From Insurgent Group to Interim Government: Taliban’s Legitimacy and Governance in Afghanistan

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Nitika Nayar interviews Dr. Niels Terpstra, on his paper, “Rebel Governance, Rebel Legitimacy, and External Intervention: Assessing Three Phases of Taliban Rule in Afghanistan,” published in Small Wars and Insurgencies, Volume 31 (6), in 2020.

With the recent capture of Kabul by the Taliban on August 15, the situation in Afghanistan is precarious, with civilian protests against the interim government, challenges mounted by anti-Taliban groups, and in-fighting within an increasingly factionalised Taliban. This volatile situation has also revived the debate on the ideology of the Taliban, the extent of its popular support and legitimacy, as well as the interim cabinet’s capacity to provide stability and development.

Based on fieldwork in Kunduz province and Kabul between 2013 and 2018, Terpstra’s research helps us understand the origins and renewed rise of the Taliban. He examines three key phases: the pre-1996 insurgency after the Soviet withdrawal; the period when the Taliban proclaimed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996 – 2001); and the post-2001 insurgency. By tracing the historical trajectory of the Taliban movement, Terpstra provides deep insights into how insurgents were able to gain influence among civilians and establish territorial control by leveraging different sources of “pragmatic and moral legitimacy” (p. 1147).

The Taliban’s ability to create a “relatively safe and stable environment” (p. 1162) by efficiently settling disputes through its “shadow judiciary” (p. 1157) and restoring order and security, accorded the rebel group much of its pragmatic legitimacy. Further, it derived moral legitimacy from religious sources and narratives about foreign ‘enemy’ forces. As a result, the insurgency was able to set up a parallel administration comprising provincial and district governors, judges, police, and intelligence commanders, as well as a system of taxation. In many districts, therefore, the seeds were already sown for a new Taliban state.

Terpstra’s work makes important new empirical and conceptual contributions to the discipline of conflict studies in South Asia and helps dispel notions of the “‘failed state’ paradigm” (p. 1144). It explains how even during conflict, complex networks exist between rebel groups and civilians that help maintain some level of social and political order. From Myanmar to Afghanistan, India is surrounded by neighbours increasingly confronted by conflict and civil war. Understanding how rebel groups build legitimacy and come to govern large civilian populations is critical for New Delhi to craft suitable and innovative policy responses.

Nitika Nayar: Your research notes that post 2001, the Taliban have made certain course corrections and learned from past strategic miscalculations. For example, there has been a greater focus on “their brand” and messaging (p. 1160). We have seen similar tactics play out on the international stage, where the group has welcomed western journalists to present itself in a new, reformed avatar in its bid to gain international legitimacy. With a ground assessment from your fieldwork that dates back as recent as 2018, what are your expectations of Taliban 2.0? Apart from their new political savvy, do you see any substantive elements of change in their administration?

Niels Terpstra: In some ways, we observe history repeating itself, but important changes should be noted too. Taking over a state’s bureaucracy and territory is a different task from governing it. After the Taliban’s first capture of Kabul in 1996, the state infrastructure was largely destroyed, its wealth looted, and many public service professionals had fled the country.  Back then, running the state apparatus was new to the Taliban and it was a daunting task for these religiously schooled fighters from the countryside to do so effectively. They had none, or very limited administrative knowledge or expertise. Hence, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)’s starting point was a small economy and a weak administration. The deplorable economic situation was intensified by international sanctions.

Currently, the Taliban clearly have more experience in governing the country because of their 1990s regime and the fact that they had already been governing significant parts of the country locally over the past decade.

Currently, the Taliban clearly have more experience in governing the country because of their 1990s regime and the fact that they had already been governing significant parts of the country locally over the past decade. They have become more political savvy indeed, in terms of using technology strategically and in their external communications. This is, however, not to say that the Taliban’s ideology has changed substantively. We see a somewhat stronger state apparatus but similar problems in terms of finance and technocratic capabilities. Finally, their focus in the first months has been on maintaining internal cohesion and less on an effective response to the country’s impending economic and humanitarian crises, with the general population as the main victim of this.

NN: After the capture of Kabul by the Taliban, there have been ensuing operations by the resistance movement and other anti-Taliban insurgent groups in the country. In such a situation, do you see the possibility of “parallel hierarchies” propping up across Afghanistan, which may be governed by such groups and perhaps also by competing factions within the Taliban?

NT: This certainly is a possibility, particularly for the anti-Taliban groups. In certain ways, the frame through which we looked at state-insurgent dynamics until the take-over has now flipped. As the Taliban have come to form the central government, it potentially faces similar problems like any other incumbent government. It can experience escalating factionalism within its own ranks, but it can also face stronger resistance by other armed groups. An example of this, is the way in which the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) has continued to stage attacks. The Taliban as an insurgency was already fighting ISKP for a few years but – in a way – it remained a ‘bystander’ to ISKP attacks in Kabul, for example. It has now assumed the task of maintaining security and preventing these attacks to take place across Afghanistan, including Kabul and other bigger cities. The prevention of more and excessive attacks by ISKP is something the population will – rightfully – expect from them, but it is very doubtful if the Taliban will be able to deliver it.

NN: In your article, you argue that the Taliban spun the narrative of foreign ‘enemy’ forces on Afghan soil to boost its legitimacy among civilians and justify its territorial control. How was the Taliban’s own proximity to external actors, such as those in Pakistan, perceived by the different civilian groups you interviewed and did this impact its influence during the insurgency? If local Afghans made distinctions between foreign enemy forces and friendlier ones, are there any lessons for countries in the region as they devise their outreach strategies to engage critical intelligence assets on the ground, and civilians affected by the current humanitarian crisis?

