The Media in Afghanistan: Local Perceptions of Regional Players
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Sambandh Scholars Speak, part of the Sambandh: Regional Connectivity Initiative, is a series of blog posts that feature evidence-based research on South Asia with a focus on regional studies and cross-border connectivity. The series engages with authors of recent books, articles, and reports on India and its neighbouring countries. This series is edited by Nitika Nayar, Research Analyst at Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP). All content reflects the individual views of the authors. The Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP) does not hold an institutional view on any subject.
In this edition of Sambandh Scholars Speak, Nitika Nayar interviews Hazrat Bahar, on his book chapter, “Image of China in Afghan Media,” published in China and South Asia: Changing Regional Dynamics, Development and Power Play (ed. Rajiv Ranjan and Guo Changgang), Routledge, in 2022.
‘Telling China’s story well’ has become integral to China’s efforts to shape international opinion in support of its global ambitions. There has been a growing body of scholarship in South Asia that examines how China influences local institutions, including the media, to steer domestic narratives in a favourable direction to secure its interests. Much less attention, however, has been paid to how China is reported on and portrayed in these countries. Bahar’s research is a notable exception.
Using a framing conceptual framework to analyse media stories published by mainstream news outlets in Afghanistan, Bahar’s research examines how China is represented by the Afghan media. His findings are based on coverage of China by three news outlets, namely Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN), Hasht e Sobh (HeS), and The Kabul Times (KT), over one year between 2018 and 2019 – a time before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, when the democratic government in power still guaranteed press freedom.
His research finds that over one year, as many as 228 stories mentioned China directly or indirectly, and the tone of a majority of these (128 stories) was favourable, presenting China as “the second-largest economy cooperating with Afghanistan on peace, counterterrorism, trade, investment and infrastructure development” (p. 191). On the other hand, the 20 stories that carried an unfavourable tone mentioned the influence of China over Pakistan and its reluctance to put pressure on the latter to help bring peace and security to Afghanistan.
Notably, none of the unfavourable media stories highlighted significant irritants in the bilateral relationship, including project delays by Chinese state-owned companies in Afghanistan. Instead, these media outlets reflected the state’s official foreign policy on China as a ‘strategic partner’, and, in some cases, even buried reports investigating these delays to avoid any backlash.
As China expands its presence in India’s immediate neighbourhood across a range of new sectors, media is an important tool for policymakers to gauge how these countries perceive and respond to this new influence, and, moreover, how China leverages these local institutions to further its objectives in the region.
Nitika Nayar: In your research, you find that China has established working relations with media practitioners in Afghanistan since 2001. In return, how have local journalists, including the newspaper editors and owners you interviewed, responded to these efforts and come to perceive China in their personal capacity?
Hazrat Bahar: China, compared to other great powers, has maintained a lower profile in Afghanistan. Although China had affirmed the US invasion, it did not contribute militarily and financially. However, this does not mean that it did nothing. China was interested in the natural resources of Afghanistan, which it has also invested in, but it became hesitant when the security situation started worsening. For example, the Mes Aynak mine extraction project worth $ 2.9 billion awarded to two Chinese state-owned companies in 2008 has been delayed due to contractual disputes and security concerns. It maintained state-level engagement with the Afghan government while establishing relations with the Taliban, who were invited to Beijing in 2016 and 2021 to encourage them to start negotiations for a political settlement. This view of China playing a ‘not very active’ role was prevalent in Afghanistan. Local journalists were no exception. They perceived China as a neutral player when it came to Afghanistan, although China did share concerns about the long-term military existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan.
[Local journalists] perceived China as a neutral player when it came to Afghanistan.
China invited and provided training to some journalists in Beijing; thus, they established a friendly relationship. Apart from that, some media outlets received financial support for producing and broadcasting media content, including Chinese language lessons, for example, Kabul News and Spogmai Radio. However, some journalists expected China to do more, particularly in forcing Pakistan to play a serious and realistic role in peace talks between the Taliban and Afghan government.
NN: Your chapter looks at coverage of China by mainstream news outlets that are predominantly located in Kabul and publish in the English language. How do the more provincial news outlets, including the vernacular press as well as other media forms (such as radio and television), cover China? How is their impact on shaping local perceptions and public opinion different from the mainstream outlets covered in your study?
