Ethnic Rebellion: Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Riya Sinha interviews Dr. David Brenner, author of Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands, published by Cornell University Press in 2019.

2021 has been another fragile year for Myanmar’s democracy. On February 1, Military Chief Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup to overthrow the elected government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD). Six months later, the military chief declared himself the Prime Minister of a newly formed caretaker government. Protests have erupted far and wide in the country, and the military’s crackdown on protestors has invited global condemnation. Domestically, this has also led to the mobilisation of many ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) previously operating only in the borderlands, against the military junta and in support of the pro-democracy movement.

Myanmar faces one of the world’s longest-running civil wars. Since it gained independence in 1948, Myanmar’s borderlands have remained war-torn with intermittent periods of war and peace. Several EAOs are active in Myanmar, with the two largest ones operating along the eastern and northern borderlands. On the country’s eastern border (with Thailand), the Karen National Union (KNU) has been active, whereas the Kachin International Organisation (KIO) has been involved in heavy fighting with Myanmar’s military in the northern borderlands (with China). In 2011, a seventeen-year-old ceasefire between the KIO and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) collapsed, leading to a resumption of violence.

Brenner’s book investigates the reasons for war and peace in Myanmar’s borderlands since 2011, through in-depth ethnographic research. By focussing on EAOs, it embraces a shift from the conventional, Western understanding of Myanmar centred around its civil-military relations. Brenner argues that this macro view makes ethnic conflict in the borderlands look like an aberration in the country’s movement towards democracy. However, the scale, strength, and organisational discipline with which these EAOs operate warrants changing the focus of analysis of Myanmar’s domestic politics. Brenner’s research contributes to the studies on political violence that reject the notion that civil wars are binary conflicts, conducted between a monolithic state and non-state actors.

His book dives deep into the horizontal and vertical ties within rebel groups and explains how the changing politico-economic environment affects their struggle for authority within organised movements. It is based on six years of research, including nine months of fieldwork in the borderlands controlled by the KNU and KIO.

The book tries to deconstruct the dynamics of conflict and explores how to engage with EAOs in constructive ways. Brenner argues that a significant reason for the continuation of armed conflict is the limited control Myanmar’s government exerted over the country’s armed forces. He further maintains that the Tatmadaw generals have long profited from the perpetuating conflict and will not simply give up their sources of power and wealth.

Riya Sinha: In chapter 2, you mention that the contemporary geopolitical strategies such as China’s “Look South” and India’s “Look East” policies are focused on increasing connectivity through infrastructure construction by making Myanmar a “land bridge” (p. 30). However, these policies do not consider the unstable nature of Myanmar’s borderlands. Should external actors engage with the non-state elements, particularly those who maintain quasi-state structures, while planning such projects, especially in politically weak states like Myanmar? What impact will the engagement (or the lack of it) have on the future of connectivity projects?  

David Brenner: Of course, external actors need to consider the actual political realities in Myanmar and other places of fragmented statehood. And they already do. China is particularly pragmatic about this and maintains working relations with various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar, i.e., the ethnonational rebel movements that have fought for greater autonomy from the central state for many decades.

China coordinates with EAOs on a variety of matters, not least the governance of transnational security concerns such as crime, drugs, public health, and of course, conflict on its lengthy land border with Myanmar. But China has also had to become more realistic with regards to her infrastructure ambitions that affect Myanmar’s borderlands, large parts of which are under the de-facto control of EAOs or heavily contested.

China has also had to become more realistic with regards to her infrastructure ambitions that affect Myanmar’s borderlands, large parts of which are under the de-facto control of EAOs [Ethnic Armed Organisations] or heavily contested.

Compare for instance the Shwe pipelines with the Myitsone hydropower dam project. China built the Shwe pipelines to circumvent the Strait of Malacca by transporting oil and gas from Africa and the Middle East from a port in Myanmar’s Rakhine State to China’s south-western Yunnan province. The pipelines run through northern Shan State, which has seen severe fighting between multiple EAOs and the Myanmar military. Despite this, the pipeline has not come under attack. It does not threaten the immediate interests of any of the warring parties, all of whom rely on good relations with China in one form or the other.

In comparison, China’s plan to construct a large hydropower station on the Myitsone confluence in Kachin State has stalled for over ten years, even though Myitsone is in an area under the de-facto control of the Myanmar state. The reasons for this are multi-faceted, including a country-wide civil society campaign against the dam that pressured the government to suspend the project. That said, a major obstacle to building the dam has been the fierce resistance of local Kachin people, including the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). Like other EAOs, the KIO relies on good diplomatic relations with China. The movement also operates in northern Shan State’s pipeline corridor. But dependencies are mutual. While the pipeline does not affect the KIO’s interests, Myitsone is seen as a matter of survival by the KIO’s constituency. This suggests that engaging with EAOs in matters that affect their territories and constituencies is imperative for any external actor.

