An Indian View on ASEAN

This is an edited and revised adaptation of remarks by Shivshankar Menon from the E-Launch and Discussion of The State of Southeast Asia: 2023 Survey Report conducted by the ASEAN Studies Centre at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, on February 9, 2023.

 ASEAN has responded well to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has borne and mitigated the economic consequences effectively, and political responses have been restrained, recognising that there is little that third parties can do to solve the issue or to end the conflict caused by the invasion.

ASEAN has a good track record of changing and adapting to change. Historically, it was formed in difficult circumstances, and it has adapted to each subsequent geopolitical shift and change in Asia: after the Vietnam War, China-US rapprochement, now rivalry, the unipolar moment and the end of the Cold War, the global economic slowdown after 2008, and so on. In today’s tough times, ASEAN will likely change and evolve once again.

(Responding to a question) In the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the international community’s response would not be the same as in the case of Ukraine. Conflict over Taiwan would not only be an issue of local order but one involving the dynamic heart of the world economy, in a geopolitical cockpit where all the major powers have significant interests, and where four nuclear weapon states (and two recessed nuclear weapon states) are in close proximity with conflicting interests.

The Ukraine conflict exacerbated economic and other trends that were already there before the Russian invasion — a global, particularly Chinese, economic slowdown, rising food and energy prices, US-Russia tensions, Russia-NATO differences on European order, and the question of Ukraine itself. In contrast, conflict over Taiwan would create new crises such as one in the semiconductor industry. More important, depending on the outcome, who wins, it could determine the survival of regimes in major powers, and it would change the geopolitical control of one of the world’s most important waterways and of the entire Indo-Pacific. Therefore, such a conflict would not remain a proxy war fought through surrogates and respecting certain limits to escalation, particularly nuclear, as Ukraine has done so far.

(When asked about ASEAN’s weight in the region) As for China-US competition for influence in the region, I think ASEAN has done well by balancing and hedging at the same time, and by not choosing sides. However, major power competition also opens up space for other powers like ASEAN. We know that China operates on a hierarchical view of the world and international order. So the bigger ASEAN can make itself, by showing more unity of purpose and action on regional issues, such as on Myanmar and on the South China Sea, the more seriously China will take ASEAN. As for the US which is looking for partners in Asia, again a more explicit and common political and security stance would complement ASEAN’s economic weight. Third countries in the region, such as India, would also welcome more ASEAN activism and would be happy to see it taking the lead on political issues.

Broader cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, the US, and EU would certainly make a significant impact in maintaining the rules-based international system. Just as ASEAN initiatives led to the East Asia Summit (EAS) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which have increased economic predictability, improved the climate and conditions for business, and provided forums for discussion of difficult issues.

There are several reasons why India’s standing and trust ratings among ASEAN nations have improved in recent times. One reason could be the deepening cooperation between India and ASEAN. While this is not enough to fully explain the improvement, it has contributed to it. India has also been behaving like other major powers in the region, but has not been as involved in ASEAN’s internal political issues. The changing role and nature of the Indian diaspora could be another factor.

The fear within ASEAN of becoming an arena for great power conflict also makes India’s behaviour as a responsible and predictable power on the international stage attractive. India’s strategic autonomy and its policy of not choosing sides, but seeking a third way, unaligned in today’s world between orders while working with all has been appreciated. Finally, India’s position as a source of growth in the post-pandemic world economy could also be contributing to the improvement in its standing among ASEAN nations. However, there is still a need for India to do more to improve these low numbers and fully realise the potential of this partnership.

For the original video discussion, please click here.