India’s China Conundrum: Learning from the Past?

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Shruti Jargad interviews Avtar Singh Bhasin on his new book, Nehru, Tibet, and China, published by Penguin Random House India in 2021.

Bhasin’s voluminous collection ‘India-China Relations 1947-2000: A Documentary Study’ and the ten-volume compilation of India-Pakistan documents are a treasure trove for any Indian foreign policy student.  In this new book, Bhasin builds on his meticulous reading of archival materials that remain largely inaccessible, including some of the Nehru Papers. He provides his interpretation on the reasoning behind the decisions made by top leaders that culminated in the 1962 India-China war.

The book aims to dispel notions of Chinese betrayal in the minds of the Indian public. Bhasin argues that the skewed narrative and secrecy over the archival documents obscure costly policy judgments that Prime Minister Nehru made. While Nehru was aware that India would come face-to-face with China upon the Communist takeover of Tibet, he was adamant in his belief that “there was no chance of any military danger to India arising from any possible change in Tibet” (p. 45). Bhasin notes that the Prime Minister also bet on his long-held notion of Asian solidarity where “China and India would play a dominant role” (p. xxvi). The book argues that the contradictions in his policy were revealed when Nehru let go of several opportunities to discuss the border question, in 1954, at the time of signing the Tibet Trade Agreement, and again in 1960 during the Delhi Summit with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Instead, when signs of border conflict emerged, Nehru made unilateral moves and launched the forward policy even without sufficient defence capabilities.

This book presents more light on extensive archival materials that are important to understand how India dealt with China in the past, and how that shapes contemporary India-China relations. Bhasin’s perspective concentrates on the pitfalls in the foreign policymaking process six decades ago, including the lack of preparedness on the border and keeping the public in the dark about the actual situation. At present, when China remains India’s most significant foreign policy challenge and with the border conflict flaring up since 2017, these historical issues are, once again, relevant.

Shruti Jargad: In your book, you highlight the contradictions in Nehru’s China policy (p. 72). Presently, on the one hand, India is confronted with an unresolved boundary and increased Chinese transgressions, but on the other hand, China continues to serve as its largest trading partner.  Is this a ‘contradiction’? How can India balance its economic interests with the new political reality?

A.S. Bhasin: The present situation is a legacy of the past. After the boundary question was frozen during the visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, the bilateral relations moved towards trade and other areas. Given the price advantage, Indian industrialists found it economical to trade with China as compared to other markets resulting in increased dependence on China. Similarly, the price advantage of Chinese consumer goods resulted in a phenomenal surge in their imports too.  Chinese import from India as compared to its exports throughout have remained at a substantial lower level resulting in a huge imbalance in trade. For instance, despite the pandemic and adversarial relations in the eight months (January to August) of the current year (2021), China’s exports to India are $58 billion as against India’s exports of $19.85 billion. Unless Indian industry and business diversify or develop indigenous sources, the imbalance and dependence on China would continue and this contradiction is unlikely to go away any time soon.

SJ: In your chapters, you note China’s dealings with Myanmar, Russia, and Nepal (p. 251). More recently, it has also signed an agreement with Bhutan to speed up border negotiations. Why has China been willing or able to resolve historical border disputes with its other neighbours, except India?

ASB: Peaceful borders between neighbours are the product of negotiated agreements by adjusting rival claims, interests and ambitions at points where they adjoin. China had a boundary problem with all its neighbours till the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 giving way to the birth of many countries. The borders of new countries were settled largely to their mutual satisfaction thereafter. It should be noted that all these countries then were in a much weaker position than China. With Vietnam, it fought a war, lost and then resolved its differences on the borders and settled its boundary.  China however, managed to create an impression generally of its reasonable attitude towards the boundary question. However, the dispute with India remains like a sore thumb. Prime Minister Nehru on 20 November 1951 had declared in Parliament that our maps show that “the McMahon Line is our boundary and that is our boundary, map or no map.” Later Girija Shankar Bajpai, as Governor of Bombay and earlier Secretary General in the Ministry of External Affairs had said “since China had never accepted the McMahon Line, the frontier question could be hardly regarded as settled”.

The unilateral alteration of the international border and insistence that even if it was not demarcated, it was understood by usage and custom… has since [Nehru] remained the bane of the India-China territorial problem.

In the western sector, where the Ladakh border adjoins Aksai Chin, in the Survey of India maps, it was shown as “undefined”. Nehru had said it was “defined chiefly by long usage and custom.” Later, he ordered replacement of old maps with new maps showing this part of the international border as “defined” with a new line drawn unilaterally and made it non-negotiable. The unilateral alteration of the international border and insistence that even if it was not demarcated, it was understood by usage and custom and hence there was no need for any fresh demarcation, has since remained the bane of the India-China territorial problem. The recently promulgated Chinese Boundary law would make a difficult problem much more difficult to resolve.

