From Traditional Ties to Critical Minerals: India–Russia Relations in Transition

Introduction

October 2025 marks 25 years since India and Russia elevated their bilateral ties from general cooperation and preliminary discussions to a strategic partnership. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin in August–September 2025, Prime Minister Modi and President Putin reaffirmed the depth of the India–Russia partnership. Their discussion at the sidelines ranged across topics of trade and security cooperation, reflecting shared priorities at a time when global alignments are uncertain. For India, the engagement with Russia is not merely transactional but part of a broader effort to diversify strategic dependencies, safeguard energy security, and reinforce its position in a shifting multipolar order. The United States’ (US) decision to impose 50% tariffs on Indian imports in response to continued purchases of Russian oil underscores that far from being weakened by external pressure, the partnership demonstrates adaptive resilience.

While defence remains central, the two countries are increasingly recalibrating their economic engagement to focus on critical minerals, rare earth elements, and green energy opportunities.

The partnership between India and Russia has historically been shaped by defence cooperation, hydrocarbons trade, and diplomatic alignment in multilateral forums. Yet, this relationship is now undergoing a structural transformation. While defence remains central, the two countries are increasingly recalibrating their economic engagement to focus on critical minerals, rare earth elements, and green energy opportunities. This shift is not simply commercial; it reflects broader geopolitical pressures on both countries, from Western sanctions on Russia’s stifling its exports to India’s urgent need for resilient supply chains for its green energy transition.

Recent announcements and joint initiatives highlight this pivot. In August 2025, India and Russia reaffirmed their intent to collaborate beyond hydrocarbons and arms trade. They have elevated critical minerals to the upcoming agenda of their leadership-level meetings, recognising their mutual stakes in securing a future driven by high-tech and green energy applications.

This shift dovetails with recent domestic policy manoeuvres. In early 2025, under the National Critical Minerals Mission (NCMM), India’s Union Cabinet approved a ₹1,500 crore ($15 billion) incentive scheme to promote recycling of critical minerals, targeting 40,000 tonnes of recovered material over six years, underscoring the push for circularity and self-reliance. Simultaneously, Russia, hosting an estimated 28.7 million tonnes across 15 rare earth metals, has emerged as a player of strategic value, with 22% of global rare earth resources. Russia has announced plans to scale up lithium production to 60,000 metric tonnes annually by 2030, while mining remained minimal at just 27 tonnes in 2023. Russia is regarded as one of the world’s leading mining nations, ranking among the top global producers for key minerals such as rare earths, diamonds, platinum group metals, and gold. Its vast territorial endowment and established mining industry give Russia significant leverage in the international minerals market and opportunities to shape supply chains beyond hydrocarbons and energy fuels.

Therefore, as India accelerates its clean energy transition and industrial modernisation, Russia offers a vital partner in broadening the mineral base essential for technological and geopolitical autonomy. This blog examines the drivers behind the transformation within this relationship from hydrocarbons to critical minerals, Russia’s domestic policy ecosystem for critical minerals, a history of India and Russia’s energy cooperation, followed by the opportunities to further this collaboration.

From Hydrocarbons and Defence to Critical Minerals

India’s strategic relationship with Russia is founded on a long-standing partnership dating back to the 1950s with the Soviet Union (USSR), which witnessed a deepening during the Cold War period. This partnership was built on political trust founded on cooperation in economic planning and development of India’s heavy-industry sector. The USSR was a principal partner in India’s five-year plan model, investing in steel, mining, heavy machinery and other capital-intensive sectors that underpinned India’s industrialisation drive.

Formal trade and technical agreements date back to the 1953 trade treaty (Indo- Soviet Trade Agreement). Many of the following bilateral arrangements embedded patterns of resource exchange and technology cooperation (minerals, fertilisers, machinery) that outlived the Soviet collapse and were inherited post-1991. Driven largely by energy, economic ties between the two partners have deepened, with trade figures rising from under $10 billion before 2020 to $68.7 billion in 2024-25.

Nuclear and energy cooperation formed a particularly durable strand of resource diplomacy. Assistance on reactors, fuel supply frameworks and civilian nuclear technology (including the long-running Kudankulam project and related supply arrangements) created institutional linkages that continue to shape strategic resource ties today.

Russian reserves, thus, present a compelling alternative, enabling India to diversify its sources and safeguard its burgeoning clean-energy infrastructure.

