Buddhism and the India-China rivalry in the Himalayas

In this edition, Kanishkh Kanodia, an intern with the Foreign Policy and Security team at CSEP, interviews Ambassador. P. Stobdan, on his book “The Great Game in the Buddhist Himalayas” published in October 2019 by Penguin Random House India. 

Recent events along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have prompted a re-evaluation of the multiple irritants in the Sino-Indian relations. An essential one among them is the question of Tibetan exiles who escaped the Chinese government’s political crackdown in 1959 to seek refuge in India.

In ‘The Great Game in the Buddhist Himalayas’, Stobdan centers Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism at the heart of India and China’s quest for dominance over the Himalayas to argue for a realignment of India’s Tibetan policy, away from US policy goals. The author, a former Indian diplomat and a resident of Ladakh, draws from his personal experiences as a Buddhist and his visits to Tibet to argue that New Delhi has failed in leveraging Tibet to fulfil its policy objectives vis-à-via China. His critique points to a broader shortcoming – India’s lack of comprehension of the political and religious forces in the Himalayas that has compromised its strategic position in the region.

The book contains a detailed and nuanced profile of Buddhism in the Himalayas – from Ladakh to Arunachal – to highlight the complex web of political and cultural ties among the diverse sects of Buddhism. It explains the tensions among the different sects of Tibetan Buddhism and its impact on the geopolitics of the Himalayan region and Sino-Indian relations. It also prompts a deeper introspection of how India should recraft its Himalayan and Tibet policies to suit its strategic goals.

Kanishkh Kanodia: Your book talks of Prime Minister Modi’s China policy post the Wuhan summit as resetting Sino-Indian ties and ‘altering the game of using Tibet for leverage against China’ (pp. 224). How have recent events between India and China reshaped ties and the Tibetan leverage you talk of? 

Stobdan: I think Prime Minister Modi genuinely tried to reset India’s ties with China through the Wuhan process that began in May 2018. It was a top-bottom approach to build trust with the top Chinese leadership. I suspected that the idea was to address the two key inter-related issues – boundary and Tibet – that have fundamentally ruined India and China’s relationship since the late 1950s.

The expectation was that India, under PM Modi, would seek to modify some of India’s moribund policies including Tibet’s issue that New Delhi has indirectly used as a pressure point by allowing the Dalai Lama to shape the course of India–China relations. In doing so, India was simply pursuing U.S. goals vis-à-vis China. But the nature of Washington’s Dalai Lama card had been to prudently use him to gain greater diplomatic and economic leverage in Beijing. Washington, and not New Delhi, enjoyed a greater say on Tibet against China even in terms of offering a mediator’s role between China and the Dalai Lama.

India, after the Wuhan talks, ably altered the game of using Tibet for leverage against China rather than simply getting played by the agenda pursued by others.

The Modi government probably learnt from Western proclivities. So, India, after the Wuhan talks, ably altered the game of using Tibet for leverage against China rather than simply getting played by the agenda pursued by others. We can see from recent events that the nature of India’s playing the Tibet card has changed.

KK: You extensively explain how the power of the “traditional spirit of Sino-Tibetan relations” (pp.238) and the deepening of China’s commercial interests in Tibet have ameliorated the relationship between them. Do such cultural and economic links overshadow the deep-seated political tensions that exist in Sino-Tibetan relations?

PS: Tibet was never an advanced region in the Western sense, but Tibetans were never poor economically. Under the Chinese system, Tibet has proven its economic vitality. There isn’t much poverty there. The region is relatively rich – the reason for China to hold on to its control. In fact, China has brought about lots of modernity in Tibet that has perhaps changed the region. At the same time, Tibetans still cling to their old Tibetan rituals and customs. Undoubtedly, the Dalai Lama is still revered as a god-king by the people.

One cannot underestimate the deeply embedded ties between the Tibetan and Chinese religions, cultures, and belief systems. They share a history of at least 300 years of mutual assimilation and acculturation (Sinification) process that lasted until the communists took over China in 1949. In fact, during the Qing period (1644–1912), China formally adopted the Mongol-style sponsorship of Tibetan Lamaism and patronised the Gelugpa sect as China’s official religion – the institution of the Dalai Lama and his Ganden Phodrang authority was its core.

The Mongol-Tibetan-Manchu trio shared a common bond established through a celestial order. The spirit of this traditional convivial relationship among them would have continued had the Communists not taken over China in 1949. The current political tension only revolves around the differences between the Dalai Lama and the Communist Party of China.

KK: The Dalai Lama’s 2017 visit to Tawang is mentioned as a significant and controversial event in the book. Would you consider the visit to be an astute strategic calculation by India to deter China? 

PS: I am not sure whether the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang in 2017 was a part of any strategic calculation. It was perhaps more a tactical move by India to simply use him as a pressure point to settle scores with China, especially to retaliate for the way Beijing had tried to block the listing of Masood Azhar on the UN terror list, prevented India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, pressed ahead with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, adopted an unyielding stance on the boundary issue, and so forth.

