Paradiplomacy in Northeast India: Assam Acts East

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Nitika Nayar interviews Obja Borah Hazarika, Assistant Professor, Dibrugarh University, on her book, Paradigms of Paradiplomacy in Northeast India: Assam’s Cross-border Concerns and Engagements, published in January 2021.

Traditionally perceived as landlocked and insurgent-ridden, India’s Northeast region is witnessing a geoeconomic transformation. Under its ‘Act East’ policy, New Delhi increasingly looks at the Northeast as a conduit of connectivity owing to its advantageous location as the region straddles India’s borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and China.

Hazarika’s Paradigms of Paradiplomacy in the Northeast is pioneering in shedding light on the paradiplomatic efforts made by these North-eastern states, with a particular focus on Assam. In the book, “paradiplomacy” refers to the involvement of sub-state actors or constituent units, including regional governments, in “influencing decisions on foreign and non-domestic matters; pursuing political, socio-cultural and economic ambitions abroad”, and engaging on issues that have an external or cross-border angle (p.5). Divided into six chapters, the book offers a comprehensive overview of the various strategies undertaken by the state government of Assam to exert influence on issues that affect its developmental prospects and encompass an external dimension. This involved setting up institutional mechanisms within the state, such as the “Act East Policy Affairs” (AEPA) department and the “Invest Assam” Foundation.

Assam’s paradiplomatic efforts also include hosting an increasing number of international delegations and its first-ever global investor’s summit, “Advantage Assam” in 2018 to attract foreign investments. The book examines these initiatives and also details how the state government was directly involved in the processes preceding the ratification of India’s historic Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh.

In bringing to the fore the different paradigms of Assam’s paradiplomacy, Hazarika’s research helps draw important lessons for the future of India’s more decentralised, federally cooperative and sub-national foreign policies. Featuring comparative case studies from other countries, it prescribes regional paradiplomacy championed by the neighbouring Chinese province of Yunnan as a model worth emulating. The book envisions an elevated international role for Assam and more broadly, the Northeast to enhance connectivity and deepen relations with India’s eastern neighbours in South and Southeast Asia.

Nitika Nayar: In 2017, the Government of Assam established the Act East Policy Affairs (AEPA) Department to institutionalise its paradiplomacy and assert a role for Assam in India’s ‘Act East’ policy. But you note that the department has largely been unsuccessful in enhancing Assam’s influence on New Delhi and its neighbourhood policies (p. 61). How can Guwahati be more effective, for example by working together with other Northeastern states to promote their interests in regional initiatives like BIMSTEC or BCIM-EC?

Obja Borah Hazarika: The states of the Northeast can only (to the most extent) support the policies of New Delhi when it comes to such trans-boundary connectivity projects as they are mainly funded and initiated by the Centre [Union government]. However, once these projects are completed, states can play a big role in preparing their people to leverage the benefits of such connectivity projects and trade activities. It is a common refrain among critics of these projects that the Northeast will become merely a gateway, land-bridge and route for the passage of trade goods from the mainland to the ASEAN nations and vice-versa, without any such tangible benefits accruing to the states as they are ill-equipped to provide necessary human resource to make the most of these projects. This is one area which the states of the Northeast can initiate under an umbrella body, say the North East Democratic Alliance (NEDA) or similar bodies that have a directional push by the Centre.

States can play a big role in preparing their people to leverage the benefits of such connectivity projects and trade activities.

The thrust can be on collecting, documenting, and understanding what Prof. Arjun Appadurai, renowned scholar of anthropology calls the “aspirations” of the people, especially of communities that reside immediately alongside the connectivity infrastructure and are involved in sectors associated with information, technology, trade, and farming. The government can develop the capacities of these communities as per their cultural and economic aspirations, so that they can take advantage of the new trans-boundary infrastructure being built by the state.

The capacity to aspire also needs to be developed and for that, the people, especially marginalized sections, need to be provided basic opportunities in education, livelihood and interactions so that they can best exercise their right to aspire and participate in the connectivity projects envisaged in and around their habitats and occupations. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the people may aspire to be left alone, and may not want any state-led intervention or variations in their lifestyles demanded by these changes in their areas.