HB: Local media, mainly radios, provide a great chunk of content to the local and rural population. And more than 70 percent of Afghans live in remote and rural areas. Since local media do not have much resources to produce media content, they were reliant on news produced by mainstream media. Most often, they copied and paraphrased such content. In other words, the coverage of mainstream and local media wasn’t very different from one another. When it comes to the impact of media, surveys show that a great number of people in Afghanistan receive news information through multiple media channels. Based on media effects theories, we can conclude that people exposed to media are impacted by its coverage. I should be cautious in generalizing what our study found; however, it can be stated that people (urban and rural) are impacted and such impact may not be very different at the central and provincial levels.
NN: Your study looks at news coverage between 2018 and 2019 and finds that the media reflected the Afghan state’s official policy on China during this time. Since the Taliban established an interim government in Kabul, the media landscape in Afghanistan has been increasingly regulated. How has coverage of China and also India and other regional players changed since?
HB: I have recently conducted 25 in-depth interviews with journalists who are in Afghanistan. Apart from that, I have also monitored and analysed news on prominent mainstream media. Findings show that freedom of media has been noticeably impacted following the collapse of the previous government in mid-August 2021, and critical reporting has been confined only to the involvement of the international community, or precisely, to NATO. The Taliban government has been imposing and implementing its new policy on media, and this has been more visible in local media compared to media in Kabul. Free media have been severely affected, however, media in Kabul are still in a better position compared to those in the provinces. Media practitioners have been warned and arrested for broadcasting sheer music let alone critically reporting current affairs in provinces, I have been told by multiple media owners. Local media don’t risk or can’t dare to question any wrongdoings of the Taliban government.
Findings show that freedom of media has been noticeably impacted following the collapse of the previous government in mid-August 2021, and critical reporting has been confined only to the involvement of the international community, or precisely, to NATO.
Regional players need to be differentiated. For example, China was and still is considered somehow a neutral player, India as pro-Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (the erstwhile civilian government in Afghanistan led by President Ashraf Ghani prior to the current interim government under the Taliban) although it has started normalizing its relationship with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) under the Taliban, and Pakistan was and is pro-IEA. A great number of people, mainly supporters and sympathizers of the previous government, are sensitive about media reports focusing on or portraying Pakistan favorably. The media understand this point and are cautiously covering such issues; the official stance of the Taliban is different. To obtain political recognition, the Taliban are trying to establish relations with the international community including China and India. Since China had already established relations, though at a low level, with the Taliban, and given the current involvement of China and the Taliban, media coverage of China has been favourable. Criticism by China of the United States’ role in Afghanistan has been enthusiastically reported in Afghanistan. When it comes to India, my research finds no unfavourable coverage.
Reports of India providing wheat, extending assistance to earthquake-hit areas, reopening its embassy in Kabul, and the return of security cadres who finished their training in India have been positively reported [by the Afghan media].
In addition, reports of India providing wheat, extending assistance to earthquake-hit areas, reopening its embassy in Kabul, and the return of security cadres who finished their training in India have been positively reported. This is despite the fact that India and the Taliban had tense relations in the past. However, it seems the nature of their relations has been softening and changing, which surely affects media coverage as well.
NN: Your article focuses on how China is represented in Afghan media and news coverage. Given your time spent in Shanghai as a scholar, how has Afghanistan been portrayed by the Chinese media in return?
HB: Generally speaking, as per my observation, I did not notice extensive coverage and representation of Afghanistan particularly between 2018 to 2020. However, Afghanistan was mostly portrayed in context of issues concerning the United States, war, narcotics, natural resources, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese media, in line with the country’s foreign policy, expressed that Afghanistan had been invaded; that the NATO involvement should have had a clear timeline; and that as neighbouring countries, the two could co-exist peacefully; Afghanistan has the potential to attract foreign investment only after its security is guaranteed. Chinese media, as always, strictly follow their state’s narrative and foreign policy.
About the author:
Hazrat Bahar is a Faculty Member in the School of Journalism at Shaikh Zayed University, Afghanistan, and Postdoctoral Fellow at Leipzig University, Germany. He has received a Ph.D. in Media and Communication from Shanghai University, China, and M.A. in International Relations from International University of Japan, Japan. His interests include the effects of social media, media in Afghanistan, and political communication.
E-Mail ID: bahar@iuj.ac.jp
Twitter: @hazratbahar
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