Positioning Critical Minerals in the India-EU Partnership

Climate change and clean energy has emerged as a crucial sector for collaboration between India and the European Union (EU). As the third and fourth largest emitters of greenhouse gases respectively, both New Delhi and Brussels have undertaken various steps to address the issue amidst the ongoing climate crisis. As the backbone of the energy and technology transitions, access to critical minerals is essential for their respective climate policies.

As the global development narrative shifts towards the pressing need for economic development that is climate-centric, the need for lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and other minerals becomes fundamental. These are referred to as critical minerals, are essential components for a wide range of industries such as clean energy, modern technology, defence, and agriculture.

There is close to a 60% overlap between the critical minerals identified by both partners.

This article discusses the potential for India and the EU to cooperate towards resilient supply chains for critical minerals given their shared interests and broader economic and geopolitical convergence. There is close to a 60% overlap between the critical minerals identified by both partners. The EU and India are members of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). The establishment of the India-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) signals a growing interest in geoeconomic cooperation. And both partners have identified supply chain disruptions as threats given the emerging economic competition and geopolitical rivalries, most importantly with China.

Part of a series of publications on India’s international partnerships on critical minerals, this article a) discusses the growing scope of the India-EU bilateral relationship; b) surveys the EU’s critical minerals policies; and c) discusses the collaborative frameworks the EU has with India on climate and energy, arguing that it offers the foundation for a partnership on critical minerals. It concludes by identifying specific cooperation pathways for the two partners, including public private partnerships, trilateral partnerships and enhancing trade and investment ties.

Strategic convergence between India and the EU

India and the EU are increasingly viewed as natural partners in a shifting geopolitical landscape, where their shared democratic values and commitment to a rules-based international order provide a strong foundation for cooperation. As the economic and security interests of the two partners converge given the rising geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and growing competition between global powers, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, the scope of the partnership has been expanding in recent years.  Making the case for congruence between Brussels’ and New Delhi’s global agendas, India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar emphasised that “India and the EU believe in a multi-polar global order, share a commitment to promoting effective multilateralism and are increasingly considerate to each other’s geopolitical, economic, strategic and security concerns.”

India and the EU are increasingly viewed as natural partners in a shifting geopolitical landscape, where their shared democratic values and commitment to a rules-based international order provide a strong foundation for cooperation.

India and the EU have a long-standing history of bilateral engagement, which has paved the way for deeper, more strategic collaborations. Since the early 1960s, both India and the European Union have nurtured a relationship that has steadily grown through trust and mutual benefit, culminating in the India-EU Strategic Partnership in 2004. This history of bilateral cooperation is now assuming a more expansive nature, with collaborations across sectors such as security, trade, climate action, and technology. This provides a strong foundation for expanding into new areas of cooperation, such as critical minerals supply chains.

India and the EU share similar outlooks on key areas such as building resilient supply chains to mitigate vulnerabilities and enhancing technological cooperation. Their strategic partnership also encompasses a growing global dimension, for example on sustainable development and climate action in third regions such as Africa. This convergence, coupled with their mutual interest in maintaining global stability and addressing challenges posed by China’s rise, positions India and the EU as important strategic partners in the evolving global order.

There are important motivations for both sides to deepen cooperation on critical minerals. For the EU, it is essential to realise that the future of its energy security in a decarbonised world depends on its capacity to expand and deepen its strategic partnerships with India and other countries. This involves mitigating risks in supply chains and co-developing policies for economic, climate, and ecological transitions. The EU must, therefore, frame its approach within the broader context of climate and environmental security to succeed in these efforts.

For India, in turn, it is essential to align its ambitious climate targets with EU policy frameworks such as the Green Deal and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Collaborative efforts can focus on technology transfer, green finance, and joint projects in the renewable energy, electric mobility, and sustainable agriculture sectors. Additionally, India may benefit from participating in EU-led initiatives like the Global Gateway to secure critical minerals essential for clean energy transitions.

As both India and the EU strive to meet ambitious decarbonisation targets, their established partnership can play a pivotal role in diversifying supply chains and mitigating geopolitical risks posed by the monopolisation of critical minerals by a limited cluster of resource-rich countries and processing giants like China.

EU’s Emerging Policy Frameworks on Critical Minerals

The EU has implemented a series of policies to secure a resilient supply chain and mitigate the risks associated with their scarcity. Its policies are more advanced than India given that the EU’s engagement with critical minerals can be traced back to its Raw Materials Initiative, launched in 2008. Therefore, for an India-EU partnership to succeed, it is important to assess the positives and negatives of the EU’s experiences and its policies. This will help New Delhi identify the right entry points to engage with Brussels.

