India-Pakistan relations and Indian think tanks

In this edition, Supriya Ravishankar, intern, Foreign Policy & Security, interviews Stuti Bhatnagar on her book “India’s Pakistan Policy: How Think Tanks Are Shaping Foreign Relations”, published by Routledge India in August 2020.

The relationship between Indian think tanks and the government, and their influence on foreign policy has been a rather understudied topic. In her book, Bhatnagar examines the role think tanks play as foreign policy actors by focusing her study on India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. She takes up the India-Pakistan “Composite Dialogue” (CD) as her main case study.

The CD was formalised in 2004 and it continued up to 2013, with only a few episodes of disruption in between. It remains the longest and one of the most significant efforts undertaken to normalise the relationship between India and Pakistan. The process involved discussions on various issues that have traditionally been areas of contention between both countries. These include territorial disputes over Jammu and Kashmir and Siachen, as well as issues such as cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking. A significant component, however, was to install institutional mechanisms that would help facilitate friendly exchanges between both countries. This occurred through the setting up of official working groups to discuss each issue separately.

The book critically analyses the role of think tanks in the CD by putting forth both their contributions as well as their failures. The author reveals how some Indian think tanks acted as echo chambers by replicating the government narrative during the CD process. The book also takes a look at how the government can curb the ability of think tanks to choose subjects of study and research by controlling channels of funding.

At the same time, the book also highlights the strengths of think tanks and the positive role they played as peacebuilders. For example, the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (CDR) was established to conduct research into specific subjects that had a bearing on Indo-Pak relations, such as the causes of militancy or trade relations. Subsequently, CBMs helped address the “trust deficit” between both countries which in-turn helped create a more liberal visa regime. In fact, the period of 2003-2007 saw a significant increase in people-to-people exchanges with an increased number of visas being processed by Indian missions in Pakistan. This enabled think tanks to establish Track Three interactions between civil society members, including media persons and artists.

Understanding the intricacies of India’s foreign policy towards Pakistan, one of its most important neighbours, is crucial to the stability and integration of the South Asian region. Three wars (and the threat of a nuclear one), cross-border terrorism, recurring border skirmishes, and the deadlock on the Kashmir issue have hindered the process of establishing lasting peace in the region.

Supriya Ravishankar: In the book, you mention that the Composite Dialogue (CD) between India and Pakistan, initiated in 2004 to deescalate tensions, was a “critical juncture” for understanding the potential that think tanks hold as foreign policy actors (p. 8). Could you explain how Indian think tanks contributed to the CD process and what could they have done with more autonomy?

Stuti Bhatnagar: The Composite Dialogue (CD) was certainly encouraging for Pakistan studies projects in various think tanks in India. Think tank contributions to the debate on India’s policy towards Pakistan was aided by the format of the CD that allowed for engagement with different stakeholders such as students, academics, bureaucrats, defence officials, and the wider civil society.

Think tanks contributed to the CD process in two significant ways. As I argue in the book, they were involved in coordinative discourse building. At one level, think tanks were involved, in consultation with government committees, in the engagement with policy ideas, and as key stakeholders in the dialogue process, both at the official and back-channel levels. At another level, they played an active role in promoting government policy and changes instituted as part of the CD, including the wide array of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and the opening of cross-border trade and travel in Jammu and Kashmir, among others. To give a few examples, policy discourse considered at defence policy think tanks, for instance, at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and the Centre for Land and Warfare studies (CLAWS), elaborated on the nuclear CBMs adopted within the CD, the relevance of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), and other operational counter-insurgency strategies in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), adding significantly to the public discourse on these complicated issues. Think tanks including IDSA, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) also conducted feasibility studies on the adopted CBMs at the behest of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of External Affairs.

The role of think tanks was particularly useful as there were limited avenues for insights into government policy, particularly on issues of defence policy. Yet, despite their interests, Indian think tanks do depend a great deal on government support, funding, and patronage. Many of the cross-border initiatives organised by think tanks even required formal government approvals. Foreign funding itself is dependent on government permissions, which can make it quite challenging for think tank policy ideas to see any traction. More importantly, the sensitive nature of India-Pakistan relations and the predominant national security narratives restrict alternative policy ideas from think tanks. Therefore, these policy ideas articulated during the CD period were not sustained and as government attention towards the peace process waned, so did think tank interest.

