Still Non-Aligned? Sri Lankan Politics and Foreign Policy

In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Constantino Xavier interviews Asanga Abeyagoonasekera on his book, Conundrum Of An Island: Sri Lanka’s Geopolitical Challenges, published by World Scientific in 2021.

Abeyagoonasekera served as the Founding Director General of the National Security Think Tank under Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Defence, until January 2020. He has been a prolific writer, with various books and articles that examine the critical link between the country’s domestic transformation and its geostrategic posture.

Conundrum of an Island is, therefore, not a typical foreign policy book, that merely looks at Sri Lanka’s external challenges in isolation. Instead, Abeyagoonasekera’s analysis in five chapters invites us to understand the decision-making transmission belt in both directions: how under the Rajapaksas-led government internal politics and socio-economic changes are disrupting Sri Lanka’s traditional foreign policy, for example on human rights or embracing China’s Belt and Road Initiative; and vice-versa, how an increasingly competitive geoeconomic order is informing Colombo’s decisions on infrastructure financing from Japan or security cooperation with India and the United States.

The book surveys these dynamics in detail, across sectors, including Sri Lanka’s security sector reforms, the regulatory context of foreign direct investment, and the role of multilateralism in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It offers readers a rare insight on how Sri Lanka is observing, debating and addressing a moment of transition and turbulence in the regional order.

The book is a timely and relevant contribution, especially to understand the dynamics behind a recent parliamentary bill clearing the US$1.4 billion investment for China Harbour Engineering Company to build and operate the Colombo Port City on a 99-year lease. This was in stark contrast with the Sri Lankan government’s decision to drop out of a trilateral, inter-governmental agreement with India and Japan to develop a container terminal in the same port.

Constantino Xavier: You compare Sri Lanka’s geostrategic position to that of England and Japan, highlighting the potential of your island-state’s Indo-Pacific centrality. But you are also concerned that Sri Lankans have “become prisoners of location, increasingly defined by external spheres of influence from powerful nations.” (p. 108). What can Colombo do better to preserve its strategic autonomy?

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera: In the book, I revisit the work of the geopolitical thinker Nicolas J. Spykman and his Rimland theory, which explains the significance of the rimland in the present context. This is a time when the United States (US) and China have drawn mental maps connecting oceans and continents to the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategies. The United Kingdom (UK) and Japan, as two geostrategic offshore islands of significance, have played a major role in global politics of the last century. However, the Atlantic-Pacific axis of power has shifted to the Indo-Pacific due to China’s rise in this century.

Sri Lanka is geographically located at the outer crescent of the rimland, facing the Indian Ocean to the south and the Indian subcontinent to the north. It is at an important geostrategic location, close to the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCS) through which China’s energy and trade demands are catered to. Additionally, proximity to India gives Sri Lanka further importance due to India’s interests in the Indian Ocean.

Sri Lanka’s conundrum is that it has failed to reach a balance in its foreign policy, and this directly impacts our internal instability.

Sri Lanka has subscribed to both the Indo-Pacific and China’s BRI, promising a ‘neutral’ foreign policy posture. Its successive governments have rhetorically claimed a ‘neutral’ and ‘balanced’ foreign policy with non-aligned principles but have failed to translate rhetoric into action due to China’s strategic inroads in the nation.

In the book, I discuss the Chinese sphere of influence in length and comparatively assess Indian and American influence in the island nation. Sri Lanka’s conundrum is that it has failed to reach a balance in its foreign policy, and this directly impacts our internal instability. Sri Lanka must follow the rules-based order and maintain its foreign policy balance.

CX: Your book argues that India is following an American line against China in South Asia, something you describe as “buck-passing tactics used by the US on India” (p. 70). Is this the overall perception in Sri Lanka today, that there is a joint US-India policy in the region targeting China and curtailing Colombo’s decision-making freedom?

AA: In the book, I refer to the realist school of thinking and the work of John Mearsheimer who popularized the concept of “buck-passing”. Mearsheimer explains that buck-passing “is essentially about who does the balancing, not whether it gets done.” Every power in history has buck passed. In the present context, in Asia, the US quietly encourages nations like Japan and India to build up their militaries in order to check China. My analysis is that the more the US buck-passes, the more India can balance and control an assertive China. It is a good thing to buck-pass and it should be seen as a positive trend.

Sri Lanka, just like India, has followed a non-aligned foreign policy in the past. Many non-aligned nations did not care for geopolitics until ‘surprise’ external forces threatened them. India, in 1962, faced a surprise attack by China and subsequently received US assistance to curb the assault and end Chinese aggression.

Similarly, US presence and assistance has helped many nations in South Asia. With multiple military agreements between the US and India, and now the Maldives, a stronger US presence is visible in the Indian Ocean, which will help maintain balance and sustain a ‘rules-based order’.