States can also prepare impact assessments of connectivity projects on the population and take appropriate holistic measures, such as those of redressal in case of displacement and other kinds of adverse impact that may emerge out of these projects.

NN: Your book suggests how the political dimensions of ‘competitive federalism’ may have unfairly disadvantaged the Northeast’s development prospects. You note instances where other Indian states have been prioritized over Assam by the center when distributing investments pledged by foreign governments and that Assamese leaders point to “unfair treatment being meted out to the states of the Northeast”(p. 135). Further, even within Assam, paradiplomatic efforts have been largely centered around Guwahati, skewing development in other remote areas within the state. What paradiplomatic initiatives can be adopted under what you call the “region-state approach” (p. 204) to ensure more equitable development of the Northeast?

OBH: The region-state approach addresses issues of regions such as the Northeast, which share more borders with foreign countries than with their own fellow states. They have deeper historical, economic, and cultural connections with countries across the international border than with the rest of their nation. The Northeast and the neighbouring geographically contiguous areas in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and China are natural economic zones, making them quintessential region states. Dr. Kenichi Ohmae, Japanese organizational theorist and expert on global strategy, describes these region-states as “natural economic zones. They may or may not fall within the geographic limits of a particular country.”

So, we need the governments of constituent units bordering each other in the region-state of Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, and Northeast India to work together on issues impacting them, in consonance with the overall policies of their respective central governments.

The focus should be on the Northeastern states working together with their counterparts in neighbouring countries to solve common regional problems.

Ohmae also contends that, “the nation-state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavour in a borderless world.” In practice therefore, the focus should be on the Northeastern states working together with their counterparts in neighbouring countries to solve common regional problems. However, this must be within the overall framework established by their respective central governments, given their security concerns.

Paradiplomatic activities can focus on fostering trans-border cooperation and exchanges in education, culture, sports, agriculture, health and medical tourism, library and museum studies, combined endeavours in tourism and hotel management. This can also include exchanges of best practices to promote ecological security and other components that come under the larger rubric of soft power and common subjects covered under the state lists of the respective countries (for example, the state list has 66 entries under schedule VII in the Indian constitution).

NN: In your book, the paradiplomacy of China’s Yunnan province is prescribed as a comparative case study for the Northeast – both regions are landlocked and share unique geographical proximity to Southeast Asian economies. However, while Beijing granted Yunnan the autonomy to pursue its international ambitions, New Delhi has not extended the same privileges to its North-eastern states. What lessons can New Delhi draw from China’s example of Yunnan to overcome its security vs development conundrum in the region?

OBH: Several. While concerns over security issues cannot be immediately overcome, there are other areas in which Northeast states can be encouraged to take on a leadership role, especially in those sectors that pertain to development.

As pointed out by Dr. Nimmi Kurian, a scholar of Asian borderlands and regionalism at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi can start by letting Northeast states host working groups on BCIM-Economic Corridor and BIMSTEC on regional governance issues, such as disaster management, customs cooperation, and regulation of passenger and cargo vehicular traffic. It can emulate the flagship role that Beijing provides to Yunnan in hosting the Greater Mekong Sub-region Working Groups on a range of regional governance issues, such as environment, tourism, and agriculture.

Greater autonomy can be provided to the Northeast to facilitate networked governance in sub-regional Asia. Kurian points to the existence of networks such as the Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network (AECEN), South Asian Biosphere Reserve Network (SeaBRNet), Asian Network of Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources (ANSAB), Freshwater Action Network South Asia (FANSA), Himalayan Conservation Approaches and Technologies (HIMCAT), and South Asian Network on Environmental Law (SANEL).

In these networks, leadership and involvement of appropriate government departments of the Northeast should be encouraged by the Centre as they are geographically better positioned to make a difference.

To cash in on the benefits of paradiplomacy, Beijing has deployed provincial authorities in its western, land-locked provinces to pursue  subnational diplomacy: Yunnan in China’s southwest in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in China’s northwest in the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC).

Similar initiatives could be undertaken by New Delhi, such as designating states of the Northeast to participate in sub-regional endeavors, including BIMSTEC and BCIM-EC for example, to enhance their autonomy and position them to achieve the aims envisioned under these groups.