The Dalai Lama’s 2017 Tawang visit also took place against the backdrop of President Trump’s two-day summit with President Xi Jinping held on April 6 and 7 at Mar-a-Lago. The expectation was that Trump would push Xi to the edge on human rights and the Tibet issue. However, the talks were overshadowed by discussions on trade and tariffs. Before the Dalai Lama’s visit, the U.S. Ambassador Richard Verma also visited Tawang, which irked the Chinese.

KK: You talk of how India’s scepticism forced the Karmapa to seek exile in a different country and stress on the importance of his return (pp. 152-171). How will that change India’s policy towards Tibet? 

PS: The Karmapa institution is very important for India because his sect – the Kagyu – holds a predominant position in the Indian Himalayas. There have been lots of controversies about the 17^th Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, ever since he landed in India in January 2000. Many believed his escape from Tibet was facilitated by the Chinese for the purpose of him getting a hold of the “sacred black hat” lying in Rumtek Monastery, Sikkim. But the key issue is how the Karmapa fits into the India-China-Tibet contestation and his utility as a geopolitical object. The general impression has been that the Karmapa is the second-most important Tibetan figure after the Dalai Lama.

In 2001, the Karmapa said he would not return to Tibet until the Dalai Lama did. But after 18 years, the Karmapa suddenly disappeared from India in May 2017. He was later found to be staying in New Jersey’s Wharton State Forest area. We do not know of the reason behind his fleeing from India, but in a video message in March 2018, telecast from the U.S, the Karmapa made some stunning revelations. In a 37-minute long “special message”, he narrated, among other things, the difficulties he faced in India, especially the restrictions placed on his movements by Dharamshala and the Indian government. He virtually lived a prisoner’s life in Gyuto monastery under tight surveillance and was kept away from the main Kagyu masters. He confessed to having run into “disharmony and disagreement” with the Indian government that caused some suspicions to the point of him being labelled a “Chinese spy.” For him, the 18 years of “hassled life” in India were disappointing.

The Karmapa’s unwillingness to return has caused a serious hit on the Central Tibetan Administration’s plans. His failing to show up has also exposed the rifts among the Tibetans.

Dorje, the `17^th Karmapa, referred to attempts being made to push him into playing a political role against his wish and the interests of Karma Kagyu unity. From his perspective, the Karmapas have historically acted as spiritual rather than political leaders. One might ask the question of why and who was pressing him to take up a political role. His confession also came on the heels of new developments relating to the Tibetan issue, both inside and outside Tibet. It uncovered many hitherto unknown issues related to Tibetan affairs in exile, especially about the discord among Tibetans living in India, including schisms and differences within major Tibetan sects.

Since then, there have been many other developments. There were reports of his talks with the Indian government about his coming back. Not surprisingly, both New Delhi and Dharamshala seemingly tried their best, though in vain, to persuade him to return. Observers speculate that the Karmapa may not return to India as he obtained the Commonwealth of Dominica’s passport in 2018. The Karmapa’s unwillingness to return has caused a serious hit on the Central Tibetan Administration’s plans. His failing to show up has also exposed the rifts among the Tibetans.

Now that Ogyen Trinley Dorje may not return to India, one can conjecture whether he might go to Tsurphu monastery in Tibet – his seat. This would fit into Beijing’s succession plan. For example, in a situation of conflict over two different reincarnations of the next Dalai Lama, Beijing will have two Tibetan stalwarts, the 17^th Karmapa and the 11^th Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu, to be the 15^th Dalai Lama. The Karmapa’s institution is nearly three centuries older than the Dalai Lama’s – China knows this would matter in esoteric-driven politics.

There is a strong and distinct traditional and sectarian difference between Ladakh (Western Himalayan) Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism along with political undertones.

KK: Ladakh and Tibet have had a long history of common culture, heritage, and traditions. Do you believe the historical linkages between the two regions can be revived despite their political distinction? 

PS: Ladakh has been an old bastion of Indian Buddhism since the days of Kushanas (2^nd-3^rd Century BC). However, from the 10^th-11^thcentury onwards, Tibetan-style Lamaism began to strongly influence Ladakh, which continues to remain strong, especially in the central and eastern parts of Ladakh. Yet, there is a strong and distinct traditional and sectarian difference between Ladakh (Western Himalayan) Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism along with political undertones. I think that the historical and political fault lines or the conflicting interests are too strong for the two regions to seek any form of a common political destiny. If any, the direct beneficiary of such an outcome will be China – something India and the U.S. should avoid.

About the expert

Amb P. Stobdan is a well-known strategic affair expert and one of the foremost experts in India on Inner Asian affairs.

He has served as Director/First Secretary at the Embassy of India in Almaty (Kazakhstan). He also served as Joint Director in National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India. He also served as the Director/Professor of the Centre for Strategic & Regional Studies in J&K. Until 2012, he was India’s Ambassador to the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

Ambassador Stobdan is currently the President of the Ladakh International Centre, Leh. He is also a leading columnist. His latest book includes ‘India and Central Asia: The Strategic Dimension’, published by KW Publishers in January 2020.

Email: pstobdan@gmail.com