Caption: The Chinese border photographed from KIO-controlled territory in 2014: A newly-built Chinese toll station lays abandoned while Chinese workers fortify the border wall after a 17-years long ceasefire between the KIO and the Myanmar military broke down. Source: David Brenner.

RS: Ethnic movements have transnational networks that get intertwined with similar conflicts across the border. You mention an intriguing example of how the Naga rebellion fighting the Indian government operates cross-border from Myanmar and how the Kachin rebels use their ties to Assam and Naga rebel movements to enter India’s higher education system (p. 38). What drives this cooperative relationship between the cross-border rebel movements?

DB: There are multiple drivers. More commonly discussed is the fact these connections provide a great resource, from educational opportunities in neighbouring countries to the regional black markets, including for arms, and to cross-border sanctuaries for armed mobilisation. That said, it is important to recognise that the transborder relations between EAOs in Myanmar and similar movements in the northeast of India are motivated by more than pure strategic rationale.

In the case of the Naga movement(s), the transborder nature of conflict is not least to do with the nature of the border.  The border between India and Myanmar is – as so often – a relic from colonial days, dividing populations who self-identify as Naga. Many Naga nationalists whom I met on the Myanmar side therefore contest its legitimacy. Moreover, there are feelings of solidarity between minoritized and marginalized ethnic nationality populations across borders. Their experiences might differ from India to Myanmar. Yet, there is a wealth of commonalities, too. Some populations also feel related by kin, as for instance people who identify as Naga, Chin and Kachin.

We can only understand the politics of rebellion in Myanmar’s borderlands when historicising them in relation to the wider borderworld that they are part of.

In fact, we can only understand the politics of rebellion in Myanmar’s borderlands when historicising them in relation to the wider borderworld that they are part of. The formation of Naga and Kachin nationalist movements did not only materialise vis-à-vis the Indian and Myanmar states. These movements also formed as part of a wider nationalist awakening amongst minoritized ethnic nationalities in Asia, whose experiences of marginalisation and demands for autonomy resonated with each other. The work of Mandy Sadan – leading expert on the Kachin and historian of non-state histories between India, Myanmar, and China – is a great resource for anyone wanting to gain a deeper understanding of this.

Caption: Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) soldiers show a heavy presence at the Naga New Year’s Celebrations in Nanyun, in the Naga Self-Administered Zone of the Sagaing Region on the border of Myanmar to India, in January 2018. Source: David Brenner.

RS: How did the changing geopolitics after the 1990s (end of the cold war) in Southeast Asia, particularly the change in China and Thailand’s regional interests, enable the Myanmar state to consolidate its presence in the northern and eastern borderlands? 

DB: Changing outlooks of both China and Thailand were important enabling factors for increased state consolidation in Myanmar’s borderlands. Both neighbouring countries directly supported two of the oldest and strongest armed resistance movements in Myanmar throughout the Cold War. Maoist China was the main supporter of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), an insurgency that comprised of Burman cadres but mobilised heavily amongst ethnic minorities in Shan State. By contrast, anti-communist Thailand supported the Karen National Union (KNU) to guard against the communist threat from Myanmar. In fact, many EAOs in Myanmar were divided into pro-capitalist and pro-communist camps during the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War both China and Thailand lost interest in directly supporting non-state armed groups in Myanmar … [which led to] a rapid rapprochement between Myanmar with China and Thailand, and a surge of cross-border economic activities.

With the end of the Cold War both China and Thailand lost interest in directly supporting non-state armed groups in Myanmar (at least to the same degree). Both neighbours rather sought profit from Myanmar’s economic potential, including its natural riches, strategic geography, and promising export market for their own produce. This led to a rapid rapprochement between Myanmar with China and Thailand, respectively and a surge of cross-border economic activities. The latter included booming transborder trade as well as strategic infrastructure projects. Former allies thus turned into nuisances for both China and Thailand.

Thailand, for instance, built the Yadana pipeline through the southeast of Myanmar to extract and transport gas from the Andaman sea to Thailand in cooperation with the Western oil companies Total and Chevron. The territory through which the pipeline runs, however, was under the control of the KNU. To build the pipeline, the Myanmar army displaced many Karen communities living in the corridor and committed many atrocities. The KNU had to withdraw from the corridor, not least because of Thai pressure.