Before becoming a party to the GMS in 1992, Yunnan was “required to report to Beijing in case it sought to launch any external projects” but soon, it initiated and hosted several large-scale projects, such as the Lancing-Mekong shipway, the Kunming-Bangkok Highway, and the customs clearance facilitation without any advance reporting to Beijing.

Such ease of doing trans-boundary business would help and go a long way in bolstering paradiplomacy. The Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DONER) could play an active role in facilitating such initiatives, allowing the Centre to have an overarching presence in such state-led initiatives while letting the constituent units take the reins.

Special thrust programs such as Beijing’s Western Development Program in 1999 helped the growth of Western provinces like Yunnan. Similar programs by the Centre aimed at the development of the Northeast could help create a mission and vision dedicated to promoting and supporting the development of the Northeast through economic integration with neighbouring countries. While the Act East policy does have a Northeast component, the emphasis still remains on boosting overall ties with ASEAN countries. This makes it pertinent to have a dedicated Northeast Development program as a sub-unit of the Act East policy.

The bottom line is there is a need to provide more autonomy to the states of the Northeast for pursuing economic, cultural, educational, and other outreach with the border nations.

The bottom line is there is a need to provide more autonomy to the states of the Northeast for pursuing economic, cultural, educational, and other outreach with the border nations. This can be enabled by the central government funding the development of human resources and infrastructure in the region to enable them to leverage the benefits from such outreach.

NN: Your book highlights the commercial interests at play that push Assam and China to engage with one another. Assam was among the first Indian states to exemplify pandemic-related paradiplomacy as it procured PPE kits directly from China (p. 72). Several Chinese provinces and cities, in turn, have also wished to establish direct linkages with the region owing to its geostrategic location (p. 81). Despite these reciprocal interests, the Northeast has often suffered as a pawn in New Delhi’s conflicting economic and security strategies toward Beijing. Can the region carve its development route and pursue economic paradiplomacy with China?

OBH: Yes! To prevent China from dominating investments or other paradiplomacy related activities in the Northeast, the states in the Northeast can opt for a multi-pronged outreach where they invite or try to attract investments from several countries including those from the United States, Japan, and other powers – a kind of a non-aligned paradiplomacy can be practiced. In this way, the constituent units could gain by maximizing their options. Since the constituent units are not bound by international diplomacy at the same level as the capitals, they can continue to pursue economic and other engagement and outreach in as many countries as possible.

The states in the Northeast can opt for a multi-pronged outreach where they invite or try to attract investments from several countries including those from the United States, Japan, and other powers – a kind of a non-aligned paradiplomacy can be practiced.

Moreover, a non-aligned paradiplomacy would also not irk New Delhi as much since a multi-country outreach would mean diversified investment and involvement from many external powers. So the best bet will be to pursue China but also as many other countries as possible. This would attract the best investments and create a competitive atmosphere for prospective investors. At the same time, it would also allay any consternations of the Centre, which may not be comfortable with one country emerging as the single or most important player in the paradiplomacy outreach of the geopolitically sensitive Northeast.

NN: The Northeast’s conducive geography and proximity to the markets of ASEAN nations have nurtured its economic paradiplomacy with neighbouring countries, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, and China. What are the views and perceptions from Assam and other Northeastern states on the central government’s recent protectionist measures, such as pulling out of RCEP or decoupling from China by way of restricting imports and investments?

OBH: Broadly, there are two views in the Northeast or among those who write on the Northeast. One is that it would do the region a great disservice if its borders are opened for trade or other such activities as i) the Northeast is not ready to leverage the opportunities given its poor human resource development and economic preparedness; ii) it would allow insurgents to use these routes to bolster their activities; iii) it would flush the region with cheap goods from its neighbours; and iv) it would make the region easier to be ambushed in case of national security crises between India and China, among others.

The other group holds that the routes and historical passages – waterways, railways, and roads – need to be rebuilt and opened for use to provide a much-needed infrastructural boost. This could turn the Northeast into one of the region’s most flourishing epicenters of growth, as in the yesteryears before the politics of colonial powers destroyed such linkages and turned it into a landlocked periphery. This in turn, had thwarted its economic prosperity and unleashed certain backwardness in the region.