The EU’s Raw Materials Initiative (2008) aims to ensure a sustainable and undisturbed supply of raw materials, including critical minerals. One of the primary pillars of the initiative is the identification of critical raw materials, periodically updated to reflect the dynamic nature of global markets and emerging technologies. The identification of criticality is driven by outlining those resources that are of high economic importance and face a high supply risk. The fifth list of critical minerals was released in 2023 and has identified 34 minerals as being critical for the EU.

Table 2 lists some of the key policies undertaken by the EU that have shaped its approach towards this issue in light of the various geopolitical drivers. While the 2008 Raw Materials Initiative and the 2020 Action Plan on critical minerals provide frameworks for identification, supply diversification, innovation and domestic critical minerals production capacity in the EU, they have been unable to ensure supply security of critical minerals for the EU. Given this, the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act provides a regulatory framework for the EU to strengthen and diversify its supply chains, monitor and mitigate current and future risks while ensuring sustainability and circularity, and leveraging the strengths and opportunities of the Single Market. The Act was adopted by the EU council in March 2024.

Regulatory frameworks have also been established to ensure responsible sourcing and sustainable extraction of critical minerals. The EU’s Conflict Minerals Regulation, implemented in 2021, aims to prevent the financing of armed groups through the trade of minerals, emphasising transparency and due diligence in supply chains. This regulation not only addresses ethical concerns but also contributes to the EU’s broader objective of fostering sustainable practices in the extraction and processing of critical minerals.

In addition to regulatory measures, the EU recognises the need for investment and innovation to enhance the resilience of its critical mineral supply chains. The EBA, launched in 2017, exemplifies this commitment by fostering collaboration between public and private stakeholders to develop a competitive and sustainable battery industry.

Table 1: Timeline of key EU policies on critical minerals

Source: Authors compilation based on various sources; not exhaustive.

Building on the foundation of climate and energy cooperation

In 2024, the European Commission adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (initially announced in 2023), designed to highlight supply chain risks for materials deemed to be crucial for European industries and the green energy shift. India, on a similar track, identified 30 critical raw materials in 2023 with the aim to foster self-reliance. Both India and the EU have increasingly viewed these supply chain risks as “threats“, driving global competition for control over these key resources.

There is a significant overlap in the critical minerals identified by the two partners (see Table 2). Out of the 34 minerals identified by the EU, 20 overlap with India’s list of critical minerals (i.e. 59% of the minerals identified are similar). This may indicate a potential for partnership as it highlights shared strategic priorities and mutual interest in securing these resources.

Table 2: List of 34 critical minerals identified by the EU and the overlaps with India’s list of critical minerals

Source: European Commission, 2023.

The minerals highlighted in green are those that are common between India and the EU based on their latest lists.

One possible answer lies in embedding critical minerals cooperation within the broader framework of their rapidly advancing climate and energy partnership.

Given the geoeconomic convergence between India and the EU, and that critical minerals have emerged as an area of overlapping interest, how can India and the EU partner more effectively? One possible answer lies in embedding critical minerals cooperation within the broader framework of their rapidly advancing climate and energy partnership.

India and the EU have taken on a prominent role in addressing climate change and working together more closely across public and private sectors. They have established partnerships in key areas such as clean energy, water management, and urban development. The EU is actively involved in supporting various Indian initiatives focused on climate action, sustainability, and clean energy. This includes projects on solar energy, offshore wind, promoting energy efficiency and investing in smart girds. Building on this foundation, ensuring resilient and stable supply chains of critical minerals is an emerging and pressing avenue where the two partners can look to collaborate.

Table 3 showcases some of the key policy collaborations between India and the EU on these areas. Yet, as India’s external affairs minister highlighted, cooperation on critical minerals is crucial to sustain and build on this cooperation.

Table 3: Timeline of key India-EU collaborations on climate change and clean energy

Source: Author’s compilation based on various sources; not exhaustive.

The establishment of the TTC has been a significant step in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The second working group (WG) on green and clean energy technologies has identified three areas of cooperation: renewable and low-carbon hydrogen, batteries for electric vehicles, and standards. Addressing the need for critical minerals security is thus embedded within the TTC. The third WG (trade, investment and resilient supply chains) has the ambit of working on developing a framework for supply chain resilience, which can help address critical minerals. The TTC has held two ministerial meetings and one international workshop on WG-2 and has made significant progress on EV batteries and recycling, and resilient supply chains among other areas.