In addition, Myanmar ended its self-imposed economic isolation of the Cold War and liberalised its border economies. The quickly expanding official border trade undercut large parts of the transborder smuggling networks, which had long been a key source of revenue for border-based armed movements. Lastly, expanding economic interactions in the borderlands provided opportunities to turn battlefield enemies into business partners through extensive ceasefire politics. While these factors did not lead to uncontested state control, they nevertheless enabled unprecedented territorialisation of state power.

Caption: Smuggling of palm oil at the Moei River which forms the border between Thailand and Myanmar in 2013. Source: David Brenner.

RS: A political economy approach enabled the Myanmar state to co-opt the Kachin International Organisation (KIO) rebel leaders by offering economic incentives. This approach rendered the Myanmar-China border peaceful between the 1990s and 2011 (p.103). However, you have shown in the book that this ceasefire capitalism has also led to renewed conflicts and that economic development cannot ensure the end of a civil war (p. 108). What lessons can be drawn from the ceasefire’s failure between the KIO and Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – for ending civil wars?

DB: Yes, the same geo-economic forces that led to greater state consolidation in Myanmar’s borderlands, also renewed resistance amongst a variety of EAOs. The reason for this, in my opinion, is twofold.

Many EAO [Ethnic Armed Organisations] grassroots and local communities did not benefit from the ceasefire economies that have been unleashed since the 1990s… while they did not have to flee war, they were for instance displaced by the rapidly expanding and highly destructive resource economies.

Firstly, ceasefire capitalism – a term coined by political ecologist Kevin Woods – hardly equals inclusive economic development. Many EAO grassroots and local communities did not benefit from the ceasefire economies that have been unleashed since the 1990s. The KIO makes for an instructive case in this regard. While some of their individual leaders became rich through the mutual exploitation of natural resources and other business activities, the fate of many local communities did not improve, at least not to the same extent. Surely, an end to fighting bettered the immediate humanitarian situation of many people in Kachin State who endured decades of war. This was one of the main reasons for the KIO to sign their ceasefire in 1994. Nevertheless, ceasefire capitalism did not bring about peace, security, or development for many local communities. In fact, it produced new insecurities. This was particularly so in rural areas, where many people faced continued displacement. While they did not have to flee the war, they were for instance displaced by the rapidly expanding and highly destructive resource economies, such as the Jade mines in Hpakant.

Secondly, and a key implication of my study, economic development is no shortcut for solving political conflicts. Despite the excesses of ceasefire capitalism, many people’s lives did of course also improve. During the ceasefire, people in urban areas often had more secure livelihoods than before. In KIO-controlled areas, the KIO also used the pause in fighting and increased revenues to build infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and hydropower stations. It also expanded its public goods provision, for instance in the realm of health and education. That, nevertheless, ceasefire capitalism produced a lot of resentments amongst the movement’s rank-and-file. This was mainly because this arrangement did little to address the underlying political demands of its constituency, centred around genuine autonomy in a federal union.

Caption: A depleted goldmine in Kachin State. Heavy use of mercury to loosen the gold from stones left behind an inhospitable environment due to soil and water pollution. Source: David Brenner

RS: Your study demonstrates that understanding the workings of power and authority inside a rebel group (micro-level dynamics) can explain the broader instances of war and peace in a region (macro-level dynamics). Can this approach support other states dealing with ethnic conflicts in enabling predictability of a political process? If yes, how?

DB: I hope that my comparative study of the KIO and the KNU in Myanmar can inform other contexts, too. I developed my book’s conceptual framework and wider theoretical arguments between my own empirical fieldwork and studies of rebellion elsewhere. So, while I believe that historical context is of huge importance for understanding the specificities of any conflict, I also think that there are fruitful conversations between different contexts.

Two of the points that my study highlight seem of particular relevance for conflict resolution. Firstly, rebel movements are often highly heterogeneous actors that can span over an extensive social network with differently positioned factions. Secondly, many rebel movements are deeply embedded in their wider social context. In fact, the very success of many guerrilla organisations depends on how they achieve durable relations with local communities. This implies that the strategic decisions and overall positioning of rebel groups – about going to war, or negotiating ceasefires, peace negotiations, etc. – cannot be reduced to the decision making of individual leaders or a uniform leadership group. Rather they are the outcomes of multifarious and often contentious relations between differently placed actors.

This framework also suggests that one particularly important axis of analysis for understanding the trajectory of rebel movements is the vertical relations between rebel leaders and their grassroots, including rank-and-file members and the wider activist networks, and constituent communities. In other words, upwards pressures from rebel grassroots matter, even though the degree to which this is the case surely differs from movement to movement. To negotiate and implement peaceful settlements to conflict then means ensuring a maximum degree of inclusivity towards concerns amongst different parts of such heterogenous movements.