NT: In the article, I show that the ‘foreign enemy frame’ was one of the elements in the Taliban’s narrative during the post-2001 insurgency. As social scientists, we know that the classification of ‘foreign’ and ‘non-foreign’ is partly factual but should at the same time be seen as a political social construct and a matter of framing. We also know from the conflict studies literature that these political social constructs and framing processes can work effectively to mobilize combatants and non-combatants during armed conflict. Social processes that take place during armed conflict may further harden the boundaries of these categories and/or identities.

The ‘good’ Taliban were seen [by civilians] as indigenous and more acceptable because they are considered to have local, ethnic, or tribal ties [whereas] the ‘bad’ Taliban were seen as ‘foreigners’ and in several cases, as excessively influenced by Pakistan.

What came up in my study and other research on the topic is the distinctions that some civilians employed to classify different types of Taliban that ruled their communities. One often heard distinction between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban. The ‘good’ Taliban came from the community, from close by. These were seen as indigenous and more acceptable because they are considered to have local, ethnic, or tribal ties. The ‘bad’ Taliban were seen as ‘outsiders’ or ‘foreigners’, and in several cases, seen as excessively influenced by Pakistan, or Pakistani intelligence services more specifically. This example does not do justice to the complexities and particularities at different localities, but the distinction between ‘foreign’ and opposite categories is politically significant.

For the humanitarian responses it remains crucial that countries in the region put the well-being of civilians centre-stage, regardless of anything else. I am obviously aware of regional interests and how this involves complex decisions and choices. However, I cannot emphasize enough that the provision of essential services for the civilian population requires our full attention. Humanitarian access remains challenging but continued efforts are direly needed. A steady, light, and balanced involvement is necessary.

NN: Apart from your fieldwork in Afghanistan, a common thread seen across your other research on rebel governance is how the presence of international troops has a counter-productive effect on insurgent groups, boosting their popularity among civilians. You point out a similar trend in the civil war in Sri Lanka, where the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) had an impact on the legitimacy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). There has been much discussion on the limitations of international forces used as instruments for state-building. Is the deployment of military force still a valid option for countries seeking to secure interests beyond their borders?

The bigger the footprint during the military deployment, the bigger the power vacuum will be with a sudden, or even a gradual, withdrawal.

NT: Yes, a few lessons can be drawn, though we must factor in that any deployment of military force by other countries should be assessed in its own specific time and place and bound by unique contextual factors. The first lesson is to carefully plan and dedicate sufficient thought to possible exit strategies. Both in the withdrawal of the IKPF in Sri Lanka in 1990 and in the withdrawal of international forces in 2021, we observe a power vacuum that was left behind. The bigger the footprint during the military deployment, the bigger the power vacuum will be with a sudden, or even a gradual, withdrawal. Simply adding more troops, as happened in Afghanistan during ‘the surge’, therefore, can undermine a successful exit strategy. It has been a complete turn-around from spending over a trillion dollars to a complete withdrawal. Following Rory Stewart, my advice is steadier, lighter, and more balanced involvement. Second, the Afghanistan experience teaches us that legitimacy matters. A technocratic so-called ‘a-political’ approach to state-building neglects the inherent political tensions that foreign interventions create. Just like Iraq, the international intervention in Afghanistan created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and we know that losers often become spoilers in the process of achieving peace and stability.

NN: Through fieldwork and ethnographic research, your article brings forth a new, bottom-up approach to understand the local experiences of conflict. As we see recent scholarship on South Asia increasingly uses similar methodologies to better understand insurgency, does this new approach have any limitations on findings, and what advice would you have for emerging scholars aspiring towards a nuanced understanding of conflict in South Asia?

NT: I certainly see the value of doing fieldwork and ethnographic research. In conflict studies, we must be able to bridge analyses on the micro, meso, and macro level. What the rebel governance literature and the contentious politics literature more generally have shown us, is that meso level analyses provide explanations that had remained ‘unseen’ from a macro or micro perspective only. Naturally, regional dynamics matter for our understanding of how the Taliban recently came to power, but at the same time we should pay attention to how the Taliban had already been governing large swaths of territory for nearly a decade. In this insurgent-civilian relationship, many good academic and policy-relevant research questions can be asked for all kinds of insurgencies throughout South Asia. About five years ago, for example, I remember that my research questions about rebel governance did not resonate well with foreign policymakers. They were mainly interested in ‘good governance’ of the Afghan state. The ways in which insurgencies govern and attempt to gain legitimacy in competition with the incumbent government are, however, crucial as we have now observed with the Taliban take-over. My advice, therefore, is to bridge different levels of analysis and different sources of data as much as possible.

About the author:

Niels Terpstra is Assistant Professor at the Utrecht School of Governance (USG) and Advisor at USG Consultancy. His research focuses on questions about governance, legitimacy, security, various forms of violence, insurgency, terrorism, and international relations. As policy advisor he advises and evaluates public organisations.

Academically, Niels has published articles and book chapters with publishers like Taylor & Francis, Cambridge University Press, Wolters Kluwer, and Routledge. In 2018 he was invited by the US Embassy in the Hague to participate as expert in an IVLP program on counterterrorism in the United States. Furthermore, he became a fellow of the Hofvijverkring in the Hague. Niels was awarded a national NWO grant for a four-year PhD research project about governance and legitimacy in conflict-affected areas. In 2013, Niels received the J.C. Baak MA thesis prize for research on the enhancement of peaceful societies, awarded by the Royal Holland Society of Sciences and Humanities.

Over the past years, Niels was involved in research and advisory projects for the Netherlands Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and peace organization PAX, and the Universität der Bundeswehr München.

Email: N.M.Terpstra@uu.nl