The Indian Ocean and Sri Lanka’s Emerging Maritime Identity
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Sambandh Scholars Speak, part of the Sambandh: Regional Connectivity Initiative, is a series of blog posts that feature evidence-based research on South Asia with a focus on regional studies and cross-border connectivity. The series engages with authors of recent books, articles, and reports on India and its neighbouring countries. This series is edited by Nitika Nayar, Research Analyst at Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP). All content reflects the individual views of the authors. The Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) does not hold an institutional view on any subject.
In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Saneet Chakradeo interviews Chulanee Attanayake, Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, on her edited volume, Maritime Sri Lanka: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, published by World Scientific in January 2021.
Historically, the Indian Ocean has been a uniquely strategic and important region in world politics. Studies have shown how the region has been integrated through trade and culture, while also being central to India’s security interests.
In recent times, in the backdrop of great power competition, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is gaining particular attention as the new “pivot” of world politics. How do littoral states in IOR look at this struggle playing out on their turf? What role do they see for themselves going ahead?
Located at the centre of this geography, Sri Lanka is an ideal case to study this dynamic. Despite being central to the country’s strategic narratives historically, the Indian Ocean has lost its importance within Sri Lanka’s broader external outlook in recent times due to domestic and regional circumstances. However, after the end of the civil war in 2009, there has once again been a clear push towards integrating greater maritime sensitivities in the country’s outward strategy. Attanayake’s edited volume compiles scholarly assessments of the questions posed to Sri Lanka in this new era of competition.
With sections exploring historical perspectives on Sri Lanka’s place in IOR, its economic and security considerations, and external perceptions of the region, the volume covers a wide range of issues that define the key geopolitical challenges faced by the country today. Attanayake’s own chapter focuses on the features of Sri Lanka’s non-aligned strategy over the years, and the country’s multipronged approach to secure its interests.
Saneet Chakradeo: You note that after the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka has been trying to construct an “Indian Ocean identity” alongside its “South Asian identity”, to rebrand itself as a maritime nation (p. 302). Is this pivot towards establishing a dual identity the right approach to diversify Sri Lanka’s interests in the region?
Chulanee Attanayake: Yes. Let me explain why.
First and foremost, Sri Lanka always had a maritime identity due to its geographical positioning. As an island nation, its connectivity with the rest of the world and its outside engagements have been through the Indian Ocean, which has always been integral to every aspect of Sri Lanka’s economic, political, and social life. And Sri Lanka has used this identity to its advantage. Even in its initial years post-independence, Sri Lanka’s Indian Ocean identity was an integral part of its strategic, security, and political narrative.
With the emergence of the long drawn out domestic conflict during …….[the Sri Lankan civil war], the Indian Ocean faded away from Sri Lanka’s narrative and its South Asian identity became stronger.
With the emergence of the long drawn out domestic conflict during …….[the Sri Lankan civil war], the Indian Ocean faded away from Sri Lanka’s narrative and its South Asian identity became stronger. This could also be a reflection of other changes in the region. With the emergence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a regional mechanism for connectivity, and with India’s [increased] engagement in Sri Lanka’s domestic political affairs, Sri Lanka’s South Asian identity took priority in policy making. For so many years, Sri Lanka was recognized as a conflict-prone country in the region.
Understandably, Sri Lanka wants to change this narrative. So, with the end of the war, successive governments have emphasised reclaiming its Indian Ocean identity. This is also a result of the changing geopolitics in the region. The Indian Ocean is taking centre stage in global affairs. Its sea lanes of communication are becoming the fulcrum of global supply chains. Every country, including India, is looking to expand its connectivity beyond the South Asian subcontinent. In this backdrop, it only makes sense for Sri Lanka to aspire for the same.
This [pivot towards a dual identity] will definitely be advantageous for Sri Lanka due to the opportunities to better connect with the fast-growing Indian subcontinent, and the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, I agree that this is the right approach for the country.
SC: In recent years, increasing Chinese engagement in Sri Lanka has prompted speculation about Colombo aligning with Beijing to nullify India’s strategic influence in the region. However, in your chapter, you state that Sri Lanka is “neither balancing nor bandwagoning with one player or the other” (p. 171). How has Sri Lanka’s “multipronged” approach helped in maintaining its strategic autonomy?
CA: Sri Lanka, in my opinion, has always followed a multipronged approach in dealing with the rest of the world. It has successfully hedged between the West, the East, and India in order to realise its foreign policy ambitions. Speculations of Sri Lanka aligning with Beijing have gained prominence over the past decade due to increased Chinese engagement with the region. However, one must understand the context within which this engagement has happened.
With the end of the war, Sri Lanka required massive funding to accelerate delayed infrastructure development, and to reconstruct conflict affected areas. The government strongly believed that only with the upgrading of infrastructure could fast economic growth be achieved. During this time, however, Sri Lanka’s traditional donors withdrew from funding such infrastructural needs alleging human rights and humanitarian violations.