The impact of think tanks on either sustaining or mending relations between India and Pakistan depends on what the formal policy agenda is.

SR: You have put forth in your book the reactions of ORF and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) to then-President Parvez Musharraf’s proposal for a phased withdrawal of troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir. ORF called it a “well-crafted and cleverly worded war game” and B. G. Verghese from CPR termed it as “public rhetoric meant for domestic consumption” (p.94). What do you think is the impact of think tanks on either sustaining or mending relations of animosity between India and Pakistan?

SB: I think, to a large part, the impact of think tanks on either sustaining or mending relations between India and Pakistan depends on what the formal policy agenda is. As I said before, there was robust engagement with India-Pakistan dialogue at think tanks during the CD process, yet the policy ideas from think tanks were restricted to specific initiatives rather than an articulation of any paradigmatic shift in India’s position on Pakistan. Policy agendas on Pakistan have remained the domain of the Indian state. This is also due to the structural environment of Indian think tanks, their membership patterns as well as their linkages with the formal policy making establishment.

In a way, as I describe in detail in the book, in institutionalising and funding think tanks, the Indian government has engaged in consensus-building on policy directions on Pakistan. There has been a constant restatement of the policy message on Pakistan via different formats and products. While this has, at one level, enabled think tanks to have a place in the policy process, it has also somewhat restricted the adoption of alternative narratives. Dominant discourse on Pakistan, therefore, emphasised threats to national security and perpetuated government narratives on Pakistan, Kashmir, Siachen, and nuclear doctrines. It also side-lined alternative conceptualisations on resolution of key conflicts.

Government think tanks also did not engage adequately with issues of trade and people-to-people contact. The similarity in viewpoints with the defence and foreign policy community emphasised the Indian government position on Kashmir that argued for a continued military presence in the region. Non-government think tanks were able to expand the academic understanding of India-Pakistan issues, and as proximity to the government became distant, the ability of think tanks to suggest policy alternatives was more visible. However, these think tanks were unable to have better inputs into policymaking. They are often relegated to the status of “bleeding heart” organisations, especially when relations between India and Pakistan are combative. Thus, think tanks do have a role to play, albeit a restricted one.

Dominant discourse on Pakistan, therefore, emphasised threats to national security and perpetuated government narratives on Pakistan, Kashmir, Siachen, and nuclear doctrines. It also side-lined alternative conceptualisations on resolution of key conflicts.

SR: Chapter 6 of your book focuses on how peacebuilding think tanks “significantly expanded the discourse on Pakistan to include civil society and women’s perspectives” (p.128). Do you think these organisations play a more important role in establishing cooperative relations between India and Pakistan than think tanks focused on mainstream security issues?

SB: Peacebuilding think tanks have a fundamentally different institutional character than think tanks that focus primarily on mainstream security issues. Established in post-liberalised India, their research agendas have been more independent of government direction, and in addition to policy enquiry, the advocacy and training component is significant, particularly on projects dedicated to conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and training for peace. With regard to cooperative relations between India and Pakistan, peacebuilding think tanks responded actively to the government’s efforts to create a peace constituency to further its economic aims through the CD.

Beyond promoting the government agenda, peacebuilding think tanks also challenged the defence establishment’s militarist approach by highlighting Kashmiri grievances and the need to build cross-border networks involving civil society, women, and the youth as stakeholders in processes of conflict resolution. Think tanks, including IPCS and the Delhi Policy Group (DPG) considered, for instance, dynamics such as the need for fair elections and good governance. Contrary to the focus on law and order evident in defence policy think tanks, peacebuilding think tanks emphasised the continuing radicalisation of young Kashmiris in J&K, deliberated on preventive measures for further radicalisation, and recommended rule of law reforms in police-community relations. Even smaller think tanks such as Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP), and the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (CDR) gave special attention to women’s empowerment and gender-based violence in the context of armed conflict in J&K.