Improving trade relations between countries has been identified as a crucial step in de-risking supply chains. It aids in diversifying sources of critical minerals, reducing reliance on a single supplier or region. This enhances resilience against geopolitical tensions, market disruptions, and supply shortages, ensuring a steady flow of resources. Improved trade relations can foster economic growth by enabling the efficient exchange of goods, services, and resources, including critical minerals at competitive prices. While there have been disruptions in the India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations in the past, the relaunching of the negotiations in 2022 has been a welcome step in advancing the bilateral relations.

Exploring convergences: What’s next?

With the EU’s comprehensive policy framework on critical minerals and the overlaps between India’s and the EU’s priority mineral lists, there is a strong foundation for deeper cooperation. Embedding this partnership into their climate and energy collaborations offers both sides a way to secure resilient supply chains, essential for clean energy transitions and technological advancements. There are several opportunities, obstacles and policy options that India and the EU must consider in order to enhance their cooperation on critical minerals.

1. Balance Brussels and bilateral engagements: While India’s engagements with the EU have been significant and forward oriented, it needs to identify how and at what level it will engage with Europe on critical minerals. Will India continue to engage through EU-wide partnerships? Or will it, and should it move towards leveraging its bilateral relationships? This has been the case for India’s climate diplomacy with Europe, where it has inked Green Strategic partnerships with member countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Denmark alongside the EU, often leading to questions about the success of these partnerships.
2. Coordinate via the Mineral Security Partnership: Beyond bilateral cooperation, the EU and India are also part of the MSP. Through sideline consultations, India and the EU should ensure coordination at the MSP to align priorities and build trust. The two partners should also work towards strengthen the MSP as the forum for ensuring resilient critical mineral supply chains.
3. Develop public-private partnerships: India could look to adapt the EU policy model of public-private partnerships to build a strong critical minerals ecosystem. The EU has robust public-private partnership initiatives, the European Battery Alliance (EBA) being one, that allow for collaborations between governments, research institutions and industry towards addressing the challenges of critical minerals. For example, the Swedish company Northvolt received funding support to establish Europe’s first ‘gigafactory’ for lithium-ion batteries through the EBA. These have been instrumental in driving innovation, research, technological advancement and international collaborations in critical minerals exploration and processing.
4. Establish knowledge partnerships: The EU has been working towards resilient supply chains for critical minerals longer than India as it identified its first list of critical minerals in 2008. Hence there are lessons India can learn from the successes and failures of the EU. Knowledge partnerships can help India to build a comprehensive policy framework (see Table 1) on ensuring secure and reliable access to critical minerals and a critical minerals strategy similar to that of the EU.
5. Learn from the EU’s other partnerships: The EU has various other partnerships with countries such as the Australia, US and Japan on securing access to critical minerals and strengthening supply chains. Such as the Critical Minerals Agreement with the US which aims to build international partnerships, diversify supply chains, facilitate trade, improve sustainability and labour standards. Replicating and adapting a partnership given the context of the India-EU relationship could further strategic alignment and interests.
6. Develop trilateral partnerships: India and the EU could consider trilateral partnerships  to ensure mineral security as they can pool resources, share expertise, and improve resilience against global disruptions. Both India and the EU have a growing focus on the African mining space and the potential for partnerships with Africa on critical minerals. This joint focus could be leveraged for potential trilateral agreements with African countries to ensure diversifying critical minerals supply chains.
7. Diversify energy baskets: Currently, the EU has signed 14 partnerships on critical minerals and raw materials with resource rich countries, such as Uzbekistan, Rwanda, Norway and others,  aimed at diversifying its supply chains. India could consider looking at these partners to diversify its own energy basket.
8. Link with trade and investment agendas: European companies seek greater market access and the integration of India into global supply chains. Shifting towards India-centred supply chains for sectors like EVs, technology, defence, and semiconductors, which are dependent on resilient supply of critical minerals, both India and the EU should broaden their approach to cooperation, embedding critical minerals more strategically within their overall economic partnership.
9. Invest in science and technology (S&T) research: Leveraging the EU’s technical expertise in the field of S&T cooperation given the more expansive institutional experience it has, India may seek to develop a robust research ecosystem on critical minerals, especially in sectors like EVs and green technology. Drawing inspiration from initiatives such as Horizon 2020, India can foster collaboration with start-ups and encourage entrepreneurial investment in critical minerals research, enhancing its innovation capabilities in this field.
10. Explore opportunities through Global Gateway: Through the Global Gateway initiative connectivity partnerships with India on sectors like energy, digital infrastructure, and transportation are already being explored. Building on this foundation, it can be further leveraged to develop resilient supply chains for critical minerals, similar to the EU’s approach with Chile, aligning with the broader strategic objectives of green and digital transitions for both regions.

*Note: The author would like to thank Constantino Xavier, Senior Fellow, CSEP for his insightful feedback and comments.