India’s Failure to Help Afghan Friends is a Strategic Liability

In March 1990, an Indian Air Force IL-76 took off from Trincomalee, in eastern Sri Lanka, en route to Mauritius. On board was Tamil leader V Perumal, the Northeast provincial council’s chief minister, along with his family and some 200 supporters, among India’s closest allies on the island.

Perumal’s organisation, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front, had paid a bloody price for standing by India’s peacekeeping mission. So when India withdrew in defeat, it evacuated him as well as well as thousands of other threatened Sri Lankan Tamils. This was not merely about moral principle, but also out of interest to protect its assets and keep leverage over Sri Lanka.

Now fast forward to the fall of Kabul, in Afghanistan. While India’s intervention was different, the challenge to stand by its Afghan friends is similar. Beyond just evacuating its own citizens and the Afghan Hindu and Sikh minorities, it was heartwarming to hear New Delhi swiftly promise to “stand by” its Afghan partners. However, the hard reality of the past fortnight reflects India’s inability to protect thousands of Afghans who worked with India to fight the Taliban and other terror groups supported by Pakistan.

The Opposition naturally criticised the government’s lack of willingness or ideological bias in keeping Afghans out of India. The truth, however, is more simple and tragic. Translating India’s commitment into practice failed because of the lack of preparation and systems, including a much-needed asylum policy.

The hurried announcement of emergency visas, for example, has still not been properly implemented, mostly due to bureaucratic frictions. Only a few dozen Afghans have been evacuated so far. It may be soothing to hear that Afghans prefer to go to North America or Europe, but the sad reality is that many gave up on waiting for an Indian emergency visa that never came.

In the absence of clear asylum and other guidelines during a crisis, ambiguity quickly turns into bureaucratic inertia and political discretion. The most glaring case came when India deported Afghan parliamentarian Rangina Kargar, after letting her wait for three hours at New Delhi airport. The fact that the government recognised the error and apologised to her only attests to the glaring shortcomings.

The Afghan crisis reflects the absence of systems and capability to protect India’s local partners in active conflict zones. More than a moral issue, this failure is also a strategic liability.

First, in the short-term, many hundreds of these Afghans may be in possession of sensitive information about India, starting with officers who trained at Indian military institutions or worked with Indian authorities. Such people are likely to be the first to be interrogated or targeted, whether by the Taliban or other terror groups working closely with Pakistan. They are now under threat of being used and abused to turn against India.

Second, in the long-term, by letting these Afghans down, what guarantee is India giving to other Afghans, in case India re-engages in the future? And what signal is New Delhi giving to potential partners in other conflict zones where India is engaged today and tomorrow? These people have alternatives and may think twice before working with India. This will cost India’s soft power and capability to operate in other countries.

In Afghanistan, India chose a clear side and invested over a billion dollars to build a more inclusive, developed and democratic State that would be supportive of India’s regional interests. None of this would have been possible without Afghan partners. From Kabul to Kandahar, India deployed paramilitary forces that relied on locals for support and security.

It’s a country where India ran five diplomatic missions that were bombed, killing not only Indian officials but also many Afghan staffers. India trained thousands of Afghan military and other officials to fight the Taliban and other Pakistan-backed terror organisations seeking to attack India. Afghan journalists, politicians and young leaders were supported by India to build a free media and vibrant women’s and minority movements.

Nobody expects India to evacuate all of its Afghan partners. Nor do we know, yet, what India is doing behind the scenes for its political allies. But when even South Korea is able to evacuate hundreds of its Afghan partners, it shows that India must find ways to do better. That the United States and others largely failed to do this does not serve as an excuse for India’s own shortcomings. Relying on hopeful backchannels with the Taliban, waiting and watching to see whether it turns out more or less vicious and violent, is not a solution.

Supporting Afghan friends, who stood by India through thick and thin, would have meant implementing a system to register local partners and establishing priority lists. It would have meant an emergency visa system in place before the crisis erupted. It would have meant pre-designated safe havens for assembly, local funds and maybe also forces for extrication. It would have meant not letting thousands of Afghan passports be at risk of being stolen at some outsourcing centre while the embassy evacuated. Finally, it would also have meant resources to host and support Afghan partners to settle in India or relocate elsewhere.

The government will have to work more on all this before the next crisis erupts in the neighbourhood. Political commitment and bureaucratic notifications are no substitute for preparation, training and resources. For a regional power with global ambitions, India must ensure it has the capabilities to respond first and bring its allies to safety.