CX: Beyond the increasingly competitive US-India-China triangle, what role do you see for other middle powers like Japan, the European Union, ASEAN or Australia in Sri Lanka? Haven’t President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa already achieved a fine balance by diversifying relations with all these actors in recent years?

AA: When Secretary Mike Pompeo was in Colombo, he asked Sri Lanka to align with the US and adhere to its Indo-Pacific values. And when senior Ambassador Yang Jiechi visited last October, he asked Sri Lanka to align with China and deepen its involvement in the BRI. Sri Lanka is being given a binary choice between the US and China. In this environment, I recommend focusing our energy towards middle powers.

There is so much Sri Lanka can do in terms of trade and security with middle powers like Japan, Australia, and the EU. A relatively small island like Sri Lanka should not be pressured to choose between great powers, and without working with middle powers, we will get carried away and spend more time contemplating these binaries.

We [Sri Lanka] should work with both great powers while also adhering to the values we have treasured in our foreign policy such as our commitment to the Law of the Sea, the Indian Ocean zone for peace, a rules-based order, and democracy.

Sri Lanka cannot afford to disengage from China nor from the US. During the Mahinda Rajapaksa era, we signed a strategic partnership with China along with other agreements and we have a rich bilateral relationship with Beijing now being our largest trading partner. In the same way, our largest export market is the US and the US-Sri Lanka bilateral relationship is essential to sustain our democratic model of governance, which we have benefited from.

We should work with both great powers while also adhering to the values we have treasured in our foreign policy such as our commitment to the Law of the Sea, the Indian Ocean zone for peace, a rules-based order, and democracy. The problem is, unlike in the past, we have not articulated our position when extra-regional powers have failed to adhere to international norms and law. Sri Lanka should remodel its passive foreign policy to be more active and vibrant. We are not bound to accept Huawei 5G, or give away a special zone with extra jurisdictional rights such as in Colombo Port City.

CX: On regional connectivity, you recommend that “India, rather than seeing China’s BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] as a threat, should move away from this policy and join the BRI just like all her neighboring countries.” (p. 70). Based on Sri Lanka’s experience with the BRI, what factors should India consider?

AA: Today, many nations prefer to bandwagon with China due to their weak economic conditions and multiple loans. Chinese loans require more transparency, and their projects require sound business models to generate revenue. Sri Lanka should avoid ‘ghost airport’ business models. It should also keep in mind the long-term strategic view on whether Chinese-financed infrastructure is leveraged for both civil and military use, such as in Djibouti.

Apart from Bhutan, India is the only South Asian nation that is not part of the BRI. It has two clear concerns: the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), and the expansion of China’s strategic presence in the region through non-transparent funding. My assessment is that both concerns are justified, but China has ignored India’s objections and there’s nothing that India can do to slow down CPEC. Through CPEC, China is trying to connect the Middle East to its western provinces of Xinjiang.

India will need to be involved in the BRI to address these concerns. However, India will need to bring in a serious security dimension to its strategic long-term assessment of the BRI. Three key BRI projects – CPEC, Hambantota/Port City, and the Myanmar Economic Corridor – surround India geographically.

India’s absence from the BRI is also a major drawback to other countries in the region. India actively engaging with the BRI can help tackle important issues such as transparency/debt repayment concerns, China’s take over of Hambantota port, the multiple debt to equity swaps, and the granting of extra-jurisdictional powers such as with the Colombo Port City, which is a clear loss of sovereignty for Sri Lanka. Certain South Asian nations in the BRI do not have the capacity and the muscle to defend their projects and to assess their business models.

India correctly observed that connectivity initiatives in the BRI must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create an unsustainable debt burden for nations.

Staying away from the BRI serves India no purpose. India correctly observed that connectivity initiatives in the BRI must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create an unsustainable debt burden for nations. So how is India going to do this by being absent? India can balance the BRI by carving trade routes that can be beneficial for it, both economically and strategically.

CX: Sri Lanka is the current chair of BIMSTEC, an organisation you describe as playing a growing security and even military role for regional cooperation in the Bay of Bengal. Doesn’t this go against BIMSTEC’s economic and connectivity mandate? Will it not further deepen suspicions about what you call “hegemonic” India among smaller states like Sri Lanka or Nepal?

AA: The answer is clearly no. BIMSTEC should include security issues in its agenda, a vital area of cooperation for all countries in the region. As I assess in the book, South Asian nations have common security threats, especially when it comes to internal stability, terrorism and even elections. Across the region, election outcomes are often impacted through violence. It points to the absence of a regional security architecture in South Asia.