Instead, many of the multilateral financial institutions did not fund the kind of infrastructure the country required. Incidentally, China gained WTO membership during this period and expanded its outreach to many geographical areas it was not previously active in. China had the financial capability to do that as well. This was also the time when the global financial crisis paralysed economies in the West. So, the West too did not have the interest or the capacity to provide the needed financing. As a result, China saw an opportunity. However, one must note that China’s funding to Sri Lanka is comparatively low compared to other South Asian countries.
Sri Lanka has used India and China’s competition to its advantage by offering competitive projects to the two countries.
China’s entry has been a catalyst for India’s turn towards Sri Lanka. If you look at the statistics on India’s development assistance and investments in Sri Lanka, there is a clear upward trajectory after China increased its engagements. And you will see that Sri Lanka has used India and China’s competition to its advantage by offering competitive projects to the two countries. I have explained this in my book chapter. Another journal article I co-authored recently, titled “Navigating the Sino-Indian power struggle in the Indian Ocean: the case of Sri Lanka” clearly shows this pattern.
It [China’s increased presence] has also helped Sri Lanka to maintain its strategic autonomy as it need not rely on one country over the other to ensure its security objectives and national interests anymore.
SC: You mention how Sri Lanka’s engagement in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Maritime Affairs Cooperation (IOMAC) has allowed Colombo to express its interests and concerns openly (p. 302). Do multilateral platforms provide small countries like Sri Lanka a voice they would otherwise lack in an asymmetric bilateral relationship?
CA: Yes, definitely. Despite realism, in theory, stating that every nation state is equal, in realpolitik, small countries have unique challenges. Due to their limited economic and political power, their ability to challenge a great power is limited. Multilateral platforms, thus, provide small countries with a collective voice. There, they can find partners who share similar interests and concerns and can express their voice as a group.
SC: Southeast Asia has been a prominent battleground of great powers with a tussle between the US and China on their turf being a primary concern for ASEAN member states. For Sri Lanka, what lessons can be drawn from how Southeast Asia has manoeuvred this rivalry?
CA: Southeast Asian countries have been using strategic hedging as a policy option to manoeuvre great power rivalry and realise their interests. In order to successfully make use of strategic hedging, it is important for the country to stay neutral with everyone and make friends with all. This is a lesson Sri Lanka can learn from ASEAN.
In order to successfully make use of strategic hedging, it is important for the country to stay neutral with everyone and make friends with all. This is a lesson Sri Lanka can learn from ASEAN.
SC: Sri Lanka often views Singapore as a model for small countries in terms of achieving the most out of their strategic location and economic performance. Given your familiarity with Singapore, what do you think is the country’s perception of Sri Lanka and its role in the Indian Ocean?
CA: Sri Lanka and Singapore are small states which have been historically connected. They have similar characteristics, including plural and heterogeneous societies. Both are considered small states from a geostrategic perspective and are placed among powerful players, making their strategic and foreign policy challenges similar to each other. However, their post-independence journeys have been unique and the different opportunities and challenges that both countries have experienced have resulted in making them the nation states they are today.
Both Sri Lanka and Singapore view each other as important partners in the Indian Ocean region. Singapore views Sri Lanka as having greater potential in harnessing Blue Ocean opportunities in IOR. Sri Lanka has advanced human development indicators including high literacy rates which has led to skilled labour. Thus, Singapore views Sri Lanka to be a country with an abundance of opportunities.
SC: You have spent a lot of time in China as part of your academic and professional endeavours, and your previous book covers an in-depth review of the Sino-Sri Lankan bilateral relationship. How did your time in China help with your understanding of the country’s international outlook?
CA: I think the more you understand a culture, the easier it is to understand its policies. In a practical context, a state or a government’s behaviour is determined by many aspects, including its historical experiences, cultural beliefs and systems, and its socio-cultural fabric. My stay in China helped me to see China beyond what we read in international media. I got to mingle with the Chinese people and observe their behaviour, expectations, and aspirations. It changed my understanding of China, and it helped me to better understand China’s policies.
The Chinese are proud of their history. They do not want to experience another “century of humiliation”. So, in my understanding, the Chinese people would want to see if they are being accepted and treated as an equal in the international system. Their international outlook reflects this. Their policies are formed by placing China at the centre of the world.
Chinese people aspire for a life that is economically stable and comfortable. They trust their government and the party, and their policies. In this context, the Chinese Communist Party has the responsibility to provide this economic and social development for its people.
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Bio:
Chulanee Attanayake is a Research Fellow at Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore. She obtained her PhD from Central China Normal University in Wuhan, China. Prior to joining ISAS, she served as the Director (Research) of Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka – the national security think-tank under the Ministry of Defence, Sri Lanka. Her research areas include China and South Asia, Politics and Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, and Sri Lanka’s Foreign Relations.
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