For decades, the India-Russia partnership was anchored in defence and hydrocarbons. Over 60% of India’s defence equipment is of Russian origin, and Russia remains a key supplier of crude oil, especially after Western sanctions diverted Russian exports toward Asian markets. However, these sectors now face constraints and vulnerabilities. India’s defence diversification strategy has reduced its dependence on Russian equipment, and Western sanctions complicate financial transactions and logistics for oil trade. The global shift to decarbonisation is gradually eroding the long-term centrality of hydrocarbons.

The realignment is also reflective of broader global dynamics. China’s near-monopoly on rare earth processing has challenged many nations’ supply chain resilience. For India, the one-sided dependence on Chinese critical mineral imports poses a clear vulnerability, especially for minerals like lithium, nickel and cobalt, where India is 100% import dependent. Russian reserves, thus, present a compelling alternative, enabling India to diversify its sources and safeguard its burgeoning clean-energy infrastructure.

It is against this backdrop that both sides are exploring critical minerals and rare earths as a new frontier of cooperation. Russia possesses vast reserves of lithium, cobalt, and rare earths in Siberia and the Far East, while India faces acute supply constraints in these resources, which are essential for electric vehicles, semiconductors, defence systems, and renewable energy technologies.

Russia’s Domestic Critical Minerals Ecosystem

Russia’s approach to critical minerals is deeply embedded in its national security framework and its broader strategy for economic diversification. As a country heavily impacted by Western sanctions and global geopolitical tensions, Russia aims to reduce its reliance on oil and gas revenues, which have traditionally dominated its export economy. This strategic pivot involves a robust focus on critical minerals, such as lithium, chromium, manganese, rare earth elements, tungsten, molybdenum, and niobium, that are essential for modern technological applications and the global green energy transition.

Russia’s vision for critical minerals is articulated in its “Strategy for the Development of the Mineral Resource Base until 2050,” approved in 2024, which sets ambitious goals to sustain current production levels while accelerating exploration and deep processing of scarce minerals. Central to this strategy is achieving full import substitution and self-sufficiency by 2030 in twelve critical raw materials, including lithium, rare earth metals, manganese, and chromium. The strategy prioritises geological exploration in underdeveloped but resource-rich regions like Siberia, the Far East, and the Arctic. To support this, Russia has streamlined licensing, introduced tax incentives, and pushed investment in technological innovation for mineral extraction and processing. Russia is fostering domestic innovation and alternative technologies while deepening partnerships with like-minded countries such as India.

Table 1: Key Russian critical mineral policies from 2015 onwards 

Source: Authors’ compilation based on various sources. Not exhaustive. 

Russia’s current policy environment around critical minerals is shaped by a trend toward tightening foreign investment and strengthening state oversight in strategic sectors. The government has increasingly emphasised the role of ministries, state-owned corporations such as Rosatom and Rosgeo, and sovereign wealth funds in guiding the development of upstream mining projects. Strategic minerals, particularly those linked to defence, energy, and advanced technologies, are treated as national assets, with investments screened carefully to limit foreign participation in sensitive areas. This reflects Moscow’s broader strategy of maintaining sovereignty over resource wealth while directing capital and industrial policy toward projects deemed critical for long-term security and economic resilience. Such state-led coordination ensures that strategic minerals remain under domestic control, even as Russia selectively engages international partners like India to diversify markets and reduce reliance on China or the West.

The India-Russia cooperation in critical minerals is situated within the broader energy and industrial technology partnership.

India-Russia Energy and Critical Minerals Cooperation

The India-Russia cooperation in critical minerals is situated within the broader energy and industrial technology partnership. Key initiatives include joint research and technology agreements between Indian institutions like CSIR-Institute of Minerals and Materials Technology (IMMT) and Russian entities such as Rosatom’s Giredmet and National University of Science and Technology (NUST MISIS) for advanced mineral processing. Additionally, joint efforts span underground coal gasification, aerospace science, and modern industrial infrastructure development. Recent dialogues have seen India and Russia formalising cooperation protocols focused on mining equipment technology transfer, exploration capacity building, and sustainable resource development.

India and Russia share 17 minerals on their critical lists, including lithium, graphite, rare earths, and potash (see Table 2). India’s list is more focused on minerals essential for clean energy, high-tech electronics, and defence. Russia’s approach is more comprehensive, encompassing a wider array of minerals and even some non-traditional resources, reflecting the state’s emphasis on both technological and industrial self-sufficiency as well as its vast mineral endowment.

Table 2: Common critical minerals between India and Russia

Source: Authors’ compilation based on multiple sources.