SJ: In 1959, when taken into confidence by Nehru about deteriorating relations with China, USSR leader Khrushchev had advised India to ‘settle borders by give and take’ (p. 300). Later in 1962, you assert that Nehru’s letter ‘practically outsourced the defence of India to the US’ (p. 304). In the current context, what role do external actors such as the United States and Russia play in the recent flare-up at the border?

ASB: In the fifties and sixties, the border question was essentially bilateral and the Soviet advice in 1959 was only friendly and private since ambassador KPS Menon had raised it with Khrushchev. As far as the United States was concerned, it only responded to Indian request for assistance in 1962. Essentially, there was no foreign intervention of any kind nor any foreign country took any public position on the conflict.

Presently, the Indian problem with China has assumed international dimensions. China now suffers from hubris and considers itself a “super power” and has run into problems with many countries on one count or the other—with the United Kingdom on Hong Kong, with Australia on trade, with Japan on the ownership of Senkaku Island in East China sea, with Southeast countries on the South China Sea, and the United States on its projection of military power. The world is now much more inter-connected than in the sixties and countries do take position on any issue which threatens the peace generally anywhere. This is how the international community today reacts where ever and whenever any threat to peace is perceived.

SJ: ‘China continued to nibble at India’s borders without raising too much concern in Delhi. There were scattered incidents at Walong, Shipki La and so on’ (p. 214). Do you think Chinese aggression on the border since 2017 is a leaf out of the 1962 rulebook?

Since Nehru had declared India’s border sacrosanct and not open for discussion, China adopted the strategy of nibbling on the borders to make India aware that there was a border dispute which needed a settlement.

ASB: I do not think so. China, after occupation of Tibet had two objectives, to end India’s special rights and privileges in Tibet and then make India settle its borders with Tibet which had become China’s border. After India had been squeezed out of Tibet in 1954, it was time for China to work on the borders. Since Nehru had declared India’s border sacrosanct and not open for discussion, China adopted the strategy of nibbling on the borders to make India aware that there was a border dispute which needed a settlement. Now there is no doubt about the dispute and hence, infringements are with a specific purpose which China may have in any particular incident.  The borders then were also not manned as they are now, and there is immediate response to any infringement.

SJ: You mention that post-colonial borders reflect “vagaries and irrationalities of history” (p. 327) but at the same time allude to the importance of “agreed, well defined, delineated and demarcated borders” (p. 193). What do you think are the preconditions for India and China to move from border disengagement to the boundary question?

ASB: The narrative in the sixties that led to the conflict in 1962 and which the successive governments have followed meticulously was that China had stabbed India in the back. It has, since then, got firmly implanted in the minds of the people of India. Resolution of any dispute requires give and take. Unfortunately, any compromise with the held position now would create a hue and cry in the country, that peace is being bought at the cost of national honour. The first and foremost requirement is to correct the skewed understanding of our own people and convince them about their flawed understanding of those events, by opening the archives. The debate that is unleashed today in the media by ill-informed experts on the basis of half backed facts, leaves the TV-driven public more confused than any wiser. Access to archives would lead to well-informed debate in the country and the public would be ready to accept any solution by give and take. Once this process has been successfully completed, the ground would be prepared for discussions with China to arrive at settlement, by give and take.

The Chinese, by the promulgation of the new Boundary Law, are seeking to reverse their earlier held position of settlement by the quid pro quo principle: China accepting the McMahon Line if India accepted Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin.

The Chinese, by the promulgation of the new Boundary Law, are seeking to reverse their earlier held position of settlement by the quid pro quo principle: China accepting the McMahon Line if India accepted Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin. Since then, it has signed several agreements on peace and tranquillity to maintain peace and status quo on the borders, which it must honour.

SJ: In several chapters, you mention India gave up not only the special rights in Tibet that were inherited from the British but also long-standing cultural and diplomatic ties in an attempt to appease China. What is the role of Tibet in India-China bilateral relations in the present-day context? Can India still leverage its historic trade and cultural ties with Tibet today?

Tibet today has ceased to be a factor in India-China relations and India can no longer leverage its past relationship with Tibet for resolution of the present problem with China.

ASB: The simple answer is, Tibet has no role to play in Sino-Indian relations generally or in the settlement of the boundary question. Tibet today has ceased to be a factor in India-China relations and India can no longer leverage its past relationship with Tibet for resolution of the present problem with China.

About the author:

Avtar Singh Bhasin retired from the Ministry of External Affairs in 1993 after three-decade of service as head of the Historical Division.  Since then, he has taken to academic research.  He was Senior Fellow at the Indian Council of Historical Research and an Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Studies of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.  He has produced several studies on South Asia. His publications include a series, each in five volumes on India’s relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal and another ten-volume study on Pakistan. His last attempt in this series was a five-volume a study of India’s Relations with China, 1947-2000 which is the forerunner for the present book. He also published for the Ministry of External Affairs an annual series titled-India’s Foreign Relations from 2002 to 2013. His other books are (i) Some Called it Partition, Some Freedom, (ii) India in Sri Lanka, Between Lion and the Tigers, and (iii) India-Pakistan: Neighbours at Odds.