Concerning the Centre’s policies on RCEP and restricting imports and investments, the arguments from the Northeast are the same as they have been about the overall prospects for the region under the Act East policy, where there are two schools of thought. One which decries this as being detrimental for the development of the region, and the other supporting it as being in the best interest of the states.

NN: Your book elucidates the story behind the ratification of the historic Land Boundary Agreement between Bangladesh and India in 2015, which was facilitated by the active involvement of the states of Assam and West Bengal. This is an exemplar of a bottom-up approach, where state governments were able to exert influence and help resolve a long-standing dispute between India and its neighbour. How can Northeastern states like Nagaland, Manipur, or Mizoram encourage India to take on a more activist role when it comes to the current conflict in Myanmar?

OBH: Regarding the coup in Myanmar, the states of the Northeast, with Mizoram in the lead, have been taking a very active role on the Chin refugees who are seeking shelter in India. The central government had issued formal orders to the states not to accept any more refugees and to send back those who had fled to India. The government of Mizoram, and to some extent Manipur, have not done so.  There are over 9000 Chin refugees in Mizoram, who fled the country as a result of political persecution and are being provided shelter by the Government of Mizoram and other bodies. The Chief Minister of Mizoram has written to the Centre asking for aid to help them provide relief to the refugees.

The entire Chin refugee episode highlights how the Northeast states and the central government may at times disagree on what to do regarding a trans-boundary issue. While for Mizoram’s Chief Minister it makes sense to provide shelter to a population seen as kindred by the people of Mizoram, this sentiment does not resonate in New Delhi as the military in Myanmar may interpret this move as India condemning the coup or worse, supporting the dissidents. This would be detrimental to overall India-Myanmar relations, which would provide greater space for China to increase its already overwhelming presence in Myanmar.

The Chief Minister’s party in Mizoram is part of the NEDA [includes the BJP] and by leveraging the coalition, the state could pressurize the Centre to accommodate its interests instead of going it alone. Moreover, the states facing this exodus can combine their efforts in relaying to the Centre the matters that impact their political calculations as well as socio-cultural milieu, which may have implications for their prospects in the next round of elections.

NN: How do research institutions and universities in the Northeast, such as the Dibrugarh University where you teach, view the growing emphasis on connectivity in the region? How are these perspectives different from the conventional geostrategic narratives espoused in New Delhi?

OBH: At the research level, there has been an emerging thrust to study local communities along the borders of the Northeast and neighbouring countries in the universities based in these states. These studies are imperiled when there is any crisis in the neighbourhood or if the relations (including communication, transportation, institutional cooperation) between the region and these countries are not well-developed. For example, several academics and scholars who are working on paradiplomacy and border studies may need to rework their original objectives given the coup in Myanmar. My own student researchers are impacted. One is carrying out her work on two communities which live along the Indo-Myanmar border and the other on the BCIM-EC. Given the instability on the border, both had to add more document-based sources in lieu of fieldwork.

So, from the research point of view, there is a need to increase connectivity as well as keep channels open despite a change in regime or the political fortunes of countries in the neighbourhood. Strong academic exchanges are being encouraged by universities on both sides of the border. This would help build educational bridges and lasting links that may withstand changing bilateral ties or regimes in neighbouring countries.

Overall, there are concerns in the Northeast including in its universities that the Centre ought to take into account the consequences of events in Myanmar, of dams being built by China, or any other issues with possible trans-boundary ramifications for the Northeast. Instead of looking at these issues as irritants in overall bilateral ties, the human element should be factored into the plans to combat the adverse impacts of such dams, floods, or coups especially by carrying out in-depth impact assessments by Northeastern states in tandem with the Centre. These should include the voices of the people and consider the local ecosystems, as well as factor in the cultural practices and kindred ties that may play a role in the aftermath of any trans-boundary issue.

Bio:

Obja Borah Hazarika is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Dibrugarh University, Assam. She completed her PhD on ‘The Strategic Dimensions of the Look East Policy, 1991-2013’ from Dibrugarh University in 2017.

Email:

obja11@gmail.com