Should India Keep Quad Out of the Neighbourhood?

New Delhi is seen as part of the Quad and “non-China” camp. These perceptions have policy consequences and a negative impact on Indian interests in the region.

Imagine it’s 2016 and India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh has publicly warned Dhaka that joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can cause “substantial damage” to bilateral relations. And Bangladeshi analysts start defending India, while asking Dhaka to appease Delhi by staying away from the BRI.

Now fast-forward to reality in May 2021, replace India with China, the BRI with the Quad, and you have the latest example of China’s growing pressure on Bangladesh. Chinese ambassador Li Jiming’s statements have been crystal clear: If Bangladesh gets anywhere close to the Quad, it will face Beijing’s wrath. There was an official pushback, but popular Bangladeshi responses to the incident reflect how the BRI and Quad are frequently equated and portrayed in contrasting light: The former as a benign economic initiative and the latter as a defensive military alliance.

This is also a popular perception among India’s other neighbours. Whether in Nepal, Sri Lanka or the Maldives, China’s BRI projects are welcome as a wonderful “win-win” development opportunity, even while India’s initiatives face opposition and suspicion of seeking to curtail strategic autonomy.

China has leveraged BRI investments for political and security influence, but host countries are often willing to tolerate this “dual use” risk as long as the money keeps flowing in. The Quad, on the other hand, has so far mainly focused on military cooperation, which is unappealing to countries seeking to modernise their economies and to engage more, not less with China.

The first-ever Quad summit finally addressed this problem by “civilianising” the platform with new initiatives on vaccine diplomacy, critical supply chains and infrastructure financing. But from the perspective of Kathmandu, Dhaka or Colombo, the Quad is still predominantly seen as a military coalition to contain, isolate, or weaken China. In 2018, for example, Nepal dropped out of an India-hosted BIMSTEC military exercise after the regional organisation was portrayed as a security alliance against China. Similarly, Nepal’s ruling Communist coalition stalled a United States-financed project for Nepal-India power transmission for allegedly being part of plot to lure the country into an Indo-Pacific alliance against China.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka approved China’s investment in Colombo’s Port City on a 99-year lease even while it scuttled a similar Japan-India bid for a container terminal for allegedly curtailing the island’s sovereignty. Sri Lanka’s predominant view is that India’s regional policies are now subsidiary to the Quad or Indo-Pacific strategies.

India has good reasons to argue that most of these perceptions are baseless and that its regional approach is separate from its Quad engagement. It can also point out that the Quad activities have often benefitted its neighbours, allowing them to keep a strategic balance and increase their bargaining power with China. But across the neighbourhood the hard reality is that India is seen as part of the Quad and “non-China” camp. These perceptions have policy consequences and a negative impact on Indian interests in the region.

Quad+ in South Asia

India can play safe, stick to the status quo and just keep the Quad out of the neighbourhood. It can continue to silently work with its three partners to exchange assessments and coordinate policies in the background. But this would reflect a weak India at the global stage, held hostage to the veto of its smaller neighbours, unable to overcome their sensitivities and counter China’s growing inroads. As the Bangladesh incident shows, it is also difficult and maybe even useless for India to keep the Quad behind the scenes. India can’t join a Quad naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal and then hope or pretend that this will not affect its relations with Dhaka or Colombo. On the other hand, engaging the Quad as it exists can be problematic: It’s still predominant security profile would activate neighbour’s sensitivities, fuel domestic opposition, and allow China to play the “Asian NATO” tune.

So how can India overcome this Quad dilemma in South Asia? To bring the Quad out of the closet in the neighbourhood, India should maximise its civilian dimension. By staying away from military issues, India could take the lead to develop Quad initiatives that offer concrete developmental alternatives to its neighbours. This also fits with the Quad+ momentum, following last year’s issue-based, flexible dialogues with Vietnam, South Korea and New Zealand, and possibly also a future place for France, the European Union or Indonesia. To start with, India will have to send a clear political signal that it is comfortable with the Quad in its periphery. This should not shock anyone. Despite mounting concerns about Beijing and the 2018 military standoff in Bhutan, Delhi was still considering Beijing as an economic partner to connect the Northeast. And in Bangladesh, India has joined hands with Russia to build new nuclear power plants.

So why keep the doors closed to the Quad? In 2016, India hosted a BRICS leaders’ meeting with its six BIMSTEC neighbours. Delhi could now facilitate a similar interaction with the Quad and its neighbours, for example, an informal ministerial or senior official meeting on climate at the side-lines of the UN General Assembly or the COP 26 negotiations.

Another “non-sensitive” topic could be to host a conference on the Bay of Bengal’s blue economy, with a new Quad development fund. Health and education are two “soft” areas that are bound to attract countries in the region, and sectors where India, Japan, Australia and the United States have much to offer. The connectivity agenda offers another low hanging fruit. Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are all in dire need of financing to develop multi-modal transportation corridors, fuel exports and reach sustainable development goals. The BRI slowdown after 2019 is leading to a financing gap, opening a window of opportunity for the Quad to deliver alternatives focused on quality and sustainable infrastructure. Coordinating such connectivity initiatives with ASEAN or the European Union would further emphasize the Quad’s new civilian and economic avatar.

Finally, India can also bring the Quad into the neighbourhood for democratic capacity building. Building on India’s formidable record of development partnerships, the four countries could coordinate to offer technical assistance and governance training for government officials and other civil society stakeholders, from a free media to judicial, electoral and parliamentary systems that sustain the rule of law. This will be the best way to ensure that South Asia remains part of a free and open Indo-Pacific, in line with Indian interests.