This complementarity is the foundation of the new partnership as Russia seeks reliable buyers and investment partners amid sanctions and India seeks strategic access to secure, long-term supplies. Over the past decade, this institutional legacy of trade channels, state-to-state platforms and scientific links has been repurposed to address contemporary supply-chain vulnerabilities. With China dominating downstream rare earth processing and global market tensions rising, India has increasingly looked to Russia not only for hydrocarbons and nuclear fuel but also as a potential supplier and partner for lithium, rare earths, copper, nickel and other critical minerals. There is a clear indication and willingness from India to source critical minerals from Russia. Recent working-level meetings and ministerial dialogues explicitly put rare earths and critical minerals cooperation on the bilateral agenda.

Table 3 lists some of the key cooperation initiatives and agreements between the two partners focused on critical minerals, while also identifying their status of development.

Table 3: India-Russia critical minerals cooperation

Source: Authors’ compilation based on various sources. Not exhaustive. 

The emerging focus on critical minerals and green energy marks a structural rebalancing of India-Russia relations, no longer solely defined by hydrocarbons and defence. For Russia, India offers an indispensable Asian partner beyond China. For India, beyond extraction, Russia also offers expertise in metallurgy and mineral processing.

Ways to Enhance the Partnership

To deepen and secure India-Russia critical minerals cooperation, the following actionable suggestions could be pursued:

1. Joint Exploration and Mining Ventures: Establish bilateral joint ventures for exploration and mining of critical minerals in Russian territories, leveraging Indian investment and Russian resources and expertise. KABIL, the GSI, as well as Indian private sector companies, could partner with Russian state-owned entities such as Rosgeo or Rostec to undertake geological surveys, feasibility studies, and mine development projects. This collaboration would provide India with access to upstream resources while enabling Russia to attract foreign investment, diversify export markets, and strengthen its position in non-fossil mineral exports. Adapted to the Russian context, the joint exploration framework under the India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership could serve as a model.
2. Technology Transfer and R&D Collaboration: Expand joint R&D programs between Indian and Russian research institutions on advanced extraction and processing technologies, including battery material innovations and processing rare earths. Particularly in areas such as rare earth separation, nuclear materials, and advanced alloys—domains where state corporations like Rosatom and Russian research institutes have decades of experience. Russia’s ability to process loparite and other rare-earth-bearing ores into separated oxides and metals is especially valuable, given that China currently dominates global refining capacity. Collaboration in this domain could allow India not only to secure raw materials but also to develop domestic processing capabilities through joint ventures, technology transfer, and co-investment in downstream facilities.
3. Infrastructure and Logistics Synergies: Building integrated logistics networks could enhance the viability of Indo-Russian cooperation on critical minerals. This includes leveraging the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor to establish a faster and more reliable shipping link for raw and processed minerals. India and Russia could also co-develop industrial clusters and mineral processing hubs in the Russian Far East, with Indian investment in port infrastructure, storage, and multimodal connectivity. Such initiatives would not only reduce dependence on traditional Europe-Asia routes but also align with India’s ambitions under the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) framework and Russia’s Arctic development strategy, creating a stable logistics backbone for resource trade.
4. Policy Coordination and Strategic Dialogue: Institutionalise regular high-level dialogues focused specifically on critical minerals policy, regulatory harmonisation, and supply chain resilience, including coordinated responses to global market disruptions. To sustain long-term cooperation, India and Russia could consider institutionalising a Critical Minerals Working Group under their existing Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC). This platform could also explore trilateral engagement with other resource-rich partners in the region, such as Mongolia and Kazakhstan, to create a more diversified and secure critical minerals network.

These steps will ensure a resilient, technology-driven partnership that supports mutual energy transition goals and strategic autonomy for both countries. This partnership provides India with upstream resource security (access to Russian deposits) and midstream technological leverage (processing know-how), both of which are indispensable for building resilient supply chains in clean energy, semiconductors, and defence manufacturing.

India and Russia’s collaboration in this space could reshape not only their bilateral relationship but also the global contest over resources and supply chains.

The partnership is not without risks from sanctions to infrastructure bottlenecks, but the geopolitical logic is compelling. As rare earths and lithium become the “new oil” of the 21st century, India and Russia’s collaboration in this space could reshape not only their bilateral relationship but also the global contest over resources and supply chains.

Note: The authors would like to thank Dr. Constantino Xavier, Senior Fellow, CSEP and Dr. Pooja Ramamurthi, Fellow, CSEP for their comments and feedback.