Today, many more players are on the scene willing and able to take up that role.

RS: You write that “the various aspects of the backchannel diplomacy provide a useful template to negotiate politically challenging and historically rooted conflicts both in South Asia and elsewhere” (p. 23). Do you see any prospects of revival of talks between India and Pakistan, especially given the current situation in Afghanistan and the recent meeting between the Taliban and India in Doha?

HJ: I am an optimist. I am of the opinion that the Kashmir deal negotiated between Indian and Pakistani diplomats during the 2004-2007 period is not dead – it can be revived as the template for a resolution as and when the political leadership on either side decide that they need to do something about the conflict. Kashmir is the mother of all conflicts between India and Pakistan – there is, to my mind, no getting away from that fact. Someday, it will need a resolution, a resolution that doesn’t change the existing borders. If non-alteration of the existing borders is the starting point of any future solution to Kashmir, the 2007 formula is a great template and a variation of this can be adopted by the two sides.

India and Pakistan have, in the past, entered a dialogue process in the wake of intensely violent periods. The Kashmir talks that began in 2004 are an example.

One is unsure how the Afghan situation will play out in the months and years ahead just as there is little clarity on how the situation in Afghanistan will impact on potential talks on Kashmir – it could either encourage such talks or discourage them. The current situation, in that sense, may hold little clue to what might happen in future. What is clear, though, is that India and Pakistan have, in the past, entered a dialogue process in the wake of intensely violent periods. The Kashmir talks that began in 2004 are an example. Since the Kargil war of 1999 till November 2003 when a ceasefire was agreed to by India and Pakistan in Kashmir, the situation between the two sides was tense. As I write in the paper, in December 2001, Pakistan-based terrorists carried out an attack at the Indian Parliament, killing seven security personnel and endangering the lives of Indian parliamentarians. This led to a mass mobilization of Indian troops along the border, codenamed Operation Parakram. The military build-up did not lead to a war, but the operation brought close to a million battle-ready soldiers eyeball-to-eyeball on the Indo-Pak border. Bilateral tension persisted through 2002 because of another terror strike against an Indian military facility in J&K even as ceasefire violations continued to rise on the LoC. In July 2003, there was another audacious terrorist attack on the Indian Army’s leadership in Jammu. And yet, in the wake of all this violence and tension, India and Pakistan decided in 2004 to start a peace process and appointed interlocutors to find a solution to Kashmir.

So I wouldn’t be too surprised if two future governments of India and Pakistan decide to hold talks on Kashmir.

About the contributor:

Dr Happymon Jacob is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). Prior to joining JNU in 2008, he held teaching positions at the University of Jammu in J&K and Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi; and research positions at the Centre for Air Power Studies, Delhi Policy Group, and Observer Research Foundation.  Dr Jacob is an elected member of the Pugwash Council since 2013. He is the author of Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics (Oxford University Press, 2019), and Line of Control: Traveling with the Indian and Pakistani Armies (Penguin Viking 2018). His concurrent engagements with the Indian media include a column with The Hindu and hosting of weekly video show on national security on The Wire.In.