I do believe peacebuilding think tanks were more effective in establishing cross-border networks, which were crucial for deepening economic links. Together, they reflected an increased tolerance for alternative approaches on Kashmir that went beyond national security concerns, yet their policy impact was restricted. While they are more independent of government direction, they lack government patronage and resources as they depend primarily on foreign funders. Therefore, their efforts towards the Indo-Pak relationship could not be sustained, and very often these think tanks moved towards adopting “more palatable” research agendas that were not in conflict with the formal bureaucracy. These think tanks were particularly sensitive to a change in India’s foreign policy after the Mumbai attacks and particularly since 2014, significantly restricting their policy relevance and impact.

Peacebuilding think tanks were more effective in establishing cross-border networks, which were crucial for deepening economic links.

SR: You categorize think tanks as being oriented towards either peacebuilding or national security. What role do organisations working on economic policy have on India’s relations with the neighbourhood?

SB: Organisations working on economic policy should have an impact on India’s relations with the neighbours. However, in my research, I did not find a very robust engagement on this level, at least during the CD period. Organisations such as CPR and the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) have considered economic policy, but the RIS did not particularly focus on India-Pakistan relations. Foreign policy think tanks, however, in particular the CPR and ORF, and to some extent the IPCS, did engage with the policy initiatives along the Line of Control (LoC) that facilitated cross-border trade. For instance, the IPCS promoted the conceptualisation of cross-LoC trade as an economic CBM that enabled trade beyond the Kashmir valley and recommended expanding the list of goods that were permitted for trade and providing banking facilities in place of the barter system that had been in use. The focus on India-Pakistan trade and its potential advantages towards the broader relationship was also considered by studies at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER). I think there has to be a more sustained engagement with economic policy, particularly focusing on South Asian dynamics at think tanks in India. So far, it remains limited.

SR: Can the lack of access and funding explain why peacebuilding is no longer a primary area of interest for think tanks today, the way it was during the CD, or are there other factors in play?

SB: Yes, to a large extent, although broader political dynamics are also at play here. There were several challenges to the CD process and think tank interest – an overdependence on top-down leadership, a lack of bureaucratic support, and the reluctance of the defence establishment to think beyond law and order in Kashmir. Multi-track efforts could also not be sustained for various reasons, though there does seem to be an effort to revive them now.

At the think tank level, several structural constraints, external and internal, restricted their autonomy and ability to effectively interject in the policy process. While external funding provided the opportunity to develop alternative ideas, the same process also significantly restricted the influence of think tanks, particularly those that emphasised peacebuilding. The strict legal framework that exists for the regulation of think tanks in receipt of foreign donations limited the autonomy of think tanks. Think tanks are also dependent on information produced by government agencies for their programme development and they require constant state support for institutional relevance and to organise cross-border initiatives – many of which became difficult in the post-2014 era.

Though economic links expanded in Kashmir, at the broader level they continued to be limited, and the civil society linkages established by the CD process were not deep enough to constitute a tangible peace constituency with Pakistan, particularly after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Also, though economic links expanded in Kashmir, at the broader level they continued to be limited, and the civil society linkages established by the CD process were not deep enough to constitute a tangible peace constituency with Pakistan, particularly after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The attacks re-empowered a national security elite within defence think tanks, the MoD, and the armed forces who insisted on using a military strategy to resolve the Kashmir conflict and control Pakistan. Newer think tanks that developed in the post-2008 environment, the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) and the India Foundation (IF), for instance, reflected the cynicism with regards to peacebuilding, and agreed with the government’s emphasis on a militaristic strategy to combat terrorism and the active use of force towards civil unrest in Kashmir. All of these political compulsions as well as structural constraints of think tanks themselves contributed to an environment wherein peace with Pakistan was not the preferred policy option.

About the author:

Stuti Bhatnagar is a Sessional Academic with the University of New South Wales, Sydney and an adjunct fellow at the University of Adelaide. She also serves as an Executive Officer – South Asian Studies Association of Australia and as the Social Media Editor for South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. With a PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Adelaide, she specialises in Indian foreign policy, especially the role and rising influence of think tanks in India. Her recent book is titled, India’s Pakistan Policy: How Think Tanks Are Shaping Foreign Relations, (Routledge India).