We can build trust by discussing these concerns. India’s Monroe doctrine in South Asia is similar to the behaviour of all large powers in their geographical vicinity, including the US, Russia, and China. However, there is a serious trust deficit between India and Sri Lanka due to underinvestment in many areas, including security. We need to institutionalise these relations. For example, an India-Sri Lanka security or defence cooperation agreement can be proposed that covers submarine port calls, alleviating Indian fears every time a Chinese submarine visits Colombo port.

We need to build trust at different levels and institutionalise, including through BIMSTEC but not only. The recent tri-lateral between India-Sri Lanka-Maldives is a good example.

My book discusses the Easter Sunday terror attack [of 2019], where India warned the Sri Lankan authorities multiple times beforehand. But why was such vital intelligence ignored? The reason is clear now: according to the Presidential Commission of Investigation (PCOI) report, the head of State Intelligence Services says that Indian intelligence was not intelligence, just information. So, the strength of Indian intelligence was reduced to mere information in Sri Lanka due to Colombo’s trust deficit.

So how do we work in such a heavily politicised environment? My answer is to build trust at different levels and institutionalise, including through BIMSTEC but not only. The recent tri-lateral between India-Sri Lanka-Maldives is a good example of regional security cooperation.

CX: Sri Lanka implemented its first free trade agreement with India more than twenty years ago. But negotiations for an expanded economic partnership, also including services and investments, have stalled in recent years. What needs to happen for this to finally advance?

AA: Over the years, successive Sri Lankan governments have adopted an inward, nationalist economic position. We talk a lot about regional integration but in practice we follow a protectionist agenda, which has slowed down our bilateral trade. Sri Lankan nationalists have been apprehensive of India taking over service sector jobs and overall control of the economy. I believe these are all politically motivated claims with no rationale. Some leftist political parties are part of the government coalition, and their nationalist voices have been a concern to the government.

This rhetoric of trade unions is controlled to a degree by political forces, which has often led us astray from the progressive path. The trade unions go to sleep when the Chinese request extra-jurisdictional power for their [Colombo] port city project. No trade unions talk of sovereignty when it comes to Chinese projects. This is unacceptable. When it comes to Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with India or Singapore, Sri Lanka is far from taking a more open posture due to these nationalist political sentiments. Sri Lankan leadership should discard these inward policies and open up, if we want to fulfill our economic vision of becoming South Asia’s Singapore. Nations like India and Japan can help Sri Lanka if it practices more open and progressive economic policies.

CX: Does the Tamil issue remain an irritant in India-Sri Lanka relations, giving China an advantage? Is India just using devolution to preserve strategic leverage or to appease domestic electorates, especially in Tamil Nadu?

AA: I believe India’s concern for Sri Lanka’s minorities is genuine. The Tamilian concern has been there for decades and has not been adequately addressed. Many majoritarian ultra-nationalists see India to have imposed devolution on Sri Lanka. This is an incorrect view, and I think devolution was a solution we required long before 1988, and India only tried to assist Sri Lanka to achieve this goal and create stability.

China states it is only here [in Sri Lanka] for economic development and not to interfere in domestic politics. But the Chinese Communist Party’s engagement with the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the Rajapaksa’s political party, is an example of direct involvement in domestic politics, as reflected during the 2018 constitutional crisis. China is not concerned about Sri Lanka’s human rights, and this was clearly stated by Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe in his recent visit. Sri Lanka should sustain its democratic values and address human rights concerns and, on these issues, as a democracy, India has a broader role than China in Sri Lanka.

Read other blogs in the Sambandh Scholars Speak series here.

About the Expert:

Asanga is an International Security and Geopolitics Analyst and Strategic Advisor from Sri Lanka. He has led two government think tanks providing strategic advocacy on Foreign Policy and Defence in Sri Lanka. Asanga is the Senior Advisor for security and geopolitics to the Leader of the Opposition in the Sri Lankan Parliament. He was the Founding Director-General of the National Security Think Tank under the Ministry of Defence (INSSSL) until January 2020. Before this, he has served as the Executive Director at the Foreign Policy think tank (Kadirgamar Institute LKIIRSS). He was the Advisor to Minister of External Affairs from 2011-2015. His new book on Sri Lanka’s geopolitical challenges, Conundrum of an Island (2021), was published by World Scientific, Singapore). It was endorsed by Walter Russell Mead as a “useful text to understand emerging dynamics of the Indo-Pacific”. Asanga is the author of ‘Sri Lanka at Crossroads’ (2019) and ‘Towards A Better World Order’ (2015). He is a keen commentator on geopolitics, intranational relations and South Asian security matters and has written extensively and published in international journals and think tanks.

He served as a Visiting Professor for Geopolitics and Global Leadership (NKU, USA), Visiting Lecturer for International Security (Colombo University, Sri Lanka), International Political Economy (University of London in Colombo RIC).

Email: asangaaa@gmail.com Twitter: @AsangaAbey