Chinese Think Tanks in the Xi Jinping Era and Implications for Indian Engagement

Executive Summary

This paper examines the evolution of Chinese think tank ecosystem under Xi Jinping and the implications for India’s engagement with them. While think tanks are often seen as intermediaries between knowledge production and policymaking, their roles in China are shaped by the logic of an authoritarian one-party state. The rapid growth of the sector in the past decade, even referred to as “think tank fever,” highlights not only a demand for expert consultation but also the strategic intent of the Communist Party of China to strengthen its governance capacity, consolidate ideological control, and expand China’s global soft power.

By analysing official policy documents, institutional frameworks, and the experience of India–China think tank exchanges since the 2000s, the study argues that under Xi Jinping, think tanks have been deliberately institutionalised as controlled but vibrant spaces for expertise. They simultaneously serve as channels of Track II diplomacy, platforms of public diplomacy, and vehicles of regime legitimacy. For India, understanding this duality is essential to navigating asymmetries in bilateral think tank engagement and leveraging them strategically.

Rise of Chinese Think Tanks

China has witnessed an extraordinary expansion in its think tank sector over the past decade. In 2012, the Global Go to Think Tank Index (GDTTI) reported 429 think tanks in China; by 2022, the China Think Tank Directory listed 1,928 active institutions, second only to the United States (US). This rapid increase has been labelled a “great leap of think tanks.”

The growth has been driven by structural demand as well as deliberate state action. Xi Jinping’s 2015 directive, Opinions on Strengthening New-Type Think Tanks with Chinese Characteristics, called for creating “influential and internationally prestigious” think tanks that would serve the party and government in scientific decision-making and strengthen China’s voice abroad. This reflects a shift away from the earlier reform era when think tanks, though never fully independent, had relatively more flexibility. Xi has framed think tanks as central to two strategic goals: (a) modernisation of national governance by providing intellectual support to address China’s complex domestic challenges, and (b) soft power projection (i.e., “telling the China story well”) through Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy and international exchanges.

Dual Dilemmas of the Party-State

The paper highlights two enduring dilemmas that have motivated the Chinese state’s policy on think tanks.

1. Technocratic Innovation vs Authoritarian Control
The Chinese party-state needs specialised expertise to bolster China’s rapid economic and social transformation. Yet, there are political risks to autonomous intellectual activity. Think tanks could potentially be controlled spaces where expert advice is solicited but kept within acceptable ideological boundaries.

2. Plurality of Voices vs Unified National Narrative
A diverse and expanding think tank sector naturally generates multiple perspectives. But the CPC insists on maintaining narrative control, especially in foreign policy and ideological domains. Institutionalisation, administrative affiliation, and Propaganda Department oversight are aimed at ensuring that a multiplicity of actors does not undermine unity of narrative.

Functions and Limitations of Chinese Think Tanks

Chinese think tanks today perform a range of functions:

• Policy Advisory: Supplying internal reports (neican) and expert input to Party and government leaders and providing technical expertise on governance challenges in areas such as public finance, energy, environment, and urban planning.
• Theoretical Innovation: Contributing to CPC ideological frameworks, such as the “China Dream” and “Xi Jinping Thought.”
• Public Diplomacy: Hosting international conferences, think tank forums, and publishing English-language reports to shape foreign perceptions.
• Social Services: Relaying government policies in an accessible language to the public.

Despite these functions, structural constraints remain. These include dependence on the state for funding, ambiguous legal status, ability to attract talent, credibility gaps, and more focus on convening than research.

India–China Think Tank Engagements: Past and Present

Regular think tank exchanges between India and China began in the early 2000s and grew in scale through the 2010s. Indian institutions such as the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA), Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), and Observer Research Foundation (ORF) have hosted delegations from leading Chinese institutions like the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). The establishment of the India–China Think Tank Forum in 2015 under government auspices marked a peak in institutionalisation, with four forums held between 2016 and 2019. Exchanges declined sharply after the 2020 Galwan clashes, compounded by pandemic restrictions. However, since late 2024, as bilateral ties tentatively stabilise, think tank engagements are resuming.

Key Features of Engagements

Institutional Actors: Exchanges are dominated by government-, academy-, and university-affiliated Chinese think tanks (e.g., CICIR, State Council Development Research Centre (DRC), CASS, SIIS), with occasional participation from Party schools, NGOs, provincial governments, and media platforms.

Patterns of Engagement: From 2006–2019, there were regular exchanges, peaking around leadership transitions and high-level visits, with the India–China Think Tank Forum (2016–2019) institutionalising dialogue. Engagement declined sharply after the 2020 Galwan clashes but has cautiously resumed since late 2024.

Delegations and Themes: Delegations include senior scholars, area studies experts, and officials, discussing bilateral politics, regional/global geopolitics, border issues, energy, and governance.

The study identifies several implications of these dynamics for India’s policy community:

1. Strategic Value of Engagements

• Even if Chinese delegates present set narratives, exchanges provide Indian participants with insights into Party-state priorities and intellectual currents in China.
• They serve as signalling channels, especially when official relations are tense.

2. Challenges of Asymmetry

• Indian think tanks’ diversity, while intellectually valuable, can appear fragmented in dialogues.
• Chinese think tanks often benefit from greater resources, government linkages, and research capacity compared to their Indian counterparts.

3. Opportunities for India

• Strengthen Domestic Think Tank Capacity
  • Invest in area studies, language training, and specialised expertise on China.
  • Institutionalise record-keeping and coordination among Indian think tanks engaging with Chinese counterparts.
  • Build convening capacity to host regular, well-documented exchanges.
• Pursue Strategic Engagement
  • Engage Chinese think tanks with realistic expectations, recognising both their value as information channels and their limitations as extensions of the Party-state.
  • Use dialogues to signal Indian concerns, gather perspectives, and cultivate long-term networks.
• Leverage Multilateralism and Partnerships
  • Expand India–China exchanges into multilateral platforms such as Brazil, Russia India, China and South Africa (BRICS), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and Group of Twenty (G20)-linked forums.
  • Collaborate with international think tanks from the US, Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia to triangulate insights on China.
• Diversify Engagement Beyond Capitals
  • Facilitate exchanges with provincial and university-based think tanks in China to capture regional perspectives.
  • Encourage reciprocal exposure of Indian scholars to local Chinese institutions.

Conclusion

Chinese think tanks in the Xi era are both products and instruments of authoritarian governance, simultaneously providing controlled intellectual input at home and projecting China’s narrative abroad. For India, engaging with them requires neither naïve optimism nor outright dismissal, but a nuanced strategy that combines critical understanding with pragmatic dialogue.

Strengthening India’s own think tank ecosystem is crucial to addressing asymmetries. By building institutional resilience and fostering creative approaches to engagement, Indian think tanks can manage relations with Chinese counterparts more effectively and contribute to the China studies ecosystem in India.