Caption: A leadership meeting of the KNU in 2013. The KNU comprises of a wealth of different governing bodies, institutions, organisations, and perspectives. Its strategies are the outcome of often contentious negotiation processes. Source: David Brenner.

RS: Your research methodology for the book has brought out some very interesting insights. You use ethnographic enquiry in conflict and security studies – a discipline that traditionally relies on a bird’s eye view. How can this methodology support development of research in similar disciplines?

DB: I believe that it’s important to understand people on their own grounds, or at least try to do this as much as possible. For instance, in the scholarship on civil wars, I believe that this is key for addressing one of the most fundamental questions, which is —why do people take up arms against the state? This is surely hard to explain. Given the military superiority of most state armies, the likelihood of success is usually rather slim. For the same reason, the likelihood of dying is very high.

While many theories seek to address this fundamental question, the birds-eye perspective of political science and related disciplines such as international relations are usually ill-suited for doing so. On the one hand, this is to do with a lack of data that informs theory-building about rebellion because there are very few studies that build on close-range research with rebels themselves. On the other hand, it is because the available paradigms, which are informed by limited data, limit our perspective of what counts as legitimate data in the first place. The commitment to methodological individualism and rational-choice theory in many parts of the political sciences has been particularly restrictive in this respect, privileging statistical data from the World Bank over the lyrics of revolutionary songs.

What we end up with in this respect, is what the Subaltern Studies scholar Ranajit Guha has called the “prose of counterinsurgency” in his critique of historiographies of peasant insurrection in colonial India: we deduce people’s motivations to rise up against the state from the data and reasoning collected by state institutions. To understand rebellion and resistance, and a wealth of other social phenomena, however, we need to focus on people’s lived realities in their social contexts. In the borderlands of Myanmar – as in many other places – this means to first shed ourselves from the Westphalian common-sense, which legitimises the state and criminalises non-state resistance despite all evidence that states have been one of the biggest sources of violence and insecurity throughout history.

Caption: A soldier of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed wing of the KIO, in frontline camp of the Kachin War. Source: David Brenner.

RS: Considering the ongoing democratic crisis in Myanmar wherein the Tatmadaw has seized control since February this year, where do you see Myanmar’s transition from the decades-old civil war heading?

DB: The Tatmadaw did actually not seize control. It has tried to seize control. While it ousted the democratically elected government, it has failed to exert control over large parts of society, state, economy, and territory. Seven months after the military coup, resistance is still widespread, including the civil disobedience campaign, such as labour strikes in the private sector and civil service, and popular boycotts of products and services from military companies. This is despite the lethal force with which the military has tried to coerce the people into submission.

The atrocities committed by security forces against peaceful protesters have also pushed more and more activists to take up armed struggle against the military junta. Self-defence units, known as People’s Defence Forces (PDF), have mobilised across the country. They seek to protect their communities from state violence but also attack military and police units and sabotage their infrastructure. The civil war has thus spread from the country’s borderlands to literally everywhere in Myanmar. PDF attacks have also hit the military’s heavily-fortified capital of Naypyidaw.

In some instance we’ve also seen PDF forces fighting side-by-side with EAOs. In fact, some EAOs explicitly support the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar, including training and equipping PDF units. Others, however, are cautious and hedge their bets in the current situation. This is not least because EAOs and their ethnic nationality constituencies have made dire experiences with the Burman pro-democracy movement in the past. The success of armed resistance thus partly lies in continuing to forge stronger unity between different forces.

That said, I don’t believe that either side can win this conflict on the battlefield. After all, the Tatmadaw has withstood seventy years of rebellion. But I also don’t think many people necessarily believe in a military victory, at least from conversations with my contacts and friends in Myanmar. It rather is about changing the junta’s calculus by making the generals understand that forcing people into submission through naked violence is simply not going to work.

Caption: KIO-produced assault rifles – which are modelled on the Chinese Type 81 version of the Kalashnikov – symbolise the sophisticated capabilities that some armed resistance forces have developed in their decades-long struggle against the Myanmar military. Source: David Brenner

About the contributor:

Bio: Dr David Brenner is Lecturer in Global Insecurities in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex, where he teaches and researches on issues of conflict, development, and security. His work is informed by extensive fieldwork in Myanmar’s restive borderlands. David is author of Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology of Armed Struggle, which was published with Cornell University Press’s Southeast Asia Program in 2019. You can follow his work on Twitter @DavBrenner.