BIMSTEC at 25: Fostering Sustainable Regional Cooperation

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Bhavyanshi Sinha interviews Sreeradha Datta on her book, BIMSTEC: The Journey and the Way Ahead, published by Vivekananda International Foundation in 2021.

Founded in 1997, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) brings together seven countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar) comprising 22 per cent of the world’s population and 3.8 per cent of the world’s GDP. Much of BIMSTEC’s focus has been on economic cooperation and transportation infrastructure in one of the world’s least integrated regions.

The sixth BIMSTEC summit is scheduled for November 2023 under the chairmanship of Thailand, the lead country for the connectivity sector. At the fifth BIMSTEC summit, member states adopted the BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity, comprising 267 flagship projects worth US$ 124 billion. About 50 percent to 61 percent of these projects are in the roads and road transportation subsector. The detailed financing proposal will become clearer during the implementation period. For the same, a study is ongoing with the support of Asian Development Bank (ADB). Thailand has committed to making the group’s efforts more tangible by focusing on road linkages between India, Myanmar, and Thailand and implementing the BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement, the Motor Vehicles Agreement, and the draft Agreement on Maritime Transport Cooperation.

In this timely book, scholars from across the region write about the achievements, impediments, and possible solutions to furthering connectivity between South and Southeast Asia via BIMSTEC. With chapters addressing significant issues such as sociocultural perspectives, trade, investment and energy, security and defence, the book offers a comprehensive view of the current and future prospects of BIMSTEC as a regional initiative. Experts from member states provide in-depth analyses and solutions to facilitate the initiatives listed under BIMSTEC’s main sector of cooperation. The policy recommendations acknowledge each member state’s level of development and suggest measures to enhance regional economic integration and infrastructure connectivity in tandem with greater security and other forms of cooperation.

Bhavyanshi Sinha (BS): In the book, you argue that “the assumptions of better relations only on grounds of economic, scientific and technological cooperation without political, ideological and strategic considerations will, at best, be insufficient” (p. 62). Do you think BIMSTEC has already achieved this maturity, despite failing at a free trade agreement and building basic economic interdependence in the Bay of Bengal region?

Sreeradha Datta (SD): BIMSTEC, despite its years, is not seen yet as a mature, functional organisation. Its ability to overcome political and strategic concerns to pursue economic goals and agenda has clearly remained limited. As is well known, BIMSTEC was dormant for a while and needed a strong push by India in 2016. The organisation has, since then, seen progress in certain sectors. The adoption of the Charter in the last summit at Colombo (2022) was significant. It is likely to adopt the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030 to build a ‘prosperous, resilient and open’ organisation at its next summit.

As is well known, BIMSTEC was dormant for a while and needed a strong push by India in 2016. The organisation has, since then, seen progress in certain sectors. The adoption of the Charter in the last summit at Colombo (2022) was significant. It is likely to adopt the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030 to build a ‘prosperous, resilient and open’ organisation at its next summit.

While the idea of regionalism and sub-regionalism receives support from all BIMSTEC members, their priorities do not converge. Further, the pandemic has had an unsettling effect on every member, causing them to refocus their national priorities. Alongside, this region has received increasing international attention—the Bay of Bengal, along with the Indo-Pacific, have risen in strategic importance. Given these evolving geo-strategic developments, members have been unable to ignore many of their inhibitions stemming from fears and apprehensions regarding the emerging alliances and their corresponding political and economic implications. Despite several studies highlighting the potential economic gains, the arguments have not been compelling enough for many to accept a free trade agreement and move towards greater economic interdependence. Individual economic needs and requirements are clearly varied among the members, and going by past trends, BIMSTEC will grow at a slow and incremental pace, and any immediate transformational move towards economic interdependence is doubtful.

BS: You mention that cyber security is a key area that requires attention at the regional level (p. 3). How might divergent national policies (for example, India’s ban on Chinese apps) effect cybersecurity cooperation within BIMSTEC, given other member states’ relatively positive bilateral relations with China? Where do you see the scope for more security cooperation?

SD: BIMSTEC members have different political systems with different bilateral engagements. Therefore, while there is convergence on a larger security understanding, putting in place norms and frameworks will take time. In addition, as previously witnessed during some high-level security meetings, members do not share similar security apparatus or concerns. It is increasingly being understood that without developing a common security framework, progress, even in other sectors, will be gradual at best and marginal at worst. A common vision of a stable global order is fundamental for building greater regionalism within BIMSTEC.

It is increasingly being understood that without developing a common security framework, progress, even in other sectors, will be gradual at best and marginal at worst. A common vision of a stable global order is fundamental for building greater regionalism within BIMSTEC.

Forging cooperation on cyber security among members with varied economic and technological levels and differing political systems will be fraught with challenges. Developing a response team for any cyber-attack and threat has been the best common minimum proposal at this point, given the differing stakes of member states. The conversations have begun, and convergences will eventually emerge after addressing the concerns of smaller members. Despite differing positions on China among the members currently, these differences can also be addressed through frank conversations to build a broader understanding. This process can be undertaken more effectively at the track-two level dialogues. Rather than being led by any member, initiatives such as these should be led by BIMSTEC and its institutional framework. Its Secretariat has to be empowered to take the lead in addressing the core issue of security and cooperative framework without which a successful BIMSTEC is unlikely.

BS: How can BIMSTEC member states coordinate their national infrastructure projects and regional connectivity projects under the BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity? What can be done to better integrate the national and regional levels of policy planning as suggested by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) report?

SD: While it may appear to be the simplest of the tasks to be undertaken by BIMSTEC, subregional experiences within South Asia have laid bare the inherent difficulties of such projects. Currently, the political crisis in Myanmar is one of the confounding factors stymying the process, but beyond that, a project like this clearly has many challenges. Though this project is backed by the ADB, given the huge number of tasks involved and the hardware and software requirements, each member will have to be fully invested in the idea and its implementation.

While all member countries were consulted in finalising the Master Plan, the level of interest among members is not similar. For greater efficiency, it is important that each member identify immediate, medium-, and long-term priorities within the overall framework of the Plan, which can then be factored in through discussions between experts from multilateral institutions and each member.

While all member countries were consulted in finalising the Master Plan, the level of interest among members is not similar. For greater efficiency, it is important that each member identify immediate, medium-, and long-term priorities within the overall framework of the Plan, which can then be factored in through discussions between experts from multilateral institutions and each member. Applying the hub and spoke model, specific task forces and focused groups may be able to identify and detail domestic, bilateral, and regional aspects and smoothen the process accordingly. Existing cross-border infrastructures may become the core for a larger cobweb to develop. For instance, the current India–Bangladesh transportation mechanism can be utilised to establish a large transport system in this part of the sub-region. Similarly, with its efficient port facilities, Colombo can establish functional engagement with ports in Bangladesh and other ports within BIMSTEC. Each member will need to prioritise specific aspects of the Master Plan to make incremental progress towards the larger goal.

BS: Your publications and research have consistently focused on the eastern part of South Asia, which is the current priority area of India’s Neighborhood First policy. But can India afford to build regional integration without equal focus on its western frontier, including through SAARC?

SD: Irrespective of BIMSTEC’s traction in recent years, SAARC remains a common reference point for all South Asian neighbours. For India, it is not an either-or issue vis-à-vis SAARC and BIMSTEC. Unfortunately, it has been perceived so, given the sharp political differences India has with Pakistan over its use of terror as a foreign policy tool towards India. Despite that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, India initiated a SAARC meeting to address some of the deep economic problems being faced by SAARC members. Pakistan could not share a common perspective with other SAARC members even on this humanitarian platform. Given Pakistan’s intransigent position and the political and economic crises it is currently facing, any change in its ways is unlikely. India desires to be part of a strong SAARC, but given contemporary political realities, that seems out of bounds presently.

As outlined in the SAARC charter, India has supported various sub-regional initiatives within SAARC. In addition, through similar other initiatives, New Delhi continues to provide new impetus for regionalism. Given the growing geo-strategic relevance of the eastern neighbourhood to its foreign policy trajectory, India will continue to focus on this area. India would have also expanded its interests on its western side if the political conditions were conducive. Without any breakthrough between India and its western neighbour, SAARC will, unfortunately, continue to underperform.

About the Author

Sreeradha Datta teaches International Affairs at OP Jindal Global University and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Previously, she was Senior Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation, heading the Neighbourhood Studies Centre. She has a Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She has been Director, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata and has held fellowships with the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, among other institutions. Her recent works include Act East Policy and Northeast India, an edited volume titled BIMSTEC: The Journey and Way Ahead, and co-edited volume titled Bangladesh at 50: Development and Challenges. Her research interests include India’s foreign policy, regionalism and cross-border issues. Amongst other distinctions, she has been the recipient of international fellowships including at the German Institute of Global Affairs, Distinguished Indian Scholar Series at the University of Taiwan, and International Leadership Visitors